File-copy from v4.4.100
This is the result of 'cp' from a linux-stable tree with the 'v4.4.100'
tag checked out (commit 26d6298789e695c9f627ce49a7bbd2286405798a) on
git://git.kernel.org/pub/scm/linux/kernel/git/stable/linux.git
Please refer to that tree for all history prior to this point.
Change-Id: I8a9ee2aea93cd29c52c847d0ce33091a73ae6afe
diff --git a/security/smack/Kconfig b/security/smack/Kconfig
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..271adae
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/smack/Kconfig
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+config SECURITY_SMACK
+ bool "Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel Support"
+ depends on NET
+ depends on INET
+ depends on SECURITY
+ select NETLABEL
+ select SECURITY_NETWORK
+ default n
+ help
+ This selects the Simplified Mandatory Access Control Kernel.
+ Smack is useful for sensitivity, integrity, and a variety
+ of other mandatory security schemes.
+ If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
+
+config SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
+ bool "Reporting on access granted by Smack rules"
+ depends on SECURITY_SMACK
+ default n
+ help
+ Enable the bring-up ("b") access mode in Smack rules.
+ When access is granted by a rule with the "b" mode a
+ message about the access requested is generated. The
+ intention is that a process can be granted a wide set
+ of access initially with the bringup mode set on the
+ rules. The developer can use the information to
+ identify which rules are necessary and what accesses
+ may be inappropriate. The developer can reduce the
+ access rule set once the behavior is well understood.
+ This is a superior mechanism to the oft abused
+ "permissive" mode of other systems.
+ If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
+
+config SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER
+ bool "Packet marking using secmarks for netfilter"
+ depends on SECURITY_SMACK
+ depends on NETWORK_SECMARK
+ depends on NETFILTER
+ default n
+ help
+ This enables security marking of network packets using
+ Smack labels.
+ If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N.
diff --git a/security/smack/Makefile b/security/smack/Makefile
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..ee2ebd5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/smack/Makefile
@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+#
+# Makefile for the SMACK LSM
+#
+
+obj-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK) := smack.o
+
+smack-y := smack_lsm.o smack_access.o smackfs.o
+smack-$(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER) += smack_netfilter.o
diff --git a/security/smack/smack.h b/security/smack/smack.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..6c91156
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/smack/smack.h
@@ -0,0 +1,485 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2007 Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation, version 2.
+ *
+ * Author:
+ * Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
+ *
+ */
+
+#ifndef _SECURITY_SMACK_H
+#define _SECURITY_SMACK_H
+
+#include <linux/capability.h>
+#include <linux/spinlock.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_hooks.h>
+#include <linux/in.h>
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+#include <linux/in6.h>
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
+#include <net/netlabel.h>
+#include <linux/list.h>
+#include <linux/rculist.h>
+#include <linux/lsm_audit.h>
+
+/*
+ * Use IPv6 port labeling if IPv6 is enabled and secmarks
+ * are not being used.
+ */
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) && !defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER)
+#define SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING 1
+#endif
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6) && defined(CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER)
+#define SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING 1
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Smack labels were limited to 23 characters for a long time.
+ */
+#define SMK_LABELLEN 24
+#define SMK_LONGLABEL 256
+
+/*
+ * This is the repository for labels seen so that it is
+ * not necessary to keep allocating tiny chuncks of memory
+ * and so that they can be shared.
+ *
+ * Labels are never modified in place. Anytime a label
+ * is imported (e.g. xattrset on a file) the list is checked
+ * for it and it is added if it doesn't exist. The address
+ * is passed out in either case. Entries are added, but
+ * never deleted.
+ *
+ * Since labels are hanging around anyway it doesn't
+ * hurt to maintain a secid for those awkward situations
+ * where kernel components that ought to use LSM independent
+ * interfaces don't. The secid should go away when all of
+ * these components have been repaired.
+ *
+ * The cipso value associated with the label gets stored here, too.
+ *
+ * Keep the access rules for this subject label here so that
+ * the entire set of rules does not need to be examined every
+ * time.
+ */
+struct smack_known {
+ struct list_head list;
+ struct hlist_node smk_hashed;
+ char *smk_known;
+ u32 smk_secid;
+ struct netlbl_lsm_secattr smk_netlabel; /* on wire labels */
+ struct list_head smk_rules; /* access rules */
+ struct mutex smk_rules_lock; /* lock for rules */
+};
+
+/*
+ * Maximum number of bytes for the levels in a CIPSO IP option.
+ * Why 23? CIPSO is constrained to 30, so a 32 byte buffer is
+ * bigger than can be used, and 24 is the next lower multiple
+ * of 8, and there are too many issues if there isn't space set
+ * aside for the terminating null byte.
+ */
+#define SMK_CIPSOLEN 24
+
+struct superblock_smack {
+ struct smack_known *smk_root;
+ struct smack_known *smk_floor;
+ struct smack_known *smk_hat;
+ struct smack_known *smk_default;
+ int smk_initialized;
+};
+
+struct socket_smack {
+ struct smack_known *smk_out; /* outbound label */
+ struct smack_known *smk_in; /* inbound label */
+ struct smack_known *smk_packet; /* TCP peer label */
+};
+
+/*
+ * Inode smack data
+ */
+struct inode_smack {
+ struct smack_known *smk_inode; /* label of the fso */
+ struct smack_known *smk_task; /* label of the task */
+ struct smack_known *smk_mmap; /* label of the mmap domain */
+ struct mutex smk_lock; /* initialization lock */
+ int smk_flags; /* smack inode flags */
+};
+
+struct task_smack {
+ struct smack_known *smk_task; /* label for access control */
+ struct smack_known *smk_forked; /* label when forked */
+ struct list_head smk_rules; /* per task access rules */
+ struct mutex smk_rules_lock; /* lock for the rules */
+ struct list_head smk_relabel; /* transit allowed labels */
+};
+
+#define SMK_INODE_INSTANT 0x01 /* inode is instantiated */
+#define SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE 0x02 /* directory is transmuting */
+#define SMK_INODE_CHANGED 0x04 /* smack was transmuted */
+#define SMK_INODE_IMPURE 0x08 /* involved in an impure transaction */
+
+/*
+ * A label access rule.
+ */
+struct smack_rule {
+ struct list_head list;
+ struct smack_known *smk_subject;
+ struct smack_known *smk_object;
+ int smk_access;
+};
+
+/*
+ * An entry in the table identifying IPv4 hosts.
+ */
+struct smk_net4addr {
+ struct list_head list;
+ struct in_addr smk_host; /* network address */
+ struct in_addr smk_mask; /* network mask */
+ int smk_masks; /* mask size */
+ struct smack_known *smk_label; /* label */
+};
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+/*
+ * An entry in the table identifying IPv6 hosts.
+ */
+struct smk_net6addr {
+ struct list_head list;
+ struct in6_addr smk_host; /* network address */
+ struct in6_addr smk_mask; /* network mask */
+ int smk_masks; /* mask size */
+ struct smack_known *smk_label; /* label */
+};
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
+
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
+/*
+ * An entry in the table identifying ports.
+ */
+struct smk_port_label {
+ struct list_head list;
+ struct sock *smk_sock; /* socket initialized on */
+ unsigned short smk_port; /* the port number */
+ struct smack_known *smk_in; /* inbound label */
+ struct smack_known *smk_out; /* outgoing label */
+};
+#endif /* SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING */
+
+struct smack_known_list_elem {
+ struct list_head list;
+ struct smack_known *smk_label;
+};
+
+/* Super block security struct flags for mount options */
+#define FSDEFAULT_MNT 0x01
+#define FSFLOOR_MNT 0x02
+#define FSHAT_MNT 0x04
+#define FSROOT_MNT 0x08
+#define FSTRANS_MNT 0x10
+
+#define NUM_SMK_MNT_OPTS 5
+
+enum {
+ Opt_error = -1,
+ Opt_fsdefault = 1,
+ Opt_fsfloor = 2,
+ Opt_fshat = 3,
+ Opt_fsroot = 4,
+ Opt_fstransmute = 5,
+};
+
+/*
+ * Mount options
+ */
+#define SMK_FSDEFAULT "smackfsdef="
+#define SMK_FSFLOOR "smackfsfloor="
+#define SMK_FSHAT "smackfshat="
+#define SMK_FSROOT "smackfsroot="
+#define SMK_FSTRANS "smackfstransmute="
+
+#define SMACK_DELETE_OPTION "-DELETE"
+#define SMACK_CIPSO_OPTION "-CIPSO"
+
+/*
+ * How communications on this socket are treated.
+ * Usually it's determined by the underlying netlabel code
+ * but there are certain cases, including single label hosts
+ * and potentially single label interfaces for which the
+ * treatment can not be known in advance.
+ *
+ * The possibility of additional labeling schemes being
+ * introduced in the future exists as well.
+ */
+#define SMACK_UNLABELED_SOCKET 0
+#define SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET 1
+
+/*
+ * CIPSO defaults.
+ */
+#define SMACK_CIPSO_DOI_DEFAULT 3 /* Historical */
+#define SMACK_CIPSO_DOI_INVALID -1 /* Not a DOI */
+#define SMACK_CIPSO_DIRECT_DEFAULT 250 /* Arbitrary */
+#define SMACK_CIPSO_MAPPED_DEFAULT 251 /* Also arbitrary */
+#define SMACK_CIPSO_MAXLEVEL 255 /* CIPSO 2.2 standard */
+/*
+ * CIPSO 2.2 standard is 239, but Smack wants to use the
+ * categories in a structured way that limits the value to
+ * the bits in 23 bytes, hence the unusual number.
+ */
+#define SMACK_CIPSO_MAXCATNUM 184 /* 23 * 8 */
+
+/*
+ * Ptrace rules
+ */
+#define SMACK_PTRACE_DEFAULT 0
+#define SMACK_PTRACE_EXACT 1
+#define SMACK_PTRACE_DRACONIAN 2
+#define SMACK_PTRACE_MAX SMACK_PTRACE_DRACONIAN
+
+/*
+ * Flags for untraditional access modes.
+ * It shouldn't be necessary to avoid conflicts with definitions
+ * in fs.h, but do so anyway.
+ */
+#define MAY_TRANSMUTE 0x00001000 /* Controls directory labeling */
+#define MAY_LOCK 0x00002000 /* Locks should be writes, but ... */
+#define MAY_BRINGUP 0x00004000 /* Report use of this rule */
+
+#define SMACK_BRINGUP_ALLOW 1 /* Allow bringup mode */
+#define SMACK_UNCONFINED_SUBJECT 2 /* Allow unconfined label */
+#define SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT 3 /* Allow unconfined label */
+
+/*
+ * Just to make the common cases easier to deal with
+ */
+#define MAY_ANYREAD (MAY_READ | MAY_EXEC)
+#define MAY_READWRITE (MAY_READ | MAY_WRITE)
+#define MAY_NOT 0
+
+/*
+ * Number of access types used by Smack (rwxatlb)
+ */
+#define SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE 7
+
+/* SMACK data */
+struct smack_audit_data {
+ const char *function;
+ char *subject;
+ char *object;
+ char *request;
+ int result;
+};
+
+/*
+ * Smack audit data; is empty if CONFIG_AUDIT not set
+ * to save some stack
+ */
+struct smk_audit_info {
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+ struct common_audit_data a;
+ struct smack_audit_data sad;
+#endif
+};
+
+/*
+ * These functions are in smack_access.c
+ */
+int smk_access_entry(char *, char *, struct list_head *);
+int smk_access(struct smack_known *, struct smack_known *,
+ int, struct smk_audit_info *);
+int smk_tskacc(struct task_smack *, struct smack_known *,
+ u32, struct smk_audit_info *);
+int smk_curacc(struct smack_known *, u32, struct smk_audit_info *);
+struct smack_known *smack_from_secid(const u32);
+char *smk_parse_smack(const char *string, int len);
+int smk_netlbl_mls(int, char *, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *, int);
+struct smack_known *smk_import_entry(const char *, int);
+void smk_insert_entry(struct smack_known *skp);
+struct smack_known *smk_find_entry(const char *);
+int smack_privileged(int cap);
+void smk_destroy_label_list(struct list_head *list);
+
+/*
+ * Shared data.
+ */
+extern int smack_enabled;
+extern int smack_cipso_direct;
+extern int smack_cipso_mapped;
+extern struct smack_known *smack_net_ambient;
+extern struct smack_known *smack_syslog_label;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
+extern struct smack_known *smack_unconfined;
+#endif
+extern int smack_ptrace_rule;
+
+extern struct smack_known smack_known_floor;
+extern struct smack_known smack_known_hat;
+extern struct smack_known smack_known_huh;
+extern struct smack_known smack_known_invalid;
+extern struct smack_known smack_known_star;
+extern struct smack_known smack_known_web;
+
+extern struct mutex smack_known_lock;
+extern struct list_head smack_known_list;
+extern struct list_head smk_net4addr_list;
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+extern struct list_head smk_net6addr_list;
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
+
+extern struct mutex smack_onlycap_lock;
+extern struct list_head smack_onlycap_list;
+
+#define SMACK_HASH_SLOTS 16
+extern struct hlist_head smack_known_hash[SMACK_HASH_SLOTS];
+
+/*
+ * Is the directory transmuting?
+ */
+static inline int smk_inode_transmutable(const struct inode *isp)
+{
+ struct inode_smack *sip = isp->i_security;
+ return (sip->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE) != 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Present a pointer to the smack label entry in an inode blob.
+ */
+static inline struct smack_known *smk_of_inode(const struct inode *isp)
+{
+ struct inode_smack *sip = isp->i_security;
+ return sip->smk_inode;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Present a pointer to the smack label entry in an task blob.
+ */
+static inline struct smack_known *smk_of_task(const struct task_smack *tsp)
+{
+ return tsp->smk_task;
+}
+
+static inline struct smack_known *smk_of_task_struct(const struct task_struct *t)
+{
+ struct smack_known *skp;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ skp = smk_of_task(__task_cred(t)->security);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return skp;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Present a pointer to the forked smack label entry in an task blob.
+ */
+static inline struct smack_known *smk_of_forked(const struct task_smack *tsp)
+{
+ return tsp->smk_forked;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Present a pointer to the smack label in the current task blob.
+ */
+static inline struct smack_known *smk_of_current(void)
+{
+ return smk_of_task(current_security());
+}
+
+/*
+ * logging functions
+ */
+#define SMACK_AUDIT_DENIED 0x1
+#define SMACK_AUDIT_ACCEPT 0x2
+extern int log_policy;
+
+void smack_log(char *subject_label, char *object_label,
+ int request,
+ int result, struct smk_audit_info *auditdata);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+
+/*
+ * some inline functions to set up audit data
+ * they do nothing if CONFIG_AUDIT is not set
+ *
+ */
+static inline void smk_ad_init(struct smk_audit_info *a, const char *func,
+ char type)
+{
+ memset(&a->sad, 0, sizeof(a->sad));
+ a->a.type = type;
+ a->a.smack_audit_data = &a->sad;
+ a->a.smack_audit_data->function = func;
+}
+
+static inline void smk_ad_init_net(struct smk_audit_info *a, const char *func,
+ char type, struct lsm_network_audit *net)
+{
+ smk_ad_init(a, func, type);
+ memset(net, 0, sizeof(*net));
+ a->a.u.net = net;
+}
+
+static inline void smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(struct smk_audit_info *a,
+ struct task_struct *t)
+{
+ a->a.u.tsk = t;
+}
+static inline void smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(struct smk_audit_info *a,
+ struct dentry *d)
+{
+ a->a.u.dentry = d;
+}
+static inline void smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(struct smk_audit_info *a,
+ struct inode *i)
+{
+ a->a.u.inode = i;
+}
+static inline void smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(struct smk_audit_info *a,
+ struct path p)
+{
+ a->a.u.path = p;
+}
+static inline void smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(struct smk_audit_info *a,
+ struct sock *sk)
+{
+ a->a.u.net->sk = sk;
+}
+
+#else /* no AUDIT */
+
+static inline void smk_ad_init(struct smk_audit_info *a, const char *func,
+ char type)
+{
+}
+static inline void smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(struct smk_audit_info *a,
+ struct task_struct *t)
+{
+}
+static inline void smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(struct smk_audit_info *a,
+ struct dentry *d)
+{
+}
+static inline void smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_mnt(struct smk_audit_info *a,
+ struct vfsmount *m)
+{
+}
+static inline void smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(struct smk_audit_info *a,
+ struct inode *i)
+{
+}
+static inline void smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(struct smk_audit_info *a,
+ struct path p)
+{
+}
+static inline void smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(struct smk_audit_info *a,
+ struct sock *sk)
+{
+}
+#endif
+
+#endif /* _SECURITY_SMACK_H */
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_access.c b/security/smack/smack_access.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a283f9e
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/smack/smack_access.c
@@ -0,0 +1,666 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2007 Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation, version 2.
+ *
+ * Author:
+ * Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <linux/types.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/fs.h>
+#include <linux/sched.h>
+#include "smack.h"
+
+struct smack_known smack_known_huh = {
+ .smk_known = "?",
+ .smk_secid = 2,
+};
+
+struct smack_known smack_known_hat = {
+ .smk_known = "^",
+ .smk_secid = 3,
+};
+
+struct smack_known smack_known_star = {
+ .smk_known = "*",
+ .smk_secid = 4,
+};
+
+struct smack_known smack_known_floor = {
+ .smk_known = "_",
+ .smk_secid = 5,
+};
+
+struct smack_known smack_known_invalid = {
+ .smk_known = "",
+ .smk_secid = 6,
+};
+
+struct smack_known smack_known_web = {
+ .smk_known = "@",
+ .smk_secid = 7,
+};
+
+LIST_HEAD(smack_known_list);
+
+/*
+ * The initial value needs to be bigger than any of the
+ * known values above.
+ */
+static u32 smack_next_secid = 10;
+
+/*
+ * what events do we log
+ * can be overwritten at run-time by /smack/logging
+ */
+int log_policy = SMACK_AUDIT_DENIED;
+
+/**
+ * smk_access_entry - look up matching access rule
+ * @subject_label: a pointer to the subject's Smack label
+ * @object_label: a pointer to the object's Smack label
+ * @rule_list: the list of rules to search
+ *
+ * This function looks up the subject/object pair in the
+ * access rule list and returns the access mode. If no
+ * entry is found returns -ENOENT.
+ *
+ * NOTE:
+ *
+ * Earlier versions of this function allowed for labels that
+ * were not on the label list. This was done to allow for
+ * labels to come over the network that had never been seen
+ * before on this host. Unless the receiving socket has the
+ * star label this will always result in a failure check. The
+ * star labeled socket case is now handled in the networking
+ * hooks so there is no case where the label is not on the
+ * label list. Checking to see if the address of two labels
+ * is the same is now a reliable test.
+ *
+ * Do the object check first because that is more
+ * likely to differ.
+ *
+ * Allowing write access implies allowing locking.
+ */
+int smk_access_entry(char *subject_label, char *object_label,
+ struct list_head *rule_list)
+{
+ int may = -ENOENT;
+ struct smack_rule *srp;
+
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(srp, rule_list, list) {
+ if (srp->smk_object->smk_known == object_label &&
+ srp->smk_subject->smk_known == subject_label) {
+ may = srp->smk_access;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * MAY_WRITE implies MAY_LOCK.
+ */
+ if ((may & MAY_WRITE) == MAY_WRITE)
+ may |= MAY_LOCK;
+ return may;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_access - determine if a subject has a specific access to an object
+ * @subject: a pointer to the subject's Smack label entry
+ * @object: a pointer to the object's Smack label entry
+ * @request: the access requested, in "MAY" format
+ * @a : a pointer to the audit data
+ *
+ * This function looks up the subject/object pair in the
+ * access rule list and returns 0 if the access is permitted,
+ * non zero otherwise.
+ *
+ * Smack labels are shared on smack_list
+ */
+int smk_access(struct smack_known *subject, struct smack_known *object,
+ int request, struct smk_audit_info *a)
+{
+ int may = MAY_NOT;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Hardcoded comparisons.
+ */
+ /*
+ * A star subject can't access any object.
+ */
+ if (subject == &smack_known_star) {
+ rc = -EACCES;
+ goto out_audit;
+ }
+ /*
+ * An internet object can be accessed by any subject.
+ * Tasks cannot be assigned the internet label.
+ * An internet subject can access any object.
+ */
+ if (object == &smack_known_web || subject == &smack_known_web)
+ goto out_audit;
+ /*
+ * A star object can be accessed by any subject.
+ */
+ if (object == &smack_known_star)
+ goto out_audit;
+ /*
+ * An object can be accessed in any way by a subject
+ * with the same label.
+ */
+ if (subject->smk_known == object->smk_known)
+ goto out_audit;
+ /*
+ * A hat subject can read or lock any object.
+ * A floor object can be read or locked by any subject.
+ */
+ if ((request & MAY_ANYREAD) == request ||
+ (request & MAY_LOCK) == request) {
+ if (object == &smack_known_floor)
+ goto out_audit;
+ if (subject == &smack_known_hat)
+ goto out_audit;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Beyond here an explicit relationship is required.
+ * If the requested access is contained in the available
+ * access (e.g. read is included in readwrite) it's
+ * good. A negative response from smk_access_entry()
+ * indicates there is no entry for this pair.
+ */
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ may = smk_access_entry(subject->smk_known, object->smk_known,
+ &subject->smk_rules);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ if (may <= 0 || (request & may) != request) {
+ rc = -EACCES;
+ goto out_audit;
+ }
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
+ /*
+ * Return a positive value if using bringup mode.
+ * This allows the hooks to identify checks that
+ * succeed because of "b" rules.
+ */
+ if (may & MAY_BRINGUP)
+ rc = SMACK_BRINGUP_ALLOW;
+#endif
+
+out_audit:
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ if (object == smack_unconfined)
+ rc = SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT;
+ if (subject == smack_unconfined)
+ rc = SMACK_UNCONFINED_SUBJECT;
+ }
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+ if (a)
+ smack_log(subject->smk_known, object->smk_known,
+ request, rc, a);
+#endif
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_tskacc - determine if a task has a specific access to an object
+ * @tsp: a pointer to the subject's task
+ * @obj_known: a pointer to the object's label entry
+ * @mode: the access requested, in "MAY" format
+ * @a : common audit data
+ *
+ * This function checks the subject task's label/object label pair
+ * in the access rule list and returns 0 if the access is permitted,
+ * non zero otherwise. It allows that the task may have the capability
+ * to override the rules.
+ */
+int smk_tskacc(struct task_smack *tsp, struct smack_known *obj_known,
+ u32 mode, struct smk_audit_info *a)
+{
+ struct smack_known *sbj_known = smk_of_task(tsp);
+ int may;
+ int rc;
+
+ /*
+ * Check the global rule list
+ */
+ rc = smk_access(sbj_known, obj_known, mode, NULL);
+ if (rc >= 0) {
+ /*
+ * If there is an entry in the task's rule list
+ * it can further restrict access.
+ */
+ may = smk_access_entry(sbj_known->smk_known,
+ obj_known->smk_known,
+ &tsp->smk_rules);
+ if (may < 0)
+ goto out_audit;
+ if ((mode & may) == mode)
+ goto out_audit;
+ rc = -EACCES;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Allow for priviliged to override policy.
+ */
+ if (rc != 0 && smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
+ rc = 0;
+
+out_audit:
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+ if (a)
+ smack_log(sbj_known->smk_known, obj_known->smk_known,
+ mode, rc, a);
+#endif
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_curacc - determine if current has a specific access to an object
+ * @obj_known: a pointer to the object's Smack label entry
+ * @mode: the access requested, in "MAY" format
+ * @a : common audit data
+ *
+ * This function checks the current subject label/object label pair
+ * in the access rule list and returns 0 if the access is permitted,
+ * non zero otherwise. It allows that current may have the capability
+ * to override the rules.
+ */
+int smk_curacc(struct smack_known *obj_known,
+ u32 mode, struct smk_audit_info *a)
+{
+ struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
+
+ return smk_tskacc(tsp, obj_known, mode, a);
+}
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+/**
+ * smack_str_from_perm : helper to transalate an int to a
+ * readable string
+ * @string : the string to fill
+ * @access : the int
+ *
+ */
+static inline void smack_str_from_perm(char *string, int access)
+{
+ int i = 0;
+
+ if (access & MAY_READ)
+ string[i++] = 'r';
+ if (access & MAY_WRITE)
+ string[i++] = 'w';
+ if (access & MAY_EXEC)
+ string[i++] = 'x';
+ if (access & MAY_APPEND)
+ string[i++] = 'a';
+ if (access & MAY_TRANSMUTE)
+ string[i++] = 't';
+ if (access & MAY_LOCK)
+ string[i++] = 'l';
+ string[i] = '\0';
+}
+/**
+ * smack_log_callback - SMACK specific information
+ * will be called by generic audit code
+ * @ab : the audit_buffer
+ * @a : audit_data
+ *
+ */
+static void smack_log_callback(struct audit_buffer *ab, void *a)
+{
+ struct common_audit_data *ad = a;
+ struct smack_audit_data *sad = ad->smack_audit_data;
+ audit_log_format(ab, "lsm=SMACK fn=%s action=%s",
+ ad->smack_audit_data->function,
+ sad->result ? "denied" : "granted");
+ audit_log_format(ab, " subject=");
+ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sad->subject);
+ audit_log_format(ab, " object=");
+ audit_log_untrustedstring(ab, sad->object);
+ if (sad->request[0] == '\0')
+ audit_log_format(ab, " labels_differ");
+ else
+ audit_log_format(ab, " requested=%s", sad->request);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_log - Audit the granting or denial of permissions.
+ * @subject_label : smack label of the requester
+ * @object_label : smack label of the object being accessed
+ * @request: requested permissions
+ * @result: result from smk_access
+ * @a: auxiliary audit data
+ *
+ * Audit the granting or denial of permissions in accordance
+ * with the policy.
+ */
+void smack_log(char *subject_label, char *object_label, int request,
+ int result, struct smk_audit_info *ad)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
+ char request_buffer[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 5];
+#else
+ char request_buffer[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
+#endif
+ struct smack_audit_data *sad;
+ struct common_audit_data *a = &ad->a;
+
+ /* check if we have to log the current event */
+ if (result < 0 && (log_policy & SMACK_AUDIT_DENIED) == 0)
+ return;
+ if (result == 0 && (log_policy & SMACK_AUDIT_ACCEPT) == 0)
+ return;
+
+ sad = a->smack_audit_data;
+
+ if (sad->function == NULL)
+ sad->function = "unknown";
+
+ /* end preparing the audit data */
+ smack_str_from_perm(request_buffer, request);
+ sad->subject = subject_label;
+ sad->object = object_label;
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
+ /*
+ * The result may be positive in bringup mode.
+ * A positive result is an allow, but not for normal reasons.
+ * Mark it as successful, but don't filter it out even if
+ * the logging policy says to do so.
+ */
+ if (result == SMACK_UNCONFINED_SUBJECT)
+ strcat(request_buffer, "(US)");
+ else if (result == SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
+ strcat(request_buffer, "(UO)");
+
+ if (result > 0)
+ result = 0;
+#endif
+ sad->request = request_buffer;
+ sad->result = result;
+
+ common_lsm_audit(a, smack_log_callback, NULL);
+}
+#else /* #ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT */
+void smack_log(char *subject_label, char *object_label, int request,
+ int result, struct smk_audit_info *ad)
+{
+}
+#endif
+
+DEFINE_MUTEX(smack_known_lock);
+
+struct hlist_head smack_known_hash[SMACK_HASH_SLOTS];
+
+/**
+ * smk_insert_entry - insert a smack label into a hash map,
+ *
+ * this function must be called under smack_known_lock
+ */
+void smk_insert_entry(struct smack_known *skp)
+{
+ unsigned int hash;
+ struct hlist_head *head;
+
+ hash = full_name_hash(skp->smk_known, strlen(skp->smk_known));
+ head = &smack_known_hash[hash & (SMACK_HASH_SLOTS - 1)];
+
+ hlist_add_head_rcu(&skp->smk_hashed, head);
+ list_add_rcu(&skp->list, &smack_known_list);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_find_entry - find a label on the list, return the list entry
+ * @string: a text string that might be a Smack label
+ *
+ * Returns a pointer to the entry in the label list that
+ * matches the passed string or NULL if not found.
+ */
+struct smack_known *smk_find_entry(const char *string)
+{
+ unsigned int hash;
+ struct hlist_head *head;
+ struct smack_known *skp;
+
+ hash = full_name_hash(string, strlen(string));
+ head = &smack_known_hash[hash & (SMACK_HASH_SLOTS - 1)];
+
+ hlist_for_each_entry_rcu(skp, head, smk_hashed)
+ if (strcmp(skp->smk_known, string) == 0)
+ return skp;
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_parse_smack - parse smack label from a text string
+ * @string: a text string that might contain a Smack label
+ * @len: the maximum size, or zero if it is NULL terminated.
+ *
+ * Returns a pointer to the clean label or an error code.
+ */
+char *smk_parse_smack(const char *string, int len)
+{
+ char *smack;
+ int i;
+
+ if (len <= 0)
+ len = strlen(string) + 1;
+
+ /*
+ * Reserve a leading '-' as an indicator that
+ * this isn't a label, but an option to interfaces
+ * including /smack/cipso and /smack/cipso2
+ */
+ if (string[0] == '-')
+ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
+ for (i = 0; i < len; i++)
+ if (string[i] > '~' || string[i] <= ' ' || string[i] == '/' ||
+ string[i] == '"' || string[i] == '\\' || string[i] == '\'')
+ break;
+
+ if (i == 0 || i >= SMK_LONGLABEL)
+ return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL);
+
+ smack = kzalloc(i + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (smack == NULL)
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+ strncpy(smack, string, i);
+
+ return smack;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_netlbl_mls - convert a catset to netlabel mls categories
+ * @catset: the Smack categories
+ * @sap: where to put the netlabel categories
+ *
+ * Allocates and fills attr.mls
+ * Returns 0 on success, error code on failure.
+ */
+int smk_netlbl_mls(int level, char *catset, struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *sap,
+ int len)
+{
+ unsigned char *cp;
+ unsigned char m;
+ int cat;
+ int rc;
+ int byte;
+
+ sap->flags |= NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT;
+ sap->attr.mls.lvl = level;
+ sap->attr.mls.cat = NULL;
+
+ for (cat = 1, cp = catset, byte = 0; byte < len; cp++, byte++)
+ for (m = 0x80; m != 0; m >>= 1, cat++) {
+ if ((m & *cp) == 0)
+ continue;
+ rc = netlbl_catmap_setbit(&sap->attr.mls.cat,
+ cat, GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (rc < 0) {
+ netlbl_catmap_free(sap->attr.mls.cat);
+ return rc;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_import_entry - import a label, return the list entry
+ * @string: a text string that might be a Smack label
+ * @len: the maximum size, or zero if it is NULL terminated.
+ *
+ * Returns a pointer to the entry in the label list that
+ * matches the passed string, adding it if necessary,
+ * or an error code.
+ */
+struct smack_known *smk_import_entry(const char *string, int len)
+{
+ struct smack_known *skp;
+ char *smack;
+ int slen;
+ int rc;
+
+ smack = smk_parse_smack(string, len);
+ if (IS_ERR(smack))
+ return ERR_CAST(smack);
+
+ mutex_lock(&smack_known_lock);
+
+ skp = smk_find_entry(smack);
+ if (skp != NULL)
+ goto freeout;
+
+ skp = kzalloc(sizeof(*skp), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (skp == NULL) {
+ skp = ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+ goto freeout;
+ }
+
+ skp->smk_known = smack;
+ skp->smk_secid = smack_next_secid++;
+ skp->smk_netlabel.domain = skp->smk_known;
+ skp->smk_netlabel.flags =
+ NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN | NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL;
+ /*
+ * If direct labeling works use it.
+ * Otherwise use mapped labeling.
+ */
+ slen = strlen(smack);
+ if (slen < SMK_CIPSOLEN)
+ rc = smk_netlbl_mls(smack_cipso_direct, skp->smk_known,
+ &skp->smk_netlabel, slen);
+ else
+ rc = smk_netlbl_mls(smack_cipso_mapped, (char *)&skp->smk_secid,
+ &skp->smk_netlabel, sizeof(skp->smk_secid));
+
+ if (rc >= 0) {
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&skp->smk_rules);
+ mutex_init(&skp->smk_rules_lock);
+ /*
+ * Make sure that the entry is actually
+ * filled before putting it on the list.
+ */
+ smk_insert_entry(skp);
+ goto unlockout;
+ }
+ /*
+ * smk_netlbl_mls failed.
+ */
+ kfree(skp);
+ skp = ERR_PTR(rc);
+freeout:
+ kfree(smack);
+unlockout:
+ mutex_unlock(&smack_known_lock);
+
+ return skp;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_from_secid - find the Smack label associated with a secid
+ * @secid: an integer that might be associated with a Smack label
+ *
+ * Returns a pointer to the appropriate Smack label entry if there is one,
+ * otherwise a pointer to the invalid Smack label.
+ */
+struct smack_known *smack_from_secid(const u32 secid)
+{
+ struct smack_known *skp;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(skp, &smack_known_list, list) {
+ if (skp->smk_secid == secid) {
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return skp;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If we got this far someone asked for the translation
+ * of a secid that is not on the list.
+ */
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return &smack_known_invalid;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Unless a process is running with one of these labels
+ * even having CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE isn't enough to grant
+ * privilege to violate MAC policy. If no labels are
+ * designated (the empty list case) capabilities apply to
+ * everyone.
+ */
+LIST_HEAD(smack_onlycap_list);
+DEFINE_MUTEX(smack_onlycap_lock);
+
+/*
+ * Is the task privileged and allowed to be privileged
+ * by the onlycap rule.
+ *
+ * Returns 1 if the task is allowed to be privileged, 0 if it's not.
+ */
+int smack_privileged(int cap)
+{
+ struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
+ struct smack_known_list_elem *sklep;
+
+ /*
+ * All kernel tasks are privileged
+ */
+ if (unlikely(current->flags & PF_KTHREAD))
+ return 1;
+
+ if (!capable(cap))
+ return 0;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ if (list_empty(&smack_onlycap_list)) {
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(sklep, &smack_onlycap_list, list) {
+ if (sklep->smk_label == skp) {
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return 1;
+ }
+ }
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ return 0;
+}
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_lsm.c b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..735a1a9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/smack/smack_lsm.c
@@ -0,0 +1,4806 @@
+/*
+ * Simplified MAC Kernel (smack) security module
+ *
+ * This file contains the smack hook function implementations.
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ * Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
+ * Jarkko Sakkinen <jarkko.sakkinen@intel.com>
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2007 Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
+ * Copyright (C) 2009 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P.
+ * Paul Moore <paul@paul-moore.com>
+ * Copyright (C) 2010 Nokia Corporation
+ * Copyright (C) 2011 Intel Corporation.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/xattr.h>
+#include <linux/pagemap.h>
+#include <linux/mount.h>
+#include <linux/stat.h>
+#include <linux/kd.h>
+#include <asm/ioctls.h>
+#include <linux/ip.h>
+#include <linux/tcp.h>
+#include <linux/udp.h>
+#include <linux/dccp.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <linux/mutex.h>
+#include <linux/pipe_fs_i.h>
+#include <net/cipso_ipv4.h>
+#include <net/ip.h>
+#include <net/ipv6.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/magic.h>
+#include <linux/dcache.h>
+#include <linux/personality.h>
+#include <linux/msg.h>
+#include <linux/shm.h>
+#include <linux/binfmts.h>
+#include <linux/parser.h>
+#include "smack.h"
+
+#define TRANS_TRUE "TRUE"
+#define TRANS_TRUE_SIZE 4
+
+#define SMK_CONNECTING 0
+#define SMK_RECEIVING 1
+#define SMK_SENDING 2
+
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
+static LIST_HEAD(smk_ipv6_port_list);
+#endif
+static struct kmem_cache *smack_inode_cache;
+int smack_enabled;
+
+static const match_table_t smk_mount_tokens = {
+ {Opt_fsdefault, SMK_FSDEFAULT "%s"},
+ {Opt_fsfloor, SMK_FSFLOOR "%s"},
+ {Opt_fshat, SMK_FSHAT "%s"},
+ {Opt_fsroot, SMK_FSROOT "%s"},
+ {Opt_fstransmute, SMK_FSTRANS "%s"},
+ {Opt_error, NULL},
+};
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
+static char *smk_bu_mess[] = {
+ "Bringup Error", /* Unused */
+ "Bringup", /* SMACK_BRINGUP_ALLOW */
+ "Unconfined Subject", /* SMACK_UNCONFINED_SUBJECT */
+ "Unconfined Object", /* SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT */
+};
+
+static void smk_bu_mode(int mode, char *s)
+{
+ int i = 0;
+
+ if (mode & MAY_READ)
+ s[i++] = 'r';
+ if (mode & MAY_WRITE)
+ s[i++] = 'w';
+ if (mode & MAY_EXEC)
+ s[i++] = 'x';
+ if (mode & MAY_APPEND)
+ s[i++] = 'a';
+ if (mode & MAY_TRANSMUTE)
+ s[i++] = 't';
+ if (mode & MAY_LOCK)
+ s[i++] = 'l';
+ if (i == 0)
+ s[i++] = '-';
+ s[i] = '\0';
+}
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
+static int smk_bu_note(char *note, struct smack_known *sskp,
+ struct smack_known *oskp, int mode, int rc)
+{
+ char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
+
+ if (rc <= 0)
+ return rc;
+ if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
+ rc = 0;
+
+ smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
+ pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
+ sskp->smk_known, oskp->smk_known, acc, note);
+ return 0;
+}
+#else
+#define smk_bu_note(note, sskp, oskp, mode, RC) (RC)
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
+static int smk_bu_current(char *note, struct smack_known *oskp,
+ int mode, int rc)
+{
+ struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
+ char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
+
+ if (rc <= 0)
+ return rc;
+ if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
+ rc = 0;
+
+ smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
+ pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) %s %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
+ tsp->smk_task->smk_known, oskp->smk_known,
+ acc, current->comm, note);
+ return 0;
+}
+#else
+#define smk_bu_current(note, oskp, mode, RC) (RC)
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
+static int smk_bu_task(struct task_struct *otp, int mode, int rc)
+{
+ struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
+ struct smack_known *smk_task = smk_of_task_struct(otp);
+ char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
+
+ if (rc <= 0)
+ return rc;
+ if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
+ rc = 0;
+
+ smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
+ pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) %s to %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
+ tsp->smk_task->smk_known, smk_task->smk_known, acc,
+ current->comm, otp->comm);
+ return 0;
+}
+#else
+#define smk_bu_task(otp, mode, RC) (RC)
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
+static int smk_bu_inode(struct inode *inode, int mode, int rc)
+{
+ struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
+ struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
+ char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
+
+ if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_IMPURE)
+ pr_info("Smack Unconfined Corruption: inode=(%s %ld) %s\n",
+ inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, current->comm);
+
+ if (rc <= 0)
+ return rc;
+ if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
+ rc = 0;
+ if (rc == SMACK_UNCONFINED_SUBJECT &&
+ (mode & (MAY_WRITE | MAY_APPEND)))
+ isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_IMPURE;
+
+ smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
+
+ pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) inode=(%s %ld) %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
+ tsp->smk_task->smk_known, isp->smk_inode->smk_known, acc,
+ inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, current->comm);
+ return 0;
+}
+#else
+#define smk_bu_inode(inode, mode, RC) (RC)
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
+static int smk_bu_file(struct file *file, int mode, int rc)
+{
+ struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
+ struct smack_known *sskp = tsp->smk_task;
+ struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
+ struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
+ char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
+
+ if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_IMPURE)
+ pr_info("Smack Unconfined Corruption: inode=(%s %ld) %s\n",
+ inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, current->comm);
+
+ if (rc <= 0)
+ return rc;
+ if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
+ rc = 0;
+
+ smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
+ pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) file=(%s %ld %pD) %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
+ sskp->smk_known, smk_of_inode(inode)->smk_known, acc,
+ inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, file,
+ current->comm);
+ return 0;
+}
+#else
+#define smk_bu_file(file, mode, RC) (RC)
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
+static int smk_bu_credfile(const struct cred *cred, struct file *file,
+ int mode, int rc)
+{
+ struct task_smack *tsp = cred->security;
+ struct smack_known *sskp = tsp->smk_task;
+ struct inode *inode = file->f_inode;
+ struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
+ char acc[SMK_NUM_ACCESS_TYPE + 1];
+
+ if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_IMPURE)
+ pr_info("Smack Unconfined Corruption: inode=(%s %ld) %s\n",
+ inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, current->comm);
+
+ if (rc <= 0)
+ return rc;
+ if (rc > SMACK_UNCONFINED_OBJECT)
+ rc = 0;
+
+ smk_bu_mode(mode, acc);
+ pr_info("Smack %s: (%s %s %s) file=(%s %ld %pD) %s\n", smk_bu_mess[rc],
+ sskp->smk_known, smk_of_inode(inode)->smk_known, acc,
+ inode->i_sb->s_id, inode->i_ino, file,
+ current->comm);
+ return 0;
+}
+#else
+#define smk_bu_credfile(cred, file, mode, RC) (RC)
+#endif
+
+/**
+ * smk_fetch - Fetch the smack label from a file.
+ * @name: type of the label (attribute)
+ * @ip: a pointer to the inode
+ * @dp: a pointer to the dentry
+ *
+ * Returns a pointer to the master list entry for the Smack label,
+ * NULL if there was no label to fetch, or an error code.
+ */
+static struct smack_known *smk_fetch(const char *name, struct inode *ip,
+ struct dentry *dp)
+{
+ int rc;
+ char *buffer;
+ struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
+
+ if (ip->i_op->getxattr == NULL)
+ return ERR_PTR(-EOPNOTSUPP);
+
+ buffer = kzalloc(SMK_LONGLABEL, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (buffer == NULL)
+ return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM);
+
+ rc = ip->i_op->getxattr(dp, name, buffer, SMK_LONGLABEL);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ skp = ERR_PTR(rc);
+ else if (rc == 0)
+ skp = NULL;
+ else
+ skp = smk_import_entry(buffer, rc);
+
+ kfree(buffer);
+
+ return skp;
+}
+
+/**
+ * new_inode_smack - allocate an inode security blob
+ * @skp: a pointer to the Smack label entry to use in the blob
+ *
+ * Returns the new blob or NULL if there's no memory available
+ */
+static struct inode_smack *new_inode_smack(struct smack_known *skp)
+{
+ struct inode_smack *isp;
+
+ isp = kmem_cache_zalloc(smack_inode_cache, GFP_NOFS);
+ if (isp == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ isp->smk_inode = skp;
+ isp->smk_flags = 0;
+ mutex_init(&isp->smk_lock);
+
+ return isp;
+}
+
+/**
+ * new_task_smack - allocate a task security blob
+ * @task: a pointer to the Smack label for the running task
+ * @forked: a pointer to the Smack label for the forked task
+ * @gfp: type of the memory for the allocation
+ *
+ * Returns the new blob or NULL if there's no memory available
+ */
+static struct task_smack *new_task_smack(struct smack_known *task,
+ struct smack_known *forked, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+ struct task_smack *tsp;
+
+ tsp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct task_smack), gfp);
+ if (tsp == NULL)
+ return NULL;
+
+ tsp->smk_task = task;
+ tsp->smk_forked = forked;
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tsp->smk_rules);
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&tsp->smk_relabel);
+ mutex_init(&tsp->smk_rules_lock);
+
+ return tsp;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_copy_rules - copy a rule set
+ * @nhead: new rules header pointer
+ * @ohead: old rules header pointer
+ * @gfp: type of the memory for the allocation
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM on error
+ */
+static int smk_copy_rules(struct list_head *nhead, struct list_head *ohead,
+ gfp_t gfp)
+{
+ struct smack_rule *nrp;
+ struct smack_rule *orp;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(nhead);
+
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(orp, ohead, list) {
+ nrp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct smack_rule), gfp);
+ if (nrp == NULL) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ break;
+ }
+ *nrp = *orp;
+ list_add_rcu(&nrp->list, nhead);
+ }
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_copy_relabel - copy smk_relabel labels list
+ * @nhead: new rules header pointer
+ * @ohead: old rules header pointer
+ * @gfp: type of the memory for the allocation
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM on error
+ */
+static int smk_copy_relabel(struct list_head *nhead, struct list_head *ohead,
+ gfp_t gfp)
+{
+ struct smack_known_list_elem *nklep;
+ struct smack_known_list_elem *oklep;
+
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(nhead);
+
+ list_for_each_entry(oklep, ohead, list) {
+ nklep = kzalloc(sizeof(struct smack_known_list_elem), gfp);
+ if (nklep == NULL) {
+ smk_destroy_label_list(nhead);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+ nklep->smk_label = oklep->smk_label;
+ list_add(&nklep->list, nhead);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_ptrace_mode - helper function for converting PTRACE_MODE_* into MAY_*
+ * @mode - input mode in form of PTRACE_MODE_*
+ *
+ * Returns a converted MAY_* mode usable by smack rules
+ */
+static inline unsigned int smk_ptrace_mode(unsigned int mode)
+{
+ if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH)
+ return MAY_READWRITE;
+ if (mode & PTRACE_MODE_READ)
+ return MAY_READ;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_ptrace_rule_check - helper for ptrace access
+ * @tracer: tracer process
+ * @tracee_known: label entry of the process that's about to be traced
+ * @mode: ptrace attachment mode (PTRACE_MODE_*)
+ * @func: name of the function that called us, used for audit
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on access granted, -error on error
+ */
+static int smk_ptrace_rule_check(struct task_struct *tracer,
+ struct smack_known *tracee_known,
+ unsigned int mode, const char *func)
+{
+ int rc;
+ struct smk_audit_info ad, *saip = NULL;
+ struct task_smack *tsp;
+ struct smack_known *tracer_known;
+
+ if ((mode & PTRACE_MODE_NOAUDIT) == 0) {
+ smk_ad_init(&ad, func, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
+ smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, tracer);
+ saip = &ad;
+ }
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ tsp = __task_cred(tracer)->security;
+ tracer_known = smk_of_task(tsp);
+
+ if ((mode & PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH) &&
+ (smack_ptrace_rule == SMACK_PTRACE_EXACT ||
+ smack_ptrace_rule == SMACK_PTRACE_DRACONIAN)) {
+ if (tracer_known->smk_known == tracee_known->smk_known)
+ rc = 0;
+ else if (smack_ptrace_rule == SMACK_PTRACE_DRACONIAN)
+ rc = -EACCES;
+ else if (capable(CAP_SYS_PTRACE))
+ rc = 0;
+ else
+ rc = -EACCES;
+
+ if (saip)
+ smack_log(tracer_known->smk_known,
+ tracee_known->smk_known,
+ 0, rc, saip);
+
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ /* In case of rule==SMACK_PTRACE_DEFAULT or mode==PTRACE_MODE_READ */
+ rc = smk_tskacc(tsp, tracee_known, smk_ptrace_mode(mode), saip);
+
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * LSM hooks.
+ * We he, that is fun!
+ */
+
+/**
+ * smack_ptrace_access_check - Smack approval on PTRACE_ATTACH
+ * @ctp: child task pointer
+ * @mode: ptrace attachment mode (PTRACE_MODE_*)
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if access is OK, an error code otherwise
+ *
+ * Do the capability checks.
+ */
+static int smack_ptrace_access_check(struct task_struct *ctp, unsigned int mode)
+{
+ struct smack_known *skp;
+
+ skp = smk_of_task_struct(ctp);
+
+ return smk_ptrace_rule_check(current, skp, mode, __func__);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_ptrace_traceme - Smack approval on PTRACE_TRACEME
+ * @ptp: parent task pointer
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if access is OK, an error code otherwise
+ *
+ * Do the capability checks, and require PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH.
+ */
+static int smack_ptrace_traceme(struct task_struct *ptp)
+{
+ int rc;
+ struct smack_known *skp;
+
+ skp = smk_of_task(current_security());
+
+ rc = smk_ptrace_rule_check(ptp, skp, PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH, __func__);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_syslog - Smack approval on syslog
+ * @type: message type
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, error code otherwise.
+ */
+static int smack_syslog(int typefrom_file)
+{
+ int rc = 0;
+ struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
+
+ if (smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (smack_syslog_label != NULL && smack_syslog_label != skp)
+ rc = -EACCES;
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+
+/*
+ * Superblock Hooks.
+ */
+
+/**
+ * smack_sb_alloc_security - allocate a superblock blob
+ * @sb: the superblock getting the blob
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success or -ENOMEM on error.
+ */
+static int smack_sb_alloc_security(struct super_block *sb)
+{
+ struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
+
+ sbsp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct superblock_smack), GFP_KERNEL);
+
+ if (sbsp == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ sbsp->smk_root = &smack_known_floor;
+ sbsp->smk_default = &smack_known_floor;
+ sbsp->smk_floor = &smack_known_floor;
+ sbsp->smk_hat = &smack_known_hat;
+ /*
+ * smk_initialized will be zero from kzalloc.
+ */
+ sb->s_security = sbsp;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_sb_free_security - free a superblock blob
+ * @sb: the superblock getting the blob
+ *
+ */
+static void smack_sb_free_security(struct super_block *sb)
+{
+ kfree(sb->s_security);
+ sb->s_security = NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_sb_copy_data - copy mount options data for processing
+ * @orig: where to start
+ * @smackopts: mount options string
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success or -ENOMEM on error.
+ *
+ * Copy the Smack specific mount options out of the mount
+ * options list.
+ */
+static int smack_sb_copy_data(char *orig, char *smackopts)
+{
+ char *cp, *commap, *otheropts, *dp;
+
+ otheropts = (char *)get_zeroed_page(GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (otheropts == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ for (cp = orig, commap = orig; commap != NULL; cp = commap + 1) {
+ if (strstr(cp, SMK_FSDEFAULT) == cp)
+ dp = smackopts;
+ else if (strstr(cp, SMK_FSFLOOR) == cp)
+ dp = smackopts;
+ else if (strstr(cp, SMK_FSHAT) == cp)
+ dp = smackopts;
+ else if (strstr(cp, SMK_FSROOT) == cp)
+ dp = smackopts;
+ else if (strstr(cp, SMK_FSTRANS) == cp)
+ dp = smackopts;
+ else
+ dp = otheropts;
+
+ commap = strchr(cp, ',');
+ if (commap != NULL)
+ *commap = '\0';
+
+ if (*dp != '\0')
+ strcat(dp, ",");
+ strcat(dp, cp);
+ }
+
+ strcpy(orig, otheropts);
+ free_page((unsigned long)otheropts);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_parse_opts_str - parse Smack specific mount options
+ * @options: mount options string
+ * @opts: where to store converted mount opts
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success or -ENOMEM on error.
+ *
+ * converts Smack specific mount options to generic security option format
+ */
+static int smack_parse_opts_str(char *options,
+ struct security_mnt_opts *opts)
+{
+ char *p;
+ char *fsdefault = NULL;
+ char *fsfloor = NULL;
+ char *fshat = NULL;
+ char *fsroot = NULL;
+ char *fstransmute = NULL;
+ int rc = -ENOMEM;
+ int num_mnt_opts = 0;
+ int token;
+
+ opts->num_mnt_opts = 0;
+
+ if (!options)
+ return 0;
+
+ while ((p = strsep(&options, ",")) != NULL) {
+ substring_t args[MAX_OPT_ARGS];
+
+ if (!*p)
+ continue;
+
+ token = match_token(p, smk_mount_tokens, args);
+
+ switch (token) {
+ case Opt_fsdefault:
+ if (fsdefault)
+ goto out_opt_err;
+ fsdefault = match_strdup(&args[0]);
+ if (!fsdefault)
+ goto out_err;
+ break;
+ case Opt_fsfloor:
+ if (fsfloor)
+ goto out_opt_err;
+ fsfloor = match_strdup(&args[0]);
+ if (!fsfloor)
+ goto out_err;
+ break;
+ case Opt_fshat:
+ if (fshat)
+ goto out_opt_err;
+ fshat = match_strdup(&args[0]);
+ if (!fshat)
+ goto out_err;
+ break;
+ case Opt_fsroot:
+ if (fsroot)
+ goto out_opt_err;
+ fsroot = match_strdup(&args[0]);
+ if (!fsroot)
+ goto out_err;
+ break;
+ case Opt_fstransmute:
+ if (fstransmute)
+ goto out_opt_err;
+ fstransmute = match_strdup(&args[0]);
+ if (!fstransmute)
+ goto out_err;
+ break;
+ default:
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ pr_warn("Smack: unknown mount option\n");
+ goto out_err;
+ }
+ }
+
+ opts->mnt_opts = kcalloc(NUM_SMK_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(char *), GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!opts->mnt_opts)
+ goto out_err;
+
+ opts->mnt_opts_flags = kcalloc(NUM_SMK_MNT_OPTS, sizeof(int),
+ GFP_ATOMIC);
+ if (!opts->mnt_opts_flags) {
+ kfree(opts->mnt_opts);
+ goto out_err;
+ }
+
+ if (fsdefault) {
+ opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fsdefault;
+ opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSDEFAULT_MNT;
+ }
+ if (fsfloor) {
+ opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fsfloor;
+ opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSFLOOR_MNT;
+ }
+ if (fshat) {
+ opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fshat;
+ opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSHAT_MNT;
+ }
+ if (fsroot) {
+ opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fsroot;
+ opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSROOT_MNT;
+ }
+ if (fstransmute) {
+ opts->mnt_opts[num_mnt_opts] = fstransmute;
+ opts->mnt_opts_flags[num_mnt_opts++] = FSTRANS_MNT;
+ }
+
+ opts->num_mnt_opts = num_mnt_opts;
+ return 0;
+
+out_opt_err:
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ pr_warn("Smack: duplicate mount options\n");
+
+out_err:
+ kfree(fsdefault);
+ kfree(fsfloor);
+ kfree(fshat);
+ kfree(fsroot);
+ kfree(fstransmute);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_set_mnt_opts - set Smack specific mount options
+ * @sb: the file system superblock
+ * @opts: Smack mount options
+ * @kern_flags: mount option from kernel space or user space
+ * @set_kern_flags: where to store converted mount opts
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, an error code on failure
+ *
+ * Allow filesystems with binary mount data to explicitly set Smack mount
+ * labels.
+ */
+static int smack_set_mnt_opts(struct super_block *sb,
+ struct security_mnt_opts *opts,
+ unsigned long kern_flags,
+ unsigned long *set_kern_flags)
+{
+ struct dentry *root = sb->s_root;
+ struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(root);
+ struct superblock_smack *sp = sb->s_security;
+ struct inode_smack *isp;
+ struct smack_known *skp;
+ int i;
+ int num_opts = opts->num_mnt_opts;
+ int transmute = 0;
+
+ if (sp->smk_initialized)
+ return 0;
+
+ sp->smk_initialized = 1;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < num_opts; i++) {
+ switch (opts->mnt_opts_flags[i]) {
+ case FSDEFAULT_MNT:
+ skp = smk_import_entry(opts->mnt_opts[i], 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(skp))
+ return PTR_ERR(skp);
+ sp->smk_default = skp;
+ break;
+ case FSFLOOR_MNT:
+ skp = smk_import_entry(opts->mnt_opts[i], 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(skp))
+ return PTR_ERR(skp);
+ sp->smk_floor = skp;
+ break;
+ case FSHAT_MNT:
+ skp = smk_import_entry(opts->mnt_opts[i], 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(skp))
+ return PTR_ERR(skp);
+ sp->smk_hat = skp;
+ break;
+ case FSROOT_MNT:
+ skp = smk_import_entry(opts->mnt_opts[i], 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(skp))
+ return PTR_ERR(skp);
+ sp->smk_root = skp;
+ break;
+ case FSTRANS_MNT:
+ skp = smk_import_entry(opts->mnt_opts[i], 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(skp))
+ return PTR_ERR(skp);
+ sp->smk_root = skp;
+ transmute = 1;
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
+ /*
+ * Unprivileged mounts don't get to specify Smack values.
+ */
+ if (num_opts)
+ return -EPERM;
+ /*
+ * Unprivileged mounts get root and default from the caller.
+ */
+ skp = smk_of_current();
+ sp->smk_root = skp;
+ sp->smk_default = skp;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Initialize the root inode.
+ */
+ isp = inode->i_security;
+ if (isp == NULL) {
+ isp = new_inode_smack(sp->smk_root);
+ if (isp == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ inode->i_security = isp;
+ } else
+ isp->smk_inode = sp->smk_root;
+
+ if (transmute)
+ isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_sb_kern_mount - Smack specific mount processing
+ * @sb: the file system superblock
+ * @flags: the mount flags
+ * @data: the smack mount options
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, an error code on failure
+ */
+static int smack_sb_kern_mount(struct super_block *sb, int flags, void *data)
+{
+ int rc = 0;
+ char *options = data;
+ struct security_mnt_opts opts;
+
+ security_init_mnt_opts(&opts);
+
+ if (!options)
+ goto out;
+
+ rc = smack_parse_opts_str(options, &opts);
+ if (rc)
+ goto out_err;
+
+out:
+ rc = smack_set_mnt_opts(sb, &opts, 0, NULL);
+
+out_err:
+ security_free_mnt_opts(&opts);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_sb_statfs - Smack check on statfs
+ * @dentry: identifies the file system in question
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current can read the floor of the filesystem,
+ * and error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_sb_statfs(struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+ struct superblock_smack *sbp = dentry->d_sb->s_security;
+ int rc;
+ struct smk_audit_info ad;
+
+ smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
+ smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
+
+ rc = smk_curacc(sbp->smk_floor, MAY_READ, &ad);
+ rc = smk_bu_current("statfs", sbp->smk_floor, MAY_READ, rc);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * BPRM hooks
+ */
+
+/**
+ * smack_bprm_set_creds - set creds for exec
+ * @bprm: the exec information
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if it gets a blob, -EPERM if exec forbidden and -ENOMEM otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_bprm_set_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+ struct inode *inode = file_inode(bprm->file);
+ struct task_smack *bsp = bprm->cred->security;
+ struct inode_smack *isp;
+ int rc;
+
+ if (bprm->cred_prepared)
+ return 0;
+
+ isp = inode->i_security;
+ if (isp->smk_task == NULL || isp->smk_task == bsp->smk_task)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (bprm->unsafe & (LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE | LSM_UNSAFE_PTRACE_CAP)) {
+ struct task_struct *tracer;
+ rc = 0;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ tracer = ptrace_parent(current);
+ if (likely(tracer != NULL))
+ rc = smk_ptrace_rule_check(tracer,
+ isp->smk_task,
+ PTRACE_MODE_ATTACH,
+ __func__);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ if (rc != 0)
+ return rc;
+ } else if (bprm->unsafe)
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ bsp->smk_task = isp->smk_task;
+ bprm->per_clear |= PER_CLEAR_ON_SETID;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_bprm_committing_creds - Prepare to install the new credentials
+ * from bprm.
+ *
+ * @bprm: binprm for exec
+ */
+static void smack_bprm_committing_creds(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+ struct task_smack *bsp = bprm->cred->security;
+
+ if (bsp->smk_task != bsp->smk_forked)
+ current->pdeath_signal = 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_bprm_secureexec - Return the decision to use secureexec.
+ * @bprm: binprm for exec
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success.
+ */
+static int smack_bprm_secureexec(struct linux_binprm *bprm)
+{
+ struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
+
+ if (tsp->smk_task != tsp->smk_forked)
+ return 1;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Inode hooks
+ */
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_alloc_security - allocate an inode blob
+ * @inode: the inode in need of a blob
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if it gets a blob, -ENOMEM otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_inode_alloc_security(struct inode *inode)
+{
+ struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
+
+ inode->i_security = new_inode_smack(skp);
+ if (inode->i_security == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_free_security - free an inode blob
+ * @inode: the inode with a blob
+ *
+ * Clears the blob pointer in inode
+ */
+static void smack_inode_free_security(struct inode *inode)
+{
+ kmem_cache_free(smack_inode_cache, inode->i_security);
+ inode->i_security = NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_init_security - copy out the smack from an inode
+ * @inode: the newly created inode
+ * @dir: containing directory object
+ * @qstr: unused
+ * @name: where to put the attribute name
+ * @value: where to put the attribute value
+ * @len: where to put the length of the attribute
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if it all works out, -ENOMEM if there's no memory
+ */
+static int smack_inode_init_security(struct inode *inode, struct inode *dir,
+ const struct qstr *qstr, const char **name,
+ void **value, size_t *len)
+{
+ struct inode_smack *issp = inode->i_security;
+ struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
+ struct smack_known *isp = smk_of_inode(inode);
+ struct smack_known *dsp = smk_of_inode(dir);
+ int may;
+
+ if (name)
+ *name = XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX;
+
+ if (value && len) {
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ may = smk_access_entry(skp->smk_known, dsp->smk_known,
+ &skp->smk_rules);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ /*
+ * If the access rule allows transmutation and
+ * the directory requests transmutation then
+ * by all means transmute.
+ * Mark the inode as changed.
+ */
+ if (may > 0 && ((may & MAY_TRANSMUTE) != 0) &&
+ smk_inode_transmutable(dir)) {
+ isp = dsp;
+ issp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_CHANGED;
+ }
+
+ *value = kstrdup(isp->smk_known, GFP_NOFS);
+ if (*value == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ *len = strlen(isp->smk_known);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_link - Smack check on link
+ * @old_dentry: the existing object
+ * @dir: unused
+ * @new_dentry: the new object
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_inode_link(struct dentry *old_dentry, struct inode *dir,
+ struct dentry *new_dentry)
+{
+ struct smack_known *isp;
+ struct smk_audit_info ad;
+ int rc;
+
+ smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
+ smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, old_dentry);
+
+ isp = smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(old_dentry));
+ rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+ rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(old_dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
+
+ if (rc == 0 && d_is_positive(new_dentry)) {
+ isp = smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(new_dentry));
+ smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, new_dentry);
+ rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+ rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(new_dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
+ }
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_unlink - Smack check on inode deletion
+ * @dir: containing directory object
+ * @dentry: file to unlink
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current can write the containing directory
+ * and the object, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_inode_unlink(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+ struct inode *ip = d_backing_inode(dentry);
+ struct smk_audit_info ad;
+ int rc;
+
+ smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
+ smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
+
+ /*
+ * You need write access to the thing you're unlinking
+ */
+ rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(ip), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+ rc = smk_bu_inode(ip, MAY_WRITE, rc);
+ if (rc == 0) {
+ /*
+ * You also need write access to the containing directory
+ */
+ smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE);
+ smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(&ad, dir);
+ rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dir), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+ rc = smk_bu_inode(dir, MAY_WRITE, rc);
+ }
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_rmdir - Smack check on directory deletion
+ * @dir: containing directory object
+ * @dentry: directory to unlink
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current can write the containing directory
+ * and the directory, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_inode_rmdir(struct inode *dir, struct dentry *dentry)
+{
+ struct smk_audit_info ad;
+ int rc;
+
+ smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
+ smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
+
+ /*
+ * You need write access to the thing you're removing
+ */
+ rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+ rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
+ if (rc == 0) {
+ /*
+ * You also need write access to the containing directory
+ */
+ smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE);
+ smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(&ad, dir);
+ rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(dir), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+ rc = smk_bu_inode(dir, MAY_WRITE, rc);
+ }
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_rename - Smack check on rename
+ * @old_inode: unused
+ * @old_dentry: the old object
+ * @new_inode: unused
+ * @new_dentry: the new object
+ *
+ * Read and write access is required on both the old and
+ * new directories.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_inode_rename(struct inode *old_inode,
+ struct dentry *old_dentry,
+ struct inode *new_inode,
+ struct dentry *new_dentry)
+{
+ int rc;
+ struct smack_known *isp;
+ struct smk_audit_info ad;
+
+ smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
+ smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, old_dentry);
+
+ isp = smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(old_dentry));
+ rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
+ rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(old_dentry), MAY_READWRITE, rc);
+
+ if (rc == 0 && d_is_positive(new_dentry)) {
+ isp = smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(new_dentry));
+ smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, new_dentry);
+ rc = smk_curacc(isp, MAY_READWRITE, &ad);
+ rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(new_dentry), MAY_READWRITE, rc);
+ }
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_permission - Smack version of permission()
+ * @inode: the inode in question
+ * @mask: the access requested
+ *
+ * This is the important Smack hook.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if access is permitted, -EACCES otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_inode_permission(struct inode *inode, int mask)
+{
+ struct smk_audit_info ad;
+ int no_block = mask & MAY_NOT_BLOCK;
+ int rc;
+
+ mask &= (MAY_READ|MAY_WRITE|MAY_EXEC|MAY_APPEND);
+ /*
+ * No permission to check. Existence test. Yup, it's there.
+ */
+ if (mask == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ /* May be droppable after audit */
+ if (no_block)
+ return -ECHILD;
+ smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_INODE);
+ smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_inode(&ad, inode);
+ rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), mask, &ad);
+ rc = smk_bu_inode(inode, mask, rc);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_setattr - Smack check for setting attributes
+ * @dentry: the object
+ * @iattr: for the force flag
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_inode_setattr(struct dentry *dentry, struct iattr *iattr)
+{
+ struct smk_audit_info ad;
+ int rc;
+
+ /*
+ * Need to allow for clearing the setuid bit.
+ */
+ if (iattr->ia_valid & ATTR_FORCE)
+ return 0;
+ smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
+ smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
+
+ rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+ rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_getattr - Smack check for getting attributes
+ * @mnt: vfsmount of the object
+ * @dentry: the object
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_inode_getattr(const struct path *path)
+{
+ struct smk_audit_info ad;
+ struct inode *inode = d_backing_inode(path->dentry);
+ int rc;
+
+ smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
+ smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, *path);
+ rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_READ, &ad);
+ rc = smk_bu_inode(inode, MAY_READ, rc);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_setxattr - Smack check for setting xattrs
+ * @dentry: the object
+ * @name: name of the attribute
+ * @value: value of the attribute
+ * @size: size of the value
+ * @flags: unused
+ *
+ * This protects the Smack attribute explicitly.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
+ const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
+{
+ struct smk_audit_info ad;
+ struct smack_known *skp;
+ int check_priv = 0;
+ int check_import = 0;
+ int check_star = 0;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Check label validity here so import won't fail in post_setxattr
+ */
+ if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0 ||
+ strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN) == 0 ||
+ strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0) {
+ check_priv = 1;
+ check_import = 1;
+ } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0 ||
+ strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) {
+ check_priv = 1;
+ check_import = 1;
+ check_star = 1;
+ } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0) {
+ check_priv = 1;
+ if (size != TRANS_TRUE_SIZE ||
+ strncmp(value, TRANS_TRUE, TRANS_TRUE_SIZE) != 0)
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ } else
+ rc = cap_inode_setxattr(dentry, name, value, size, flags);
+
+ if (check_priv && !smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+ rc = -EPERM;
+
+ if (rc == 0 && check_import) {
+ skp = size ? smk_import_entry(value, size) : NULL;
+ if (IS_ERR(skp))
+ rc = PTR_ERR(skp);
+ else if (skp == NULL || (check_star &&
+ (skp == &smack_known_star || skp == &smack_known_web)))
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
+ smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
+
+ if (rc == 0) {
+ rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+ rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
+ }
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_post_setxattr - Apply the Smack update approved above
+ * @dentry: object
+ * @name: attribute name
+ * @value: attribute value
+ * @size: attribute size
+ * @flags: unused
+ *
+ * Set the pointer in the inode blob to the entry found
+ * in the master label list.
+ */
+static void smack_inode_post_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name,
+ const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
+{
+ struct smack_known *skp;
+ struct inode_smack *isp = d_backing_inode(dentry)->i_security;
+
+ if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0) {
+ isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0) {
+ skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
+ if (!IS_ERR(skp))
+ isp->smk_inode = skp;
+ else
+ isp->smk_inode = &smack_known_invalid;
+ } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0) {
+ skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
+ if (!IS_ERR(skp))
+ isp->smk_task = skp;
+ else
+ isp->smk_task = &smack_known_invalid;
+ } else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) {
+ skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
+ if (!IS_ERR(skp))
+ isp->smk_mmap = skp;
+ else
+ isp->smk_mmap = &smack_known_invalid;
+ }
+
+ return;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_getxattr - Smack check on getxattr
+ * @dentry: the object
+ * @name: unused
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_inode_getxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
+{
+ struct smk_audit_info ad;
+ int rc;
+
+ smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
+ smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
+
+ rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)), MAY_READ, &ad);
+ rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry), MAY_READ, rc);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_removexattr - Smack check on removexattr
+ * @dentry: the object
+ * @name: name of the attribute
+ *
+ * Removing the Smack attribute requires CAP_MAC_ADMIN
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if access is permitted, an error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_inode_removexattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *name)
+{
+ struct inode_smack *isp;
+ struct smk_audit_info ad;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0 ||
+ strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN) == 0 ||
+ strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT) == 0 ||
+ strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC) == 0 ||
+ strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0 ||
+ strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0) {
+ if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+ rc = -EPERM;
+ } else
+ rc = cap_inode_removexattr(dentry, name);
+
+ if (rc != 0)
+ return rc;
+
+ smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_DENTRY);
+ smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path_dentry(&ad, dentry);
+
+ rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry)), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+ rc = smk_bu_inode(d_backing_inode(dentry), MAY_WRITE, rc);
+ if (rc != 0)
+ return rc;
+
+ isp = d_backing_inode(dentry)->i_security;
+ /*
+ * Don't do anything special for these.
+ * XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPIN
+ * XATTR_NAME_SMACKIPOUT
+ * XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC
+ */
+ if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACK) == 0)
+ isp->smk_task = NULL;
+ else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP) == 0)
+ isp->smk_mmap = NULL;
+ else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE) == 0)
+ isp->smk_flags &= ~SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_getsecurity - get smack xattrs
+ * @inode: the object
+ * @name: attribute name
+ * @buffer: where to put the result
+ * @alloc: duplicate memory
+ *
+ * Returns the size of the attribute or an error code
+ */
+static int smack_inode_getsecurity(const struct inode *inode,
+ const char *name, void **buffer,
+ bool alloc)
+{
+ struct socket_smack *ssp;
+ struct socket *sock;
+ struct super_block *sbp;
+ struct inode *ip = (struct inode *)inode;
+ struct smack_known *isp;
+
+ if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX) == 0)
+ isp = smk_of_inode(inode);
+ else {
+ /*
+ * The rest of the Smack xattrs are only on sockets.
+ */
+ sbp = ip->i_sb;
+ if (sbp->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC)
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+ sock = SOCKET_I(ip);
+ if (sock == NULL || sock->sk == NULL)
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+ ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+
+ if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPIN) == 0)
+ isp = ssp->smk_in;
+ else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT) == 0)
+ isp = ssp->smk_out;
+ else
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+ }
+
+ if (alloc) {
+ *buffer = kstrdup(isp->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (*buffer == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ return strlen(isp->smk_known);
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_listsecurity - list the Smack attributes
+ * @inode: the object
+ * @buffer: where they go
+ * @buffer_size: size of buffer
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, -EINVAL otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_inode_listsecurity(struct inode *inode, char *buffer,
+ size_t buffer_size)
+{
+ int len = sizeof(XATTR_NAME_SMACK);
+
+ if (buffer != NULL && len <= buffer_size)
+ memcpy(buffer, XATTR_NAME_SMACK, len);
+
+ return len;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_getsecid - Extract inode's security id
+ * @inode: inode to extract the info from
+ * @secid: where result will be saved
+ */
+static void smack_inode_getsecid(const struct inode *inode, u32 *secid)
+{
+ struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
+
+ *secid = isp->smk_inode->smk_secid;
+}
+
+/*
+ * File Hooks
+ */
+
+/**
+ * smack_file_permission - Smack check on file operations
+ * @file: unused
+ * @mask: unused
+ *
+ * Returns 0
+ *
+ * Should access checks be done on each read or write?
+ * UNICOS and SELinux say yes.
+ * Trusted Solaris, Trusted Irix, and just about everyone else says no.
+ *
+ * I'll say no for now. Smack does not do the frequent
+ * label changing that SELinux does.
+ */
+static int smack_file_permission(struct file *file, int mask)
+{
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_file_alloc_security - assign a file security blob
+ * @file: the object
+ *
+ * The security blob for a file is a pointer to the master
+ * label list, so no allocation is done.
+ *
+ * f_security is the owner security information. It
+ * isn't used on file access checks, it's for send_sigio.
+ *
+ * Returns 0
+ */
+static int smack_file_alloc_security(struct file *file)
+{
+ struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
+
+ file->f_security = skp;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_file_free_security - clear a file security blob
+ * @file: the object
+ *
+ * The security blob for a file is a pointer to the master
+ * label list, so no memory is freed.
+ */
+static void smack_file_free_security(struct file *file)
+{
+ file->f_security = NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_file_ioctl - Smack check on ioctls
+ * @file: the object
+ * @cmd: what to do
+ * @arg: unused
+ *
+ * Relies heavily on the correct use of the ioctl command conventions.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if allowed, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_file_ioctl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
+ unsigned long arg)
+{
+ int rc = 0;
+ struct smk_audit_info ad;
+ struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
+
+ smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
+ smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
+
+ if (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_WRITE) {
+ rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+ rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_WRITE, rc);
+ }
+
+ if (rc == 0 && (_IOC_DIR(cmd) & _IOC_READ)) {
+ rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_READ, &ad);
+ rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_READ, rc);
+ }
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_file_lock - Smack check on file locking
+ * @file: the object
+ * @cmd: unused
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current has lock access, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_file_lock(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd)
+{
+ struct smk_audit_info ad;
+ int rc;
+ struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
+
+ smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
+ smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
+ rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_LOCK, &ad);
+ rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_LOCK, rc);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_file_fcntl - Smack check on fcntl
+ * @file: the object
+ * @cmd: what action to check
+ * @arg: unused
+ *
+ * Generally these operations are harmless.
+ * File locking operations present an obvious mechanism
+ * for passing information, so they require write access.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current has access, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_file_fcntl(struct file *file, unsigned int cmd,
+ unsigned long arg)
+{
+ struct smk_audit_info ad;
+ int rc = 0;
+ struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
+
+ switch (cmd) {
+ case F_GETLK:
+ break;
+ case F_SETLK:
+ case F_SETLKW:
+ smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
+ smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
+ rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_LOCK, &ad);
+ rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_LOCK, rc);
+ break;
+ case F_SETOWN:
+ case F_SETSIG:
+ smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
+ smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
+ rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+ rc = smk_bu_file(file, MAY_WRITE, rc);
+ break;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_mmap_file :
+ * Check permissions for a mmap operation. The @file may be NULL, e.g.
+ * if mapping anonymous memory.
+ * @file contains the file structure for file to map (may be NULL).
+ * @reqprot contains the protection requested by the application.
+ * @prot contains the protection that will be applied by the kernel.
+ * @flags contains the operational flags.
+ * Return 0 if permission is granted.
+ */
+static int smack_mmap_file(struct file *file,
+ unsigned long reqprot, unsigned long prot,
+ unsigned long flags)
+{
+ struct smack_known *skp;
+ struct smack_known *mkp;
+ struct smack_rule *srp;
+ struct task_smack *tsp;
+ struct smack_known *okp;
+ struct inode_smack *isp;
+ int may;
+ int mmay;
+ int tmay;
+ int rc;
+
+ if (file == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ isp = file_inode(file)->i_security;
+ if (isp->smk_mmap == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ mkp = isp->smk_mmap;
+
+ tsp = current_security();
+ skp = smk_of_current();
+ rc = 0;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ /*
+ * For each Smack rule associated with the subject
+ * label verify that the SMACK64MMAP also has access
+ * to that rule's object label.
+ */
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(srp, &skp->smk_rules, list) {
+ okp = srp->smk_object;
+ /*
+ * Matching labels always allows access.
+ */
+ if (mkp->smk_known == okp->smk_known)
+ continue;
+ /*
+ * If there is a matching local rule take
+ * that into account as well.
+ */
+ may = smk_access_entry(srp->smk_subject->smk_known,
+ okp->smk_known,
+ &tsp->smk_rules);
+ if (may == -ENOENT)
+ may = srp->smk_access;
+ else
+ may &= srp->smk_access;
+ /*
+ * If may is zero the SMACK64MMAP subject can't
+ * possibly have less access.
+ */
+ if (may == 0)
+ continue;
+
+ /*
+ * Fetch the global list entry.
+ * If there isn't one a SMACK64MMAP subject
+ * can't have as much access as current.
+ */
+ mmay = smk_access_entry(mkp->smk_known, okp->smk_known,
+ &mkp->smk_rules);
+ if (mmay == -ENOENT) {
+ rc = -EACCES;
+ break;
+ }
+ /*
+ * If there is a local entry it modifies the
+ * potential access, too.
+ */
+ tmay = smk_access_entry(mkp->smk_known, okp->smk_known,
+ &tsp->smk_rules);
+ if (tmay != -ENOENT)
+ mmay &= tmay;
+
+ /*
+ * If there is any access available to current that is
+ * not available to a SMACK64MMAP subject
+ * deny access.
+ */
+ if ((may | mmay) != mmay) {
+ rc = -EACCES;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_file_set_fowner - set the file security blob value
+ * @file: object in question
+ *
+ */
+static void smack_file_set_fowner(struct file *file)
+{
+ file->f_security = smk_of_current();
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_file_send_sigiotask - Smack on sigio
+ * @tsk: The target task
+ * @fown: the object the signal come from
+ * @signum: unused
+ *
+ * Allow a privileged task to get signals even if it shouldn't
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if a subject with the object's smack could
+ * write to the task, an error code otherwise.
+ */
+static int smack_file_send_sigiotask(struct task_struct *tsk,
+ struct fown_struct *fown, int signum)
+{
+ struct smack_known *skp;
+ struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_task(tsk->cred->security);
+ struct file *file;
+ int rc;
+ struct smk_audit_info ad;
+
+ /*
+ * struct fown_struct is never outside the context of a struct file
+ */
+ file = container_of(fown, struct file, f_owner);
+
+ /* we don't log here as rc can be overriden */
+ skp = file->f_security;
+ rc = smk_access(skp, tkp, MAY_WRITE, NULL);
+ rc = smk_bu_note("sigiotask", skp, tkp, MAY_WRITE, rc);
+ if (rc != 0 && has_capability(tsk, CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
+ rc = 0;
+
+ smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
+ smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, tsk);
+ smack_log(skp->smk_known, tkp->smk_known, MAY_WRITE, rc, &ad);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_file_receive - Smack file receive check
+ * @file: the object
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current has access, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_file_receive(struct file *file)
+{
+ int rc;
+ int may = 0;
+ struct smk_audit_info ad;
+ struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
+
+ if (unlikely(IS_PRIVATE(inode)))
+ return 0;
+
+ smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
+ smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
+ /*
+ * This code relies on bitmasks.
+ */
+ if (file->f_mode & FMODE_READ)
+ may = MAY_READ;
+ if (file->f_mode & FMODE_WRITE)
+ may |= MAY_WRITE;
+
+ rc = smk_curacc(smk_of_inode(inode), may, &ad);
+ rc = smk_bu_file(file, may, rc);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_file_open - Smack dentry open processing
+ * @file: the object
+ * @cred: task credential
+ *
+ * Set the security blob in the file structure.
+ * Allow the open only if the task has read access. There are
+ * many read operations (e.g. fstat) that you can do with an
+ * fd even if you have the file open write-only.
+ *
+ * Returns 0
+ */
+static int smack_file_open(struct file *file, const struct cred *cred)
+{
+ struct task_smack *tsp = cred->security;
+ struct inode *inode = file_inode(file);
+ struct smk_audit_info ad;
+ int rc;
+
+ if (smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
+ return 0;
+
+ smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_PATH);
+ smk_ad_setfield_u_fs_path(&ad, file->f_path);
+ rc = smk_access(tsp->smk_task, smk_of_inode(inode), MAY_READ, &ad);
+ rc = smk_bu_credfile(cred, file, MAY_READ, rc);
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Task hooks
+ */
+
+/**
+ * smack_cred_alloc_blank - "allocate" blank task-level security credentials
+ * @new: the new credentials
+ * @gfp: the atomicity of any memory allocations
+ *
+ * Prepare a blank set of credentials for modification. This must allocate all
+ * the memory the LSM module might require such that cred_transfer() can
+ * complete without error.
+ */
+static int smack_cred_alloc_blank(struct cred *cred, gfp_t gfp)
+{
+ struct task_smack *tsp;
+
+ tsp = new_task_smack(NULL, NULL, gfp);
+ if (tsp == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ cred->security = tsp;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * smack_cred_free - "free" task-level security credentials
+ * @cred: the credentials in question
+ *
+ */
+static void smack_cred_free(struct cred *cred)
+{
+ struct task_smack *tsp = cred->security;
+ struct smack_rule *rp;
+ struct list_head *l;
+ struct list_head *n;
+
+ if (tsp == NULL)
+ return;
+ cred->security = NULL;
+
+ smk_destroy_label_list(&tsp->smk_relabel);
+
+ list_for_each_safe(l, n, &tsp->smk_rules) {
+ rp = list_entry(l, struct smack_rule, list);
+ list_del(&rp->list);
+ kfree(rp);
+ }
+ kfree(tsp);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_cred_prepare - prepare new set of credentials for modification
+ * @new: the new credentials
+ * @old: the original credentials
+ * @gfp: the atomicity of any memory allocations
+ *
+ * Prepare a new set of credentials for modification.
+ */
+static int smack_cred_prepare(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old,
+ gfp_t gfp)
+{
+ struct task_smack *old_tsp = old->security;
+ struct task_smack *new_tsp;
+ int rc;
+
+ new_tsp = new_task_smack(old_tsp->smk_task, old_tsp->smk_task, gfp);
+ if (new_tsp == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ rc = smk_copy_rules(&new_tsp->smk_rules, &old_tsp->smk_rules, gfp);
+ if (rc != 0)
+ return rc;
+
+ rc = smk_copy_relabel(&new_tsp->smk_relabel, &old_tsp->smk_relabel,
+ gfp);
+ if (rc != 0)
+ return rc;
+
+ new->security = new_tsp;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_cred_transfer - Transfer the old credentials to the new credentials
+ * @new: the new credentials
+ * @old: the original credentials
+ *
+ * Fill in a set of blank credentials from another set of credentials.
+ */
+static void smack_cred_transfer(struct cred *new, const struct cred *old)
+{
+ struct task_smack *old_tsp = old->security;
+ struct task_smack *new_tsp = new->security;
+
+ new_tsp->smk_task = old_tsp->smk_task;
+ new_tsp->smk_forked = old_tsp->smk_task;
+ mutex_init(&new_tsp->smk_rules_lock);
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&new_tsp->smk_rules);
+
+
+ /* cbs copy rule list */
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_kernel_act_as - Set the subjective context in a set of credentials
+ * @new: points to the set of credentials to be modified.
+ * @secid: specifies the security ID to be set
+ *
+ * Set the security data for a kernel service.
+ */
+static int smack_kernel_act_as(struct cred *new, u32 secid)
+{
+ struct task_smack *new_tsp = new->security;
+ struct smack_known *skp = smack_from_secid(secid);
+
+ if (skp == NULL)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ new_tsp->smk_task = skp;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_kernel_create_files_as - Set the file creation label in a set of creds
+ * @new: points to the set of credentials to be modified
+ * @inode: points to the inode to use as a reference
+ *
+ * Set the file creation context in a set of credentials to the same
+ * as the objective context of the specified inode
+ */
+static int smack_kernel_create_files_as(struct cred *new,
+ struct inode *inode)
+{
+ struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
+ struct task_smack *tsp = new->security;
+
+ tsp->smk_forked = isp->smk_inode;
+ tsp->smk_task = tsp->smk_forked;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_curacc_on_task - helper to log task related access
+ * @p: the task object
+ * @access: the access requested
+ * @caller: name of the calling function for audit
+ *
+ * Return 0 if access is permitted
+ */
+static int smk_curacc_on_task(struct task_struct *p, int access,
+ const char *caller)
+{
+ struct smk_audit_info ad;
+ struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct(p);
+ int rc;
+
+ smk_ad_init(&ad, caller, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
+ smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, p);
+ rc = smk_curacc(skp, access, &ad);
+ rc = smk_bu_task(p, access, rc);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_task_setpgid - Smack check on setting pgid
+ * @p: the task object
+ * @pgid: unused
+ *
+ * Return 0 if write access is permitted
+ */
+static int smack_task_setpgid(struct task_struct *p, pid_t pgid)
+{
+ return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_task_getpgid - Smack access check for getpgid
+ * @p: the object task
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current can read the object task, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_task_getpgid(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+ return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ, __func__);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_task_getsid - Smack access check for getsid
+ * @p: the object task
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current can read the object task, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_task_getsid(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+ return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ, __func__);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_task_getsecid - get the secid of the task
+ * @p: the object task
+ * @secid: where to put the result
+ *
+ * Sets the secid to contain a u32 version of the smack label.
+ */
+static void smack_task_getsecid(struct task_struct *p, u32 *secid)
+{
+ struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct(p);
+
+ *secid = skp->smk_secid;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_task_setnice - Smack check on setting nice
+ * @p: the task object
+ * @nice: unused
+ *
+ * Return 0 if write access is permitted
+ */
+static int smack_task_setnice(struct task_struct *p, int nice)
+{
+ return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_task_setioprio - Smack check on setting ioprio
+ * @p: the task object
+ * @ioprio: unused
+ *
+ * Return 0 if write access is permitted
+ */
+static int smack_task_setioprio(struct task_struct *p, int ioprio)
+{
+ return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_task_getioprio - Smack check on reading ioprio
+ * @p: the task object
+ *
+ * Return 0 if read access is permitted
+ */
+static int smack_task_getioprio(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+ return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ, __func__);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_task_setscheduler - Smack check on setting scheduler
+ * @p: the task object
+ * @policy: unused
+ * @lp: unused
+ *
+ * Return 0 if read access is permitted
+ */
+static int smack_task_setscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+ return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_task_getscheduler - Smack check on reading scheduler
+ * @p: the task object
+ *
+ * Return 0 if read access is permitted
+ */
+static int smack_task_getscheduler(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+ return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_READ, __func__);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_task_movememory - Smack check on moving memory
+ * @p: the task object
+ *
+ * Return 0 if write access is permitted
+ */
+static int smack_task_movememory(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+ return smk_curacc_on_task(p, MAY_WRITE, __func__);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_task_kill - Smack check on signal delivery
+ * @p: the task object
+ * @info: unused
+ * @sig: unused
+ * @secid: identifies the smack to use in lieu of current's
+ *
+ * Return 0 if write access is permitted
+ *
+ * The secid behavior is an artifact of an SELinux hack
+ * in the USB code. Someday it may go away.
+ */
+static int smack_task_kill(struct task_struct *p, struct siginfo *info,
+ int sig, u32 secid)
+{
+ struct smk_audit_info ad;
+ struct smack_known *skp;
+ struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_task_struct(p);
+ int rc;
+
+ smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_TASK);
+ smk_ad_setfield_u_tsk(&ad, p);
+ /*
+ * Sending a signal requires that the sender
+ * can write the receiver.
+ */
+ if (secid == 0) {
+ rc = smk_curacc(tkp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+ rc = smk_bu_task(p, MAY_WRITE, rc);
+ return rc;
+ }
+ /*
+ * If the secid isn't 0 we're dealing with some USB IO
+ * specific behavior. This is not clean. For one thing
+ * we can't take privilege into account.
+ */
+ skp = smack_from_secid(secid);
+ rc = smk_access(skp, tkp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+ rc = smk_bu_note("USB signal", skp, tkp, MAY_WRITE, rc);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_task_wait - Smack access check for waiting
+ * @p: task to wait for
+ *
+ * Returns 0
+ */
+static int smack_task_wait(struct task_struct *p)
+{
+ /*
+ * Allow the operation to succeed.
+ * Zombies are bad.
+ * In userless environments (e.g. phones) programs
+ * get marked with SMACK64EXEC and even if the parent
+ * and child shouldn't be talking the parent still
+ * may expect to know when the child exits.
+ */
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_task_to_inode - copy task smack into the inode blob
+ * @p: task to copy from
+ * @inode: inode to copy to
+ *
+ * Sets the smack pointer in the inode security blob
+ */
+static void smack_task_to_inode(struct task_struct *p, struct inode *inode)
+{
+ struct inode_smack *isp = inode->i_security;
+ struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct(p);
+
+ isp->smk_inode = skp;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Socket hooks.
+ */
+
+/**
+ * smack_sk_alloc_security - Allocate a socket blob
+ * @sk: the socket
+ * @family: unused
+ * @gfp_flags: memory allocation flags
+ *
+ * Assign Smack pointers to current
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, -ENOMEM is there's no memory
+ */
+static int smack_sk_alloc_security(struct sock *sk, int family, gfp_t gfp_flags)
+{
+ struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
+ struct socket_smack *ssp;
+
+ ssp = kzalloc(sizeof(struct socket_smack), gfp_flags);
+ if (ssp == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ ssp->smk_in = skp;
+ ssp->smk_out = skp;
+ ssp->smk_packet = NULL;
+
+ sk->sk_security = ssp;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_sk_free_security - Free a socket blob
+ * @sk: the socket
+ *
+ * Clears the blob pointer
+ */
+static void smack_sk_free_security(struct sock *sk)
+{
+ kfree(sk->sk_security);
+}
+
+/**
+* smack_ipv4host_label - check host based restrictions
+* @sip: the object end
+*
+* looks for host based access restrictions
+*
+* This version will only be appropriate for really small sets of single label
+* hosts. The caller is responsible for ensuring that the RCU read lock is
+* taken before calling this function.
+*
+* Returns the label of the far end or NULL if it's not special.
+*/
+static struct smack_known *smack_ipv4host_label(struct sockaddr_in *sip)
+{
+ struct smk_net4addr *snp;
+ struct in_addr *siap = &sip->sin_addr;
+
+ if (siap->s_addr == 0)
+ return NULL;
+
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(snp, &smk_net4addr_list, list)
+ /*
+ * we break after finding the first match because
+ * the list is sorted from longest to shortest mask
+ * so we have found the most specific match
+ */
+ if (snp->smk_host.s_addr ==
+ (siap->s_addr & snp->smk_mask.s_addr))
+ return snp->smk_label;
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+/*
+ * smk_ipv6_localhost - Check for local ipv6 host address
+ * @sip: the address
+ *
+ * Returns boolean true if this is the localhost address
+ */
+static bool smk_ipv6_localhost(struct sockaddr_in6 *sip)
+{
+ __be16 *be16p = (__be16 *)&sip->sin6_addr;
+ __be32 *be32p = (__be32 *)&sip->sin6_addr;
+
+ if (be32p[0] == 0 && be32p[1] == 0 && be32p[2] == 0 && be16p[6] == 0 &&
+ ntohs(be16p[7]) == 1)
+ return true;
+ return false;
+}
+
+/**
+* smack_ipv6host_label - check host based restrictions
+* @sip: the object end
+*
+* looks for host based access restrictions
+*
+* This version will only be appropriate for really small sets of single label
+* hosts. The caller is responsible for ensuring that the RCU read lock is
+* taken before calling this function.
+*
+* Returns the label of the far end or NULL if it's not special.
+*/
+static struct smack_known *smack_ipv6host_label(struct sockaddr_in6 *sip)
+{
+ struct smk_net6addr *snp;
+ struct in6_addr *sap = &sip->sin6_addr;
+ int i;
+ int found = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * It's local. Don't look for a host label.
+ */
+ if (smk_ipv6_localhost(sip))
+ return NULL;
+
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(snp, &smk_net6addr_list, list) {
+ /*
+ * we break after finding the first match because
+ * the list is sorted from longest to shortest mask
+ * so we have found the most specific match
+ */
+ for (found = 1, i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
+ /*
+ * If the label is NULL the entry has
+ * been renounced. Ignore it.
+ */
+ if (snp->smk_label == NULL)
+ continue;
+ if ((sap->s6_addr16[i] & snp->smk_mask.s6_addr16[i]) !=
+ snp->smk_host.s6_addr16[i]) {
+ found = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (found)
+ return snp->smk_label;
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
+
+/**
+ * smack_netlabel - Set the secattr on a socket
+ * @sk: the socket
+ * @labeled: socket label scheme
+ *
+ * Convert the outbound smack value (smk_out) to a
+ * secattr and attach it to the socket.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success or an error code
+ */
+static int smack_netlabel(struct sock *sk, int labeled)
+{
+ struct smack_known *skp;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Usually the netlabel code will handle changing the
+ * packet labeling based on the label.
+ * The case of a single label host is different, because
+ * a single label host should never get a labeled packet
+ * even though the label is usually associated with a packet
+ * label.
+ */
+ local_bh_disable();
+ bh_lock_sock_nested(sk);
+
+ if (ssp->smk_out == smack_net_ambient ||
+ labeled == SMACK_UNLABELED_SOCKET)
+ netlbl_sock_delattr(sk);
+ else {
+ skp = ssp->smk_out;
+ rc = netlbl_sock_setattr(sk, sk->sk_family, &skp->smk_netlabel);
+ }
+
+ bh_unlock_sock(sk);
+ local_bh_enable();
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_netlbel_send - Set the secattr on a socket and perform access checks
+ * @sk: the socket
+ * @sap: the destination address
+ *
+ * Set the correct secattr for the given socket based on the destination
+ * address and perform any outbound access checks needed.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success or an error code.
+ *
+ */
+static int smack_netlabel_send(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in *sap)
+{
+ struct smack_known *skp;
+ int rc;
+ int sk_lbl;
+ struct smack_known *hkp;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ struct smk_audit_info ad;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ hkp = smack_ipv4host_label(sap);
+ if (hkp != NULL) {
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+ struct lsm_network_audit net;
+
+ smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
+ ad.a.u.net->family = sap->sin_family;
+ ad.a.u.net->dport = sap->sin_port;
+ ad.a.u.net->v4info.daddr = sap->sin_addr.s_addr;
+#endif
+ sk_lbl = SMACK_UNLABELED_SOCKET;
+ skp = ssp->smk_out;
+ rc = smk_access(skp, hkp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+ rc = smk_bu_note("IPv4 host check", skp, hkp, MAY_WRITE, rc);
+ } else {
+ sk_lbl = SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET;
+ rc = 0;
+ }
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+ if (rc != 0)
+ return rc;
+
+ return smack_netlabel(sk, sk_lbl);
+}
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+/**
+ * smk_ipv6_check - check Smack access
+ * @subject: subject Smack label
+ * @object: object Smack label
+ * @address: address
+ * @act: the action being taken
+ *
+ * Check an IPv6 access
+ */
+static int smk_ipv6_check(struct smack_known *subject,
+ struct smack_known *object,
+ struct sockaddr_in6 *address, int act)
+{
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+ struct lsm_network_audit net;
+#endif
+ struct smk_audit_info ad;
+ int rc;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+ smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
+ ad.a.u.net->family = PF_INET6;
+ ad.a.u.net->dport = ntohs(address->sin6_port);
+ if (act == SMK_RECEIVING)
+ ad.a.u.net->v6info.saddr = address->sin6_addr;
+ else
+ ad.a.u.net->v6info.daddr = address->sin6_addr;
+#endif
+ rc = smk_access(subject, object, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+ rc = smk_bu_note("IPv6 check", subject, object, MAY_WRITE, rc);
+ return rc;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
+
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
+/**
+ * smk_ipv6_port_label - Smack port access table management
+ * @sock: socket
+ * @address: address
+ *
+ * Create or update the port list entry
+ */
+static void smk_ipv6_port_label(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address)
+{
+ struct sock *sk = sock->sk;
+ struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ struct smk_port_label *spp;
+ unsigned short port = 0;
+
+ if (address == NULL) {
+ /*
+ * This operation is changing the Smack information
+ * on the bound socket. Take the changes to the port
+ * as well.
+ */
+ list_for_each_entry(spp, &smk_ipv6_port_list, list) {
+ if (sk != spp->smk_sock)
+ continue;
+ spp->smk_in = ssp->smk_in;
+ spp->smk_out = ssp->smk_out;
+ return;
+ }
+ /*
+ * A NULL address is only used for updating existing
+ * bound entries. If there isn't one, it's OK.
+ */
+ return;
+ }
+
+ addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)address;
+ port = ntohs(addr6->sin6_port);
+ /*
+ * This is a special case that is safely ignored.
+ */
+ if (port == 0)
+ return;
+
+ /*
+ * Look for an existing port list entry.
+ * This is an indication that a port is getting reused.
+ */
+ list_for_each_entry(spp, &smk_ipv6_port_list, list) {
+ if (spp->smk_port != port)
+ continue;
+ spp->smk_port = port;
+ spp->smk_sock = sk;
+ spp->smk_in = ssp->smk_in;
+ spp->smk_out = ssp->smk_out;
+ return;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * A new port entry is required.
+ */
+ spp = kzalloc(sizeof(*spp), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (spp == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ spp->smk_port = port;
+ spp->smk_sock = sk;
+ spp->smk_in = ssp->smk_in;
+ spp->smk_out = ssp->smk_out;
+
+ list_add(&spp->list, &smk_ipv6_port_list);
+ return;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_ipv6_port_check - check Smack port access
+ * @sock: socket
+ * @address: address
+ *
+ * Create or update the port list entry
+ */
+static int smk_ipv6_port_check(struct sock *sk, struct sockaddr_in6 *address,
+ int act)
+{
+ struct smk_port_label *spp;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
+ unsigned short port;
+ struct smack_known *object;
+
+ if (act == SMK_RECEIVING) {
+ skp = smack_ipv6host_label(address);
+ object = ssp->smk_in;
+ } else {
+ skp = ssp->smk_out;
+ object = smack_ipv6host_label(address);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * The other end is a single label host.
+ */
+ if (skp != NULL && object != NULL)
+ return smk_ipv6_check(skp, object, address, act);
+ if (skp == NULL)
+ skp = smack_net_ambient;
+ if (object == NULL)
+ object = smack_net_ambient;
+
+ /*
+ * It's remote, so port lookup does no good.
+ */
+ if (!smk_ipv6_localhost(address))
+ return smk_ipv6_check(skp, object, address, act);
+
+ /*
+ * It's local so the send check has to have passed.
+ */
+ if (act == SMK_RECEIVING)
+ return 0;
+
+ port = ntohs(address->sin6_port);
+ list_for_each_entry(spp, &smk_ipv6_port_list, list) {
+ if (spp->smk_port != port)
+ continue;
+ object = spp->smk_in;
+ if (act == SMK_CONNECTING)
+ ssp->smk_packet = spp->smk_out;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return smk_ipv6_check(skp, object, address, act);
+}
+#endif /* SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING */
+
+/**
+ * smack_inode_setsecurity - set smack xattrs
+ * @inode: the object
+ * @name: attribute name
+ * @value: attribute value
+ * @size: size of the attribute
+ * @flags: unused
+ *
+ * Sets the named attribute in the appropriate blob
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, or an error code
+ */
+static int smack_inode_setsecurity(struct inode *inode, const char *name,
+ const void *value, size_t size, int flags)
+{
+ struct smack_known *skp;
+ struct inode_smack *nsp = inode->i_security;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp;
+ struct socket *sock;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ if (value == NULL || size > SMK_LONGLABEL || size == 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
+ if (IS_ERR(skp))
+ return PTR_ERR(skp);
+
+ if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX) == 0) {
+ nsp->smk_inode = skp;
+ nsp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_INSTANT;
+ return 0;
+ }
+ /*
+ * The rest of the Smack xattrs are only on sockets.
+ */
+ if (inode->i_sb->s_magic != SOCKFS_MAGIC)
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+ sock = SOCKET_I(inode);
+ if (sock == NULL || sock->sk == NULL)
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+ ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+
+ if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPIN) == 0)
+ ssp->smk_in = skp;
+ else if (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_IPOUT) == 0) {
+ ssp->smk_out = skp;
+ if (sock->sk->sk_family == PF_INET) {
+ rc = smack_netlabel(sock->sk, SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET);
+ if (rc != 0)
+ printk(KERN_WARNING
+ "Smack: \"%s\" netlbl error %d.\n",
+ __func__, -rc);
+ }
+ } else
+ return -EOPNOTSUPP;
+
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
+ if (sock->sk->sk_family == PF_INET6)
+ smk_ipv6_port_label(sock, NULL);
+#endif
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_socket_post_create - finish socket setup
+ * @sock: the socket
+ * @family: protocol family
+ * @type: unused
+ * @protocol: unused
+ * @kern: unused
+ *
+ * Sets the netlabel information on the socket
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, and error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_socket_post_create(struct socket *sock, int family,
+ int type, int protocol, int kern)
+{
+ struct socket_smack *ssp;
+
+ if (sock->sk == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Sockets created by kernel threads receive web label.
+ */
+ if (unlikely(current->flags & PF_KTHREAD)) {
+ ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ ssp->smk_in = &smack_known_web;
+ ssp->smk_out = &smack_known_web;
+ }
+
+ if (family != PF_INET)
+ return 0;
+ /*
+ * Set the outbound netlbl.
+ */
+ return smack_netlabel(sock->sk, SMACK_CIPSO_SOCKET);
+}
+
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
+/**
+ * smack_socket_bind - record port binding information.
+ * @sock: the socket
+ * @address: the port address
+ * @addrlen: size of the address
+ *
+ * Records the label bound to a port.
+ *
+ * Returns 0
+ */
+static int smack_socket_bind(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *address,
+ int addrlen)
+{
+ if (sock->sk != NULL && sock->sk->sk_family == PF_INET6)
+ smk_ipv6_port_label(sock, address);
+ return 0;
+}
+#endif /* SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING */
+
+/**
+ * smack_socket_connect - connect access check
+ * @sock: the socket
+ * @sap: the other end
+ * @addrlen: size of sap
+ *
+ * Verifies that a connection may be possible
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, and error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_socket_connect(struct socket *sock, struct sockaddr *sap,
+ int addrlen)
+{
+ int rc = 0;
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+ struct sockaddr_in6 *sip = (struct sockaddr_in6 *)sap;
+#endif
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
+ struct smack_known *rsp;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+#endif
+
+ if (sock->sk == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ switch (sock->sk->sk_family) {
+ case PF_INET:
+ if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in))
+ return -EINVAL;
+ rc = smack_netlabel_send(sock->sk, (struct sockaddr_in *)sap);
+ break;
+ case PF_INET6:
+ if (addrlen < sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6))
+ return -EINVAL;
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
+ rsp = smack_ipv6host_label(sip);
+ if (rsp != NULL)
+ rc = smk_ipv6_check(ssp->smk_out, rsp, sip,
+ SMK_CONNECTING);
+#endif
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
+ rc = smk_ipv6_port_check(sock->sk, sip, SMK_CONNECTING);
+#endif
+ break;
+ }
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_flags_to_may - convert S_ to MAY_ values
+ * @flags: the S_ value
+ *
+ * Returns the equivalent MAY_ value
+ */
+static int smack_flags_to_may(int flags)
+{
+ int may = 0;
+
+ if (flags & S_IRUGO)
+ may |= MAY_READ;
+ if (flags & S_IWUGO)
+ may |= MAY_WRITE;
+ if (flags & S_IXUGO)
+ may |= MAY_EXEC;
+
+ return may;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_msg_msg_alloc_security - Set the security blob for msg_msg
+ * @msg: the object
+ *
+ * Returns 0
+ */
+static int smack_msg_msg_alloc_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
+{
+ struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
+
+ msg->security = skp;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_msg_msg_free_security - Clear the security blob for msg_msg
+ * @msg: the object
+ *
+ * Clears the blob pointer
+ */
+static void smack_msg_msg_free_security(struct msg_msg *msg)
+{
+ msg->security = NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_of_shm - the smack pointer for the shm
+ * @shp: the object
+ *
+ * Returns a pointer to the smack value
+ */
+static struct smack_known *smack_of_shm(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
+{
+ return (struct smack_known *)shp->shm_perm.security;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_shm_alloc_security - Set the security blob for shm
+ * @shp: the object
+ *
+ * Returns 0
+ */
+static int smack_shm_alloc_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
+{
+ struct kern_ipc_perm *isp = &shp->shm_perm;
+ struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
+
+ isp->security = skp;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_shm_free_security - Clear the security blob for shm
+ * @shp: the object
+ *
+ * Clears the blob pointer
+ */
+static void smack_shm_free_security(struct shmid_kernel *shp)
+{
+ struct kern_ipc_perm *isp = &shp->shm_perm;
+
+ isp->security = NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_curacc_shm : check if current has access on shm
+ * @shp : the object
+ * @access : access requested
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smk_curacc_shm(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int access)
+{
+ struct smack_known *ssp = smack_of_shm(shp);
+ struct smk_audit_info ad;
+ int rc;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+ smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
+ ad.a.u.ipc_id = shp->shm_perm.id;
+#endif
+ rc = smk_curacc(ssp, access, &ad);
+ rc = smk_bu_current("shm", ssp, access, rc);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_shm_associate - Smack access check for shm
+ * @shp: the object
+ * @shmflg: access requested
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_shm_associate(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int shmflg)
+{
+ int may;
+
+ may = smack_flags_to_may(shmflg);
+ return smk_curacc_shm(shp, may);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_shm_shmctl - Smack access check for shm
+ * @shp: the object
+ * @cmd: what it wants to do
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_shm_shmctl(struct shmid_kernel *shp, int cmd)
+{
+ int may;
+
+ switch (cmd) {
+ case IPC_STAT:
+ case SHM_STAT:
+ may = MAY_READ;
+ break;
+ case IPC_SET:
+ case SHM_LOCK:
+ case SHM_UNLOCK:
+ case IPC_RMID:
+ may = MAY_READWRITE;
+ break;
+ case IPC_INFO:
+ case SHM_INFO:
+ /*
+ * System level information.
+ */
+ return 0;
+ default:
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ return smk_curacc_shm(shp, may);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_shm_shmat - Smack access for shmat
+ * @shp: the object
+ * @shmaddr: unused
+ * @shmflg: access requested
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_shm_shmat(struct shmid_kernel *shp, char __user *shmaddr,
+ int shmflg)
+{
+ int may;
+
+ may = smack_flags_to_may(shmflg);
+ return smk_curacc_shm(shp, may);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_of_sem - the smack pointer for the sem
+ * @sma: the object
+ *
+ * Returns a pointer to the smack value
+ */
+static struct smack_known *smack_of_sem(struct sem_array *sma)
+{
+ return (struct smack_known *)sma->sem_perm.security;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_sem_alloc_security - Set the security blob for sem
+ * @sma: the object
+ *
+ * Returns 0
+ */
+static int smack_sem_alloc_security(struct sem_array *sma)
+{
+ struct kern_ipc_perm *isp = &sma->sem_perm;
+ struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
+
+ isp->security = skp;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_sem_free_security - Clear the security blob for sem
+ * @sma: the object
+ *
+ * Clears the blob pointer
+ */
+static void smack_sem_free_security(struct sem_array *sma)
+{
+ struct kern_ipc_perm *isp = &sma->sem_perm;
+
+ isp->security = NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_curacc_sem : check if current has access on sem
+ * @sma : the object
+ * @access : access requested
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smk_curacc_sem(struct sem_array *sma, int access)
+{
+ struct smack_known *ssp = smack_of_sem(sma);
+ struct smk_audit_info ad;
+ int rc;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+ smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
+ ad.a.u.ipc_id = sma->sem_perm.id;
+#endif
+ rc = smk_curacc(ssp, access, &ad);
+ rc = smk_bu_current("sem", ssp, access, rc);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_sem_associate - Smack access check for sem
+ * @sma: the object
+ * @semflg: access requested
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_sem_associate(struct sem_array *sma, int semflg)
+{
+ int may;
+
+ may = smack_flags_to_may(semflg);
+ return smk_curacc_sem(sma, may);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_sem_shmctl - Smack access check for sem
+ * @sma: the object
+ * @cmd: what it wants to do
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_sem_semctl(struct sem_array *sma, int cmd)
+{
+ int may;
+
+ switch (cmd) {
+ case GETPID:
+ case GETNCNT:
+ case GETZCNT:
+ case GETVAL:
+ case GETALL:
+ case IPC_STAT:
+ case SEM_STAT:
+ may = MAY_READ;
+ break;
+ case SETVAL:
+ case SETALL:
+ case IPC_RMID:
+ case IPC_SET:
+ may = MAY_READWRITE;
+ break;
+ case IPC_INFO:
+ case SEM_INFO:
+ /*
+ * System level information
+ */
+ return 0;
+ default:
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ return smk_curacc_sem(sma, may);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_sem_semop - Smack checks of semaphore operations
+ * @sma: the object
+ * @sops: unused
+ * @nsops: unused
+ * @alter: unused
+ *
+ * Treated as read and write in all cases.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if access is allowed, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_sem_semop(struct sem_array *sma, struct sembuf *sops,
+ unsigned nsops, int alter)
+{
+ return smk_curacc_sem(sma, MAY_READWRITE);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_msg_alloc_security - Set the security blob for msg
+ * @msq: the object
+ *
+ * Returns 0
+ */
+static int smack_msg_queue_alloc_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
+{
+ struct kern_ipc_perm *kisp = &msq->q_perm;
+ struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
+
+ kisp->security = skp;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_msg_free_security - Clear the security blob for msg
+ * @msq: the object
+ *
+ * Clears the blob pointer
+ */
+static void smack_msg_queue_free_security(struct msg_queue *msq)
+{
+ struct kern_ipc_perm *kisp = &msq->q_perm;
+
+ kisp->security = NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_of_msq - the smack pointer for the msq
+ * @msq: the object
+ *
+ * Returns a pointer to the smack label entry
+ */
+static struct smack_known *smack_of_msq(struct msg_queue *msq)
+{
+ return (struct smack_known *)msq->q_perm.security;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_curacc_msq : helper to check if current has access on msq
+ * @msq : the msq
+ * @access : access requested
+ *
+ * return 0 if current has access, error otherwise
+ */
+static int smk_curacc_msq(struct msg_queue *msq, int access)
+{
+ struct smack_known *msp = smack_of_msq(msq);
+ struct smk_audit_info ad;
+ int rc;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+ smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
+ ad.a.u.ipc_id = msq->q_perm.id;
+#endif
+ rc = smk_curacc(msp, access, &ad);
+ rc = smk_bu_current("msq", msp, access, rc);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_msg_queue_associate - Smack access check for msg_queue
+ * @msq: the object
+ * @msqflg: access requested
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_msg_queue_associate(struct msg_queue *msq, int msqflg)
+{
+ int may;
+
+ may = smack_flags_to_may(msqflg);
+ return smk_curacc_msq(msq, may);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_msg_queue_msgctl - Smack access check for msg_queue
+ * @msq: the object
+ * @cmd: what it wants to do
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_msg_queue_msgctl(struct msg_queue *msq, int cmd)
+{
+ int may;
+
+ switch (cmd) {
+ case IPC_STAT:
+ case MSG_STAT:
+ may = MAY_READ;
+ break;
+ case IPC_SET:
+ case IPC_RMID:
+ may = MAY_READWRITE;
+ break;
+ case IPC_INFO:
+ case MSG_INFO:
+ /*
+ * System level information
+ */
+ return 0;
+ default:
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ return smk_curacc_msq(msq, may);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_msg_queue_msgsnd - Smack access check for msg_queue
+ * @msq: the object
+ * @msg: unused
+ * @msqflg: access requested
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current has the requested access, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_msg_queue_msgsnd(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
+ int msqflg)
+{
+ int may;
+
+ may = smack_flags_to_may(msqflg);
+ return smk_curacc_msq(msq, may);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_msg_queue_msgsnd - Smack access check for msg_queue
+ * @msq: the object
+ * @msg: unused
+ * @target: unused
+ * @type: unused
+ * @mode: unused
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current has read and write access, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_msg_queue_msgrcv(struct msg_queue *msq, struct msg_msg *msg,
+ struct task_struct *target, long type, int mode)
+{
+ return smk_curacc_msq(msq, MAY_READWRITE);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_ipc_permission - Smack access for ipc_permission()
+ * @ipp: the object permissions
+ * @flag: access requested
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if current has read and write access, error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_ipc_permission(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipp, short flag)
+{
+ struct smack_known *iskp = ipp->security;
+ int may = smack_flags_to_may(flag);
+ struct smk_audit_info ad;
+ int rc;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+ smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_IPC);
+ ad.a.u.ipc_id = ipp->id;
+#endif
+ rc = smk_curacc(iskp, may, &ad);
+ rc = smk_bu_current("svipc", iskp, may, rc);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_ipc_getsecid - Extract smack security id
+ * @ipp: the object permissions
+ * @secid: where result will be saved
+ */
+static void smack_ipc_getsecid(struct kern_ipc_perm *ipp, u32 *secid)
+{
+ struct smack_known *iskp = ipp->security;
+
+ *secid = iskp->smk_secid;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_d_instantiate - Make sure the blob is correct on an inode
+ * @opt_dentry: dentry where inode will be attached
+ * @inode: the object
+ *
+ * Set the inode's security blob if it hasn't been done already.
+ */
+static void smack_d_instantiate(struct dentry *opt_dentry, struct inode *inode)
+{
+ struct super_block *sbp;
+ struct superblock_smack *sbsp;
+ struct inode_smack *isp;
+ struct smack_known *skp;
+ struct smack_known *ckp = smk_of_current();
+ struct smack_known *final;
+ char trattr[TRANS_TRUE_SIZE];
+ int transflag = 0;
+ int rc;
+ struct dentry *dp;
+
+ if (inode == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ isp = inode->i_security;
+
+ mutex_lock(&isp->smk_lock);
+ /*
+ * If the inode is already instantiated
+ * take the quick way out
+ */
+ if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_INSTANT)
+ goto unlockandout;
+
+ sbp = inode->i_sb;
+ sbsp = sbp->s_security;
+ /*
+ * We're going to use the superblock default label
+ * if there's no label on the file.
+ */
+ final = sbsp->smk_default;
+
+ /*
+ * If this is the root inode the superblock
+ * may be in the process of initialization.
+ * If that is the case use the root value out
+ * of the superblock.
+ */
+ if (opt_dentry->d_parent == opt_dentry) {
+ switch (sbp->s_magic) {
+ case CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC:
+ /*
+ * The cgroup filesystem is never mounted,
+ * so there's no opportunity to set the mount
+ * options.
+ */
+ sbsp->smk_root = &smack_known_star;
+ sbsp->smk_default = &smack_known_star;
+ isp->smk_inode = sbsp->smk_root;
+ break;
+ case TMPFS_MAGIC:
+ /*
+ * What about shmem/tmpfs anonymous files with dentry
+ * obtained from d_alloc_pseudo()?
+ */
+ isp->smk_inode = smk_of_current();
+ break;
+ case PIPEFS_MAGIC:
+ isp->smk_inode = smk_of_current();
+ break;
+ default:
+ isp->smk_inode = sbsp->smk_root;
+ break;
+ }
+ isp->smk_flags |= SMK_INODE_INSTANT;
+ goto unlockandout;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * This is pretty hackish.
+ * Casey says that we shouldn't have to do
+ * file system specific code, but it does help
+ * with keeping it simple.
+ */
+ switch (sbp->s_magic) {
+ case SMACK_MAGIC:
+ case PIPEFS_MAGIC:
+ case SOCKFS_MAGIC:
+ case CGROUP_SUPER_MAGIC:
+ /*
+ * Casey says that it's a little embarrassing
+ * that the smack file system doesn't do
+ * extended attributes.
+ *
+ * Casey says pipes are easy (?)
+ *
+ * Socket access is controlled by the socket
+ * structures associated with the task involved.
+ *
+ * Cgroupfs is special
+ */
+ final = &smack_known_star;
+ break;
+ case DEVPTS_SUPER_MAGIC:
+ /*
+ * devpts seems content with the label of the task.
+ * Programs that change smack have to treat the
+ * pty with respect.
+ */
+ final = ckp;
+ break;
+ case PROC_SUPER_MAGIC:
+ /*
+ * Casey says procfs appears not to care.
+ * The superblock default suffices.
+ */
+ break;
+ case TMPFS_MAGIC:
+ /*
+ * Device labels should come from the filesystem,
+ * but watch out, because they're volitile,
+ * getting recreated on every reboot.
+ */
+ final = &smack_known_star;
+ /*
+ * No break.
+ *
+ * If a smack value has been set we want to use it,
+ * but since tmpfs isn't giving us the opportunity
+ * to set mount options simulate setting the
+ * superblock default.
+ */
+ default:
+ /*
+ * This isn't an understood special case.
+ * Get the value from the xattr.
+ */
+
+ /*
+ * UNIX domain sockets use lower level socket data.
+ */
+ if (S_ISSOCK(inode->i_mode)) {
+ final = &smack_known_star;
+ break;
+ }
+ /*
+ * No xattr support means, alas, no SMACK label.
+ * Use the aforeapplied default.
+ * It would be curious if the label of the task
+ * does not match that assigned.
+ */
+ if (inode->i_op->getxattr == NULL)
+ break;
+ /*
+ * Get the dentry for xattr.
+ */
+ dp = dget(opt_dentry);
+ skp = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACK, inode, dp);
+ if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(skp))
+ final = skp;
+
+ /*
+ * Transmuting directory
+ */
+ if (S_ISDIR(inode->i_mode)) {
+ /*
+ * If this is a new directory and the label was
+ * transmuted when the inode was initialized
+ * set the transmute attribute on the directory
+ * and mark the inode.
+ *
+ * If there is a transmute attribute on the
+ * directory mark the inode.
+ */
+ if (isp->smk_flags & SMK_INODE_CHANGED) {
+ isp->smk_flags &= ~SMK_INODE_CHANGED;
+ rc = inode->i_op->setxattr(dp,
+ XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE,
+ TRANS_TRUE, TRANS_TRUE_SIZE,
+ 0);
+ } else {
+ rc = inode->i_op->getxattr(dp,
+ XATTR_NAME_SMACKTRANSMUTE, trattr,
+ TRANS_TRUE_SIZE);
+ if (rc >= 0 && strncmp(trattr, TRANS_TRUE,
+ TRANS_TRUE_SIZE) != 0)
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ }
+ if (rc >= 0)
+ transflag = SMK_INODE_TRANSMUTE;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Don't let the exec or mmap label be "*" or "@".
+ */
+ skp = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKEXEC, inode, dp);
+ if (IS_ERR(skp) || skp == &smack_known_star ||
+ skp == &smack_known_web)
+ skp = NULL;
+ isp->smk_task = skp;
+
+ skp = smk_fetch(XATTR_NAME_SMACKMMAP, inode, dp);
+ if (IS_ERR(skp) || skp == &smack_known_star ||
+ skp == &smack_known_web)
+ skp = NULL;
+ isp->smk_mmap = skp;
+
+ dput(dp);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (final == NULL)
+ isp->smk_inode = ckp;
+ else
+ isp->smk_inode = final;
+
+ isp->smk_flags |= (SMK_INODE_INSTANT | transflag);
+
+unlockandout:
+ mutex_unlock(&isp->smk_lock);
+ return;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_getprocattr - Smack process attribute access
+ * @p: the object task
+ * @name: the name of the attribute in /proc/.../attr
+ * @value: where to put the result
+ *
+ * Places a copy of the task Smack into value
+ *
+ * Returns the length of the smack label or an error code
+ */
+static int smack_getprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name, char **value)
+{
+ struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task_struct(p);
+ char *cp;
+ int slen;
+
+ if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ cp = kstrdup(skp->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (cp == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ slen = strlen(cp);
+ *value = cp;
+ return slen;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_setprocattr - Smack process attribute setting
+ * @p: the object task
+ * @name: the name of the attribute in /proc/.../attr
+ * @value: the value to set
+ * @size: the size of the value
+ *
+ * Sets the Smack value of the task. Only setting self
+ * is permitted and only with privilege
+ *
+ * Returns the length of the smack label or an error code
+ */
+static int smack_setprocattr(struct task_struct *p, char *name,
+ void *value, size_t size)
+{
+ struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
+ struct cred *new;
+ struct smack_known *skp;
+ struct smack_known_list_elem *sklep;
+ int rc;
+
+ /*
+ * Changing another process' Smack value is too dangerous
+ * and supports no sane use case.
+ */
+ if (p != current)
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN) && list_empty(&tsp->smk_relabel))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ if (value == NULL || size == 0 || size >= SMK_LONGLABEL)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (strcmp(name, "current") != 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ skp = smk_import_entry(value, size);
+ if (IS_ERR(skp))
+ return PTR_ERR(skp);
+
+ /*
+ * No process is ever allowed the web ("@") label.
+ */
+ if (skp == &smack_known_web)
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN)) {
+ rc = -EPERM;
+ list_for_each_entry(sklep, &tsp->smk_relabel, list)
+ if (sklep->smk_label == skp) {
+ rc = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ if (rc)
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ new = prepare_creds();
+ if (new == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ tsp = new->security;
+ tsp->smk_task = skp;
+ /*
+ * process can change its label only once
+ */
+ smk_destroy_label_list(&tsp->smk_relabel);
+
+ commit_creds(new);
+ return size;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_unix_stream_connect - Smack access on UDS
+ * @sock: one sock
+ * @other: the other sock
+ * @newsk: unused
+ *
+ * Return 0 if a subject with the smack of sock could access
+ * an object with the smack of other, otherwise an error code
+ */
+static int smack_unix_stream_connect(struct sock *sock,
+ struct sock *other, struct sock *newsk)
+{
+ struct smack_known *skp;
+ struct smack_known *okp;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *osp = other->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *nsp = newsk->sk_security;
+ struct smk_audit_info ad;
+ int rc = 0;
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+ struct lsm_network_audit net;
+#endif
+
+ if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE)) {
+ skp = ssp->smk_out;
+ okp = osp->smk_in;
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+ smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
+ smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(&ad, other);
+#endif
+ rc = smk_access(skp, okp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+ rc = smk_bu_note("UDS connect", skp, okp, MAY_WRITE, rc);
+ if (rc == 0) {
+ okp = osp->smk_out;
+ skp = ssp->smk_in;
+ rc = smk_access(okp, skp, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+ rc = smk_bu_note("UDS connect", okp, skp,
+ MAY_WRITE, rc);
+ }
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Cross reference the peer labels for SO_PEERSEC.
+ */
+ if (rc == 0) {
+ nsp->smk_packet = ssp->smk_out;
+ ssp->smk_packet = osp->smk_out;
+ }
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_unix_may_send - Smack access on UDS
+ * @sock: one socket
+ * @other: the other socket
+ *
+ * Return 0 if a subject with the smack of sock could access
+ * an object with the smack of other, otherwise an error code
+ */
+static int smack_unix_may_send(struct socket *sock, struct socket *other)
+{
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ struct socket_smack *osp = other->sk->sk_security;
+ struct smk_audit_info ad;
+ int rc;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+ struct lsm_network_audit net;
+
+ smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
+ smk_ad_setfield_u_net_sk(&ad, other->sk);
+#endif
+
+ if (smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_OVERRIDE))
+ return 0;
+
+ rc = smk_access(ssp->smk_out, osp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+ rc = smk_bu_note("UDS send", ssp->smk_out, osp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, rc);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_socket_sendmsg - Smack check based on destination host
+ * @sock: the socket
+ * @msg: the message
+ * @size: the size of the message
+ *
+ * Return 0 if the current subject can write to the destination host.
+ * For IPv4 this is only a question if the destination is a single label host.
+ * For IPv6 this is a check against the label of the port.
+ */
+static int smack_socket_sendmsg(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg,
+ int size)
+{
+ struct sockaddr_in *sip = (struct sockaddr_in *) msg->msg_name;
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+ struct sockaddr_in6 *sap = (struct sockaddr_in6 *) msg->msg_name;
+#endif
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ struct smack_known *rsp;
+#endif
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * Perfectly reasonable for this to be NULL
+ */
+ if (sip == NULL)
+ return 0;
+
+ switch (sip->sin_family) {
+ case AF_INET:
+ rc = smack_netlabel_send(sock->sk, sip);
+ break;
+ case AF_INET6:
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
+ rsp = smack_ipv6host_label(sap);
+ if (rsp != NULL)
+ rc = smk_ipv6_check(ssp->smk_out, rsp, sap,
+ SMK_CONNECTING);
+#endif
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
+ rc = smk_ipv6_port_check(sock->sk, sap, SMK_SENDING);
+#endif
+ break;
+ }
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_from_secattr - Convert a netlabel attr.mls.lvl/attr.mls.cat pair to smack
+ * @sap: netlabel secattr
+ * @ssp: socket security information
+ *
+ * Returns a pointer to a Smack label entry found on the label list.
+ */
+static struct smack_known *smack_from_secattr(struct netlbl_lsm_secattr *sap,
+ struct socket_smack *ssp)
+{
+ struct smack_known *skp;
+ int found = 0;
+ int acat;
+ int kcat;
+
+ if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL) != 0) {
+ /*
+ * Looks like a CIPSO packet.
+ * If there are flags but no level netlabel isn't
+ * behaving the way we expect it to.
+ *
+ * Look it up in the label table
+ * Without guidance regarding the smack value
+ * for the packet fall back on the network
+ * ambient value.
+ */
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ list_for_each_entry(skp, &smack_known_list, list) {
+ if (sap->attr.mls.lvl != skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.lvl)
+ continue;
+ /*
+ * Compare the catsets. Use the netlbl APIs.
+ */
+ if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT) == 0) {
+ if ((skp->smk_netlabel.flags &
+ NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_CAT) == 0)
+ found = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ for (acat = -1, kcat = -1; acat == kcat; ) {
+ acat = netlbl_catmap_walk(sap->attr.mls.cat,
+ acat + 1);
+ kcat = netlbl_catmap_walk(
+ skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.cat,
+ kcat + 1);
+ if (acat < 0 || kcat < 0)
+ break;
+ }
+ if (acat == kcat) {
+ found = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ if (found)
+ return skp;
+
+ if (ssp != NULL && ssp->smk_in == &smack_known_star)
+ return &smack_known_web;
+ return &smack_known_star;
+ }
+ if ((sap->flags & NETLBL_SECATTR_SECID) != 0) {
+ /*
+ * Looks like a fallback, which gives us a secid.
+ */
+ skp = smack_from_secid(sap->attr.secid);
+ /*
+ * This has got to be a bug because it is
+ * impossible to specify a fallback without
+ * specifying the label, which will ensure
+ * it has a secid, and the only way to get a
+ * secid is from a fallback.
+ */
+ BUG_ON(skp == NULL);
+ return skp;
+ }
+ /*
+ * Without guidance regarding the smack value
+ * for the packet fall back on the network
+ * ambient value.
+ */
+ return smack_net_ambient;
+}
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+static int smk_skb_to_addr_ipv6(struct sk_buff *skb, struct sockaddr_in6 *sip)
+{
+ u8 nexthdr;
+ int offset;
+ int proto = -EINVAL;
+ struct ipv6hdr _ipv6h;
+ struct ipv6hdr *ip6;
+ __be16 frag_off;
+ struct tcphdr _tcph, *th;
+ struct udphdr _udph, *uh;
+ struct dccp_hdr _dccph, *dh;
+
+ sip->sin6_port = 0;
+
+ offset = skb_network_offset(skb);
+ ip6 = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_ipv6h), &_ipv6h);
+ if (ip6 == NULL)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ sip->sin6_addr = ip6->saddr;
+
+ nexthdr = ip6->nexthdr;
+ offset += sizeof(_ipv6h);
+ offset = ipv6_skip_exthdr(skb, offset, &nexthdr, &frag_off);
+ if (offset < 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ proto = nexthdr;
+ switch (proto) {
+ case IPPROTO_TCP:
+ th = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_tcph), &_tcph);
+ if (th != NULL)
+ sip->sin6_port = th->source;
+ break;
+ case IPPROTO_UDP:
+ uh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_udph), &_udph);
+ if (uh != NULL)
+ sip->sin6_port = uh->source;
+ break;
+ case IPPROTO_DCCP:
+ dh = skb_header_pointer(skb, offset, sizeof(_dccph), &_dccph);
+ if (dh != NULL)
+ sip->sin6_port = dh->dccph_sport;
+ break;
+ }
+ return proto;
+}
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
+
+/**
+ * smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb - Smack packet delivery access check
+ * @sk: socket
+ * @skb: packet
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if the packet should be delivered, an error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb)
+{
+ struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
+ int rc = 0;
+ struct smk_audit_info ad;
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+ struct lsm_network_audit net;
+#endif
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+ struct sockaddr_in6 sadd;
+ int proto;
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
+
+ switch (sk->sk_family) {
+ case PF_INET:
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER
+ /*
+ * If there is a secmark use it rather than the CIPSO label.
+ * If there is no secmark fall back to CIPSO.
+ * The secmark is assumed to reflect policy better.
+ */
+ if (skb && skb->secmark != 0) {
+ skp = smack_from_secid(skb->secmark);
+ goto access_check;
+ }
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER */
+ /*
+ * Translate what netlabel gave us.
+ */
+ netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
+
+ rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, sk->sk_family, &secattr);
+ if (rc == 0)
+ skp = smack_from_secattr(&secattr, ssp);
+ else
+ skp = smack_net_ambient;
+
+ netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER
+access_check:
+#endif
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+ smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
+ ad.a.u.net->family = sk->sk_family;
+ ad.a.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
+ ipv4_skb_to_auditdata(skb, &ad.a, NULL);
+#endif
+ /*
+ * Receiving a packet requires that the other end
+ * be able to write here. Read access is not required.
+ * This is the simplist possible security model
+ * for networking.
+ */
+ rc = smk_access(skp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+ rc = smk_bu_note("IPv4 delivery", skp, ssp->smk_in,
+ MAY_WRITE, rc);
+ if (rc != 0)
+ netlbl_skbuff_err(skb, rc, 0);
+ break;
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+ case PF_INET6:
+ proto = smk_skb_to_addr_ipv6(skb, &sadd);
+ if (proto != IPPROTO_UDP && proto != IPPROTO_TCP)
+ break;
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
+ if (skb && skb->secmark != 0)
+ skp = smack_from_secid(skb->secmark);
+ else
+ skp = smack_ipv6host_label(&sadd);
+ if (skp == NULL)
+ skp = smack_net_ambient;
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+ smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
+ ad.a.u.net->family = sk->sk_family;
+ ad.a.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
+ ipv6_skb_to_auditdata(skb, &ad.a, NULL);
+#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
+ rc = smk_access(skp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+ rc = smk_bu_note("IPv6 delivery", skp, ssp->smk_in,
+ MAY_WRITE, rc);
+#endif /* SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING */
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
+ rc = smk_ipv6_port_check(sk, &sadd, SMK_RECEIVING);
+#endif /* SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING */
+ break;
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
+ }
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_socket_getpeersec_stream - pull in packet label
+ * @sock: the socket
+ * @optval: user's destination
+ * @optlen: size thereof
+ * @len: max thereof
+ *
+ * returns zero on success, an error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_socket_getpeersec_stream(struct socket *sock,
+ char __user *optval,
+ int __user *optlen, unsigned len)
+{
+ struct socket_smack *ssp;
+ char *rcp = "";
+ int slen = 1;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ if (ssp->smk_packet != NULL) {
+ rcp = ssp->smk_packet->smk_known;
+ slen = strlen(rcp) + 1;
+ }
+
+ if (slen > len)
+ rc = -ERANGE;
+ else if (copy_to_user(optval, rcp, slen) != 0)
+ rc = -EFAULT;
+
+ if (put_user(slen, optlen) != 0)
+ rc = -EFAULT;
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram - pull in packet label
+ * @sock: the peer socket
+ * @skb: packet data
+ * @secid: pointer to where to put the secid of the packet
+ *
+ * Sets the netlabel socket state on sk from parent
+ */
+static int smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram(struct socket *sock,
+ struct sk_buff *skb, u32 *secid)
+
+{
+ struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = NULL;
+ struct smack_known *skp;
+ int family = PF_UNSPEC;
+ u32 s = 0; /* 0 is the invalid secid */
+ int rc;
+
+ if (skb != NULL) {
+ if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
+ family = PF_INET;
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+ else if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IPV6))
+ family = PF_INET6;
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
+ }
+ if (family == PF_UNSPEC && sock != NULL)
+ family = sock->sk->sk_family;
+
+ switch (family) {
+ case PF_UNIX:
+ ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ s = ssp->smk_out->smk_secid;
+ break;
+ case PF_INET:
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER
+ s = skb->secmark;
+ if (s != 0)
+ break;
+#endif
+ /*
+ * Translate what netlabel gave us.
+ */
+ if (sock != NULL && sock->sk != NULL)
+ ssp = sock->sk->sk_security;
+ netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
+ rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr);
+ if (rc == 0) {
+ skp = smack_from_secattr(&secattr, ssp);
+ s = skp->smk_secid;
+ }
+ netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
+ break;
+ case PF_INET6:
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
+ s = skb->secmark;
+#endif
+ break;
+ }
+ *secid = s;
+ if (s == 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_sock_graft - Initialize a newly created socket with an existing sock
+ * @sk: child sock
+ * @parent: parent socket
+ *
+ * Set the smk_{in,out} state of an existing sock based on the process that
+ * is creating the new socket.
+ */
+static void smack_sock_graft(struct sock *sk, struct socket *parent)
+{
+ struct socket_smack *ssp;
+ struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
+
+ if (sk == NULL ||
+ (sk->sk_family != PF_INET && sk->sk_family != PF_INET6))
+ return;
+
+ ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ ssp->smk_in = skp;
+ ssp->smk_out = skp;
+ /* cssp->smk_packet is already set in smack_inet_csk_clone() */
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inet_conn_request - Smack access check on connect
+ * @sk: socket involved
+ * @skb: packet
+ * @req: unused
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if a task with the packet label could write to
+ * the socket, otherwise an error code
+ */
+static int smack_inet_conn_request(struct sock *sk, struct sk_buff *skb,
+ struct request_sock *req)
+{
+ u16 family = sk->sk_family;
+ struct smack_known *skp;
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ struct netlbl_lsm_secattr secattr;
+ struct sockaddr_in addr;
+ struct iphdr *hdr;
+ struct smack_known *hskp;
+ int rc;
+ struct smk_audit_info ad;
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+ struct lsm_network_audit net;
+#endif
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+ if (family == PF_INET6) {
+ /*
+ * Handle mapped IPv4 packets arriving
+ * via IPv6 sockets. Don't set up netlabel
+ * processing on IPv6.
+ */
+ if (skb->protocol == htons(ETH_P_IP))
+ family = PF_INET;
+ else
+ return 0;
+ }
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER
+ /*
+ * If there is a secmark use it rather than the CIPSO label.
+ * If there is no secmark fall back to CIPSO.
+ * The secmark is assumed to reflect policy better.
+ */
+ if (skb && skb->secmark != 0) {
+ skp = smack_from_secid(skb->secmark);
+ goto access_check;
+ }
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER */
+
+ netlbl_secattr_init(&secattr);
+ rc = netlbl_skbuff_getattr(skb, family, &secattr);
+ if (rc == 0)
+ skp = smack_from_secattr(&secattr, ssp);
+ else
+ skp = &smack_known_huh;
+ netlbl_secattr_destroy(&secattr);
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER
+access_check:
+#endif
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+ smk_ad_init_net(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_NET, &net);
+ ad.a.u.net->family = family;
+ ad.a.u.net->netif = skb->skb_iif;
+ ipv4_skb_to_auditdata(skb, &ad.a, NULL);
+#endif
+ /*
+ * Receiving a packet requires that the other end be able to write
+ * here. Read access is not required.
+ */
+ rc = smk_access(skp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, &ad);
+ rc = smk_bu_note("IPv4 connect", skp, ssp->smk_in, MAY_WRITE, rc);
+ if (rc != 0)
+ return rc;
+
+ /*
+ * Save the peer's label in the request_sock so we can later setup
+ * smk_packet in the child socket so that SO_PEERCRED can report it.
+ */
+ req->peer_secid = skp->smk_secid;
+
+ /*
+ * We need to decide if we want to label the incoming connection here
+ * if we do we only need to label the request_sock and the stack will
+ * propagate the wire-label to the sock when it is created.
+ */
+ hdr = ip_hdr(skb);
+ addr.sin_addr.s_addr = hdr->saddr;
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ hskp = smack_ipv4host_label(&addr);
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+
+ if (hskp == NULL)
+ rc = netlbl_req_setattr(req, &skp->smk_netlabel);
+ else
+ netlbl_req_delattr(req);
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_inet_csk_clone - Copy the connection information to the new socket
+ * @sk: the new socket
+ * @req: the connection's request_sock
+ *
+ * Transfer the connection's peer label to the newly created socket.
+ */
+static void smack_inet_csk_clone(struct sock *sk,
+ const struct request_sock *req)
+{
+ struct socket_smack *ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ struct smack_known *skp;
+
+ if (req->peer_secid != 0) {
+ skp = smack_from_secid(req->peer_secid);
+ ssp->smk_packet = skp;
+ } else
+ ssp->smk_packet = NULL;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Key management security hooks
+ *
+ * Casey has not tested key support very heavily.
+ * The permission check is most likely too restrictive.
+ * If you care about keys please have a look.
+ */
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+
+/**
+ * smack_key_alloc - Set the key security blob
+ * @key: object
+ * @cred: the credentials to use
+ * @flags: unused
+ *
+ * No allocation required
+ *
+ * Returns 0
+ */
+static int smack_key_alloc(struct key *key, const struct cred *cred,
+ unsigned long flags)
+{
+ struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_task(cred->security);
+
+ key->security = skp;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_key_free - Clear the key security blob
+ * @key: the object
+ *
+ * Clear the blob pointer
+ */
+static void smack_key_free(struct key *key)
+{
+ key->security = NULL;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_key_permission - Smack access on a key
+ * @key_ref: gets to the object
+ * @cred: the credentials to use
+ * @perm: requested key permissions
+ *
+ * Return 0 if the task has read and write to the object,
+ * an error code otherwise
+ */
+static int smack_key_permission(key_ref_t key_ref,
+ const struct cred *cred, unsigned perm)
+{
+ struct key *keyp;
+ struct smk_audit_info ad;
+ struct smack_known *tkp = smk_of_task(cred->security);
+ int request = 0;
+ int rc;
+
+ keyp = key_ref_to_ptr(key_ref);
+ if (keyp == NULL)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ /*
+ * If the key hasn't been initialized give it access so that
+ * it may do so.
+ */
+ if (keyp->security == NULL)
+ return 0;
+ /*
+ * This should not occur
+ */
+ if (tkp == NULL)
+ return -EACCES;
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+ smk_ad_init(&ad, __func__, LSM_AUDIT_DATA_KEY);
+ ad.a.u.key_struct.key = keyp->serial;
+ ad.a.u.key_struct.key_desc = keyp->description;
+#endif
+ if (perm & KEY_NEED_READ)
+ request = MAY_READ;
+ if (perm & (KEY_NEED_WRITE | KEY_NEED_LINK | KEY_NEED_SETATTR))
+ request = MAY_WRITE;
+ rc = smk_access(tkp, keyp->security, request, &ad);
+ rc = smk_bu_note("key access", tkp, keyp->security, request, rc);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * smack_key_getsecurity - Smack label tagging the key
+ * @key points to the key to be queried
+ * @_buffer points to a pointer that should be set to point to the
+ * resulting string (if no label or an error occurs).
+ * Return the length of the string (including terminating NUL) or -ve if
+ * an error.
+ * May also return 0 (and a NULL buffer pointer) if there is no label.
+ */
+static int smack_key_getsecurity(struct key *key, char **_buffer)
+{
+ struct smack_known *skp = key->security;
+ size_t length;
+ char *copy;
+
+ if (key->security == NULL) {
+ *_buffer = NULL;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ copy = kstrdup(skp->smk_known, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (copy == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ length = strlen(copy) + 1;
+
+ *_buffer = copy;
+ return length;
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
+
+/*
+ * Smack Audit hooks
+ *
+ * Audit requires a unique representation of each Smack specific
+ * rule. This unique representation is used to distinguish the
+ * object to be audited from remaining kernel objects and also
+ * works as a glue between the audit hooks.
+ *
+ * Since repository entries are added but never deleted, we'll use
+ * the smack_known label address related to the given audit rule as
+ * the needed unique representation. This also better fits the smack
+ * model where nearly everything is a label.
+ */
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+
+/**
+ * smack_audit_rule_init - Initialize a smack audit rule
+ * @field: audit rule fields given from user-space (audit.h)
+ * @op: required testing operator (=, !=, >, <, ...)
+ * @rulestr: smack label to be audited
+ * @vrule: pointer to save our own audit rule representation
+ *
+ * Prepare to audit cases where (@field @op @rulestr) is true.
+ * The label to be audited is created if necessay.
+ */
+static int smack_audit_rule_init(u32 field, u32 op, char *rulestr, void **vrule)
+{
+ struct smack_known *skp;
+ char **rule = (char **)vrule;
+ *rule = NULL;
+
+ if (field != AUDIT_SUBJ_USER && field != AUDIT_OBJ_USER)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (op != Audit_equal && op != Audit_not_equal)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ skp = smk_import_entry(rulestr, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(skp))
+ return PTR_ERR(skp);
+
+ *rule = skp->smk_known;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_audit_rule_known - Distinguish Smack audit rules
+ * @krule: rule of interest, in Audit kernel representation format
+ *
+ * This is used to filter Smack rules from remaining Audit ones.
+ * If it's proved that this rule belongs to us, the
+ * audit_rule_match hook will be called to do the final judgement.
+ */
+static int smack_audit_rule_known(struct audit_krule *krule)
+{
+ struct audit_field *f;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; i < krule->field_count; i++) {
+ f = &krule->fields[i];
+
+ if (f->type == AUDIT_SUBJ_USER || f->type == AUDIT_OBJ_USER)
+ return 1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_audit_rule_match - Audit given object ?
+ * @secid: security id for identifying the object to test
+ * @field: audit rule flags given from user-space
+ * @op: required testing operator
+ * @vrule: smack internal rule presentation
+ * @actx: audit context associated with the check
+ *
+ * The core Audit hook. It's used to take the decision of
+ * whether to audit or not to audit a given object.
+ */
+static int smack_audit_rule_match(u32 secid, u32 field, u32 op, void *vrule,
+ struct audit_context *actx)
+{
+ struct smack_known *skp;
+ char *rule = vrule;
+
+ if (unlikely(!rule)) {
+ WARN_ONCE(1, "Smack: missing rule\n");
+ return -ENOENT;
+ }
+
+ if (field != AUDIT_SUBJ_USER && field != AUDIT_OBJ_USER)
+ return 0;
+
+ skp = smack_from_secid(secid);
+
+ /*
+ * No need to do string comparisons. If a match occurs,
+ * both pointers will point to the same smack_known
+ * label.
+ */
+ if (op == Audit_equal)
+ return (rule == skp->smk_known);
+ if (op == Audit_not_equal)
+ return (rule != skp->smk_known);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_audit_rule_free - free smack rule representation
+ * @vrule: rule to be freed.
+ *
+ * No memory was allocated.
+ */
+static void smack_audit_rule_free(void *vrule)
+{
+ /* No-op */
+}
+
+#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
+
+/**
+ * smack_ismaclabel - check if xattr @name references a smack MAC label
+ * @name: Full xattr name to check.
+ */
+static int smack_ismaclabel(const char *name)
+{
+ return (strcmp(name, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX) == 0);
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * smack_secid_to_secctx - return the smack label for a secid
+ * @secid: incoming integer
+ * @secdata: destination
+ * @seclen: how long it is
+ *
+ * Exists for networking code.
+ */
+static int smack_secid_to_secctx(u32 secid, char **secdata, u32 *seclen)
+{
+ struct smack_known *skp = smack_from_secid(secid);
+
+ if (secdata)
+ *secdata = skp->smk_known;
+ *seclen = strlen(skp->smk_known);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_secctx_to_secid - return the secid for a smack label
+ * @secdata: smack label
+ * @seclen: how long result is
+ * @secid: outgoing integer
+ *
+ * Exists for audit and networking code.
+ */
+static int smack_secctx_to_secid(const char *secdata, u32 seclen, u32 *secid)
+{
+ struct smack_known *skp = smk_find_entry(secdata);
+
+ if (skp)
+ *secid = skp->smk_secid;
+ else
+ *secid = 0;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_release_secctx - don't do anything.
+ * @secdata: unused
+ * @seclen: unused
+ *
+ * Exists to make sure nothing gets done, and properly
+ */
+static void smack_release_secctx(char *secdata, u32 seclen)
+{
+}
+
+static int smack_inode_notifysecctx(struct inode *inode, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
+{
+ return smack_inode_setsecurity(inode, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
+}
+
+static int smack_inode_setsecctx(struct dentry *dentry, void *ctx, u32 ctxlen)
+{
+ return __vfs_setxattr_noperm(dentry, XATTR_NAME_SMACK, ctx, ctxlen, 0);
+}
+
+static int smack_inode_getsecctx(struct inode *inode, void **ctx, u32 *ctxlen)
+{
+ int len = 0;
+ len = smack_inode_getsecurity(inode, XATTR_SMACK_SUFFIX, ctx, true);
+
+ if (len < 0)
+ return len;
+ *ctxlen = len;
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static struct security_hook_list smack_hooks[] = {
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_access_check, smack_ptrace_access_check),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(ptrace_traceme, smack_ptrace_traceme),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(syslog, smack_syslog),
+
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_alloc_security, smack_sb_alloc_security),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, smack_sb_free_security),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_copy_data, smack_sb_copy_data),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_kern_mount, smack_sb_kern_mount),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_statfs, smack_sb_statfs),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_set_mnt_opts, smack_set_mnt_opts),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_parse_opts_str, smack_parse_opts_str),
+
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_set_creds, smack_bprm_set_creds),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_committing_creds, smack_bprm_committing_creds),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(bprm_secureexec, smack_bprm_secureexec),
+
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_alloc_security, smack_inode_alloc_security),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_free_security, smack_inode_free_security),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_init_security, smack_inode_init_security),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_link, smack_inode_link),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_unlink, smack_inode_unlink),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rmdir, smack_inode_rmdir),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_rename, smack_inode_rename),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_permission, smack_inode_permission),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setattr, smack_inode_setattr),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getattr, smack_inode_getattr),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setxattr, smack_inode_setxattr),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_post_setxattr, smack_inode_post_setxattr),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getxattr, smack_inode_getxattr),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_removexattr, smack_inode_removexattr),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecurity, smack_inode_getsecurity),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecurity, smack_inode_setsecurity),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_listsecurity, smack_inode_listsecurity),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecid, smack_inode_getsecid),
+
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_permission, smack_file_permission),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_alloc_security, smack_file_alloc_security),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_free_security, smack_file_free_security),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_ioctl, smack_file_ioctl),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_lock, smack_file_lock),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_fcntl, smack_file_fcntl),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_file, smack_mmap_file),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(mmap_addr, cap_mmap_addr),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_set_fowner, smack_file_set_fowner),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_send_sigiotask, smack_file_send_sigiotask),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_receive, smack_file_receive),
+
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(file_open, smack_file_open),
+
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_alloc_blank, smack_cred_alloc_blank),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_free, smack_cred_free),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_prepare, smack_cred_prepare),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(cred_transfer, smack_cred_transfer),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_act_as, smack_kernel_act_as),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_create_files_as, smack_kernel_create_files_as),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setpgid, smack_task_setpgid),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getpgid, smack_task_getpgid),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsid, smack_task_getsid),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getsecid, smack_task_getsecid),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setnice, smack_task_setnice),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setioprio, smack_task_setioprio),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getioprio, smack_task_getioprio),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_setscheduler, smack_task_setscheduler),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_getscheduler, smack_task_getscheduler),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_movememory, smack_task_movememory),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_kill, smack_task_kill),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_wait, smack_task_wait),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(task_to_inode, smack_task_to_inode),
+
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_permission, smack_ipc_permission),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(ipc_getsecid, smack_ipc_getsecid),
+
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_alloc_security, smack_msg_msg_alloc_security),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_msg_free_security, smack_msg_msg_free_security),
+
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_alloc_security, smack_msg_queue_alloc_security),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_free_security, smack_msg_queue_free_security),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_associate, smack_msg_queue_associate),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgctl, smack_msg_queue_msgctl),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgsnd, smack_msg_queue_msgsnd),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(msg_queue_msgrcv, smack_msg_queue_msgrcv),
+
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_alloc_security, smack_shm_alloc_security),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_free_security, smack_shm_free_security),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_associate, smack_shm_associate),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmctl, smack_shm_shmctl),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(shm_shmat, smack_shm_shmat),
+
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_alloc_security, smack_sem_alloc_security),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_free_security, smack_sem_free_security),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_associate, smack_sem_associate),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semctl, smack_sem_semctl),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sem_semop, smack_sem_semop),
+
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(d_instantiate, smack_d_instantiate),
+
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(getprocattr, smack_getprocattr),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(setprocattr, smack_setprocattr),
+
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_stream_connect, smack_unix_stream_connect),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(unix_may_send, smack_unix_may_send),
+
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_post_create, smack_socket_post_create),
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_bind, smack_socket_bind),
+#endif
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_connect, smack_socket_connect),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sendmsg, smack_socket_sendmsg),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_sock_rcv_skb, smack_socket_sock_rcv_skb),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_stream, smack_socket_getpeersec_stream),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(socket_getpeersec_dgram, smack_socket_getpeersec_dgram),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_alloc_security, smack_sk_alloc_security),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sk_free_security, smack_sk_free_security),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(sock_graft, smack_sock_graft),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_conn_request, smack_inet_conn_request),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inet_csk_clone, smack_inet_csk_clone),
+
+ /* key management security hooks */
+#ifdef CONFIG_KEYS
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_alloc, smack_key_alloc),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_free, smack_key_free),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_permission, smack_key_permission),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(key_getsecurity, smack_key_getsecurity),
+#endif /* CONFIG_KEYS */
+
+ /* Audit hooks */
+#ifdef CONFIG_AUDIT
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_init, smack_audit_rule_init),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_known, smack_audit_rule_known),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_match, smack_audit_rule_match),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(audit_rule_free, smack_audit_rule_free),
+#endif /* CONFIG_AUDIT */
+
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(ismaclabel, smack_ismaclabel),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(secid_to_secctx, smack_secid_to_secctx),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(secctx_to_secid, smack_secctx_to_secid),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(release_secctx, smack_release_secctx),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_notifysecctx, smack_inode_notifysecctx),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_setsecctx, smack_inode_setsecctx),
+ LSM_HOOK_INIT(inode_getsecctx, smack_inode_getsecctx),
+};
+
+
+static __init void init_smack_known_list(void)
+{
+ /*
+ * Initialize rule list locks
+ */
+ mutex_init(&smack_known_huh.smk_rules_lock);
+ mutex_init(&smack_known_hat.smk_rules_lock);
+ mutex_init(&smack_known_floor.smk_rules_lock);
+ mutex_init(&smack_known_star.smk_rules_lock);
+ mutex_init(&smack_known_invalid.smk_rules_lock);
+ mutex_init(&smack_known_web.smk_rules_lock);
+ /*
+ * Initialize rule lists
+ */
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_huh.smk_rules);
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_hat.smk_rules);
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_star.smk_rules);
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_floor.smk_rules);
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_invalid.smk_rules);
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(&smack_known_web.smk_rules);
+ /*
+ * Create the known labels list
+ */
+ smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_huh);
+ smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_hat);
+ smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_star);
+ smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_floor);
+ smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_invalid);
+ smk_insert_entry(&smack_known_web);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smack_init - initialize the smack system
+ *
+ * Returns 0
+ */
+static __init int smack_init(void)
+{
+ struct cred *cred;
+ struct task_smack *tsp;
+
+ if (!security_module_enable("smack"))
+ return 0;
+
+ smack_inode_cache = KMEM_CACHE(inode_smack, 0);
+ if (!smack_inode_cache)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ tsp = new_task_smack(&smack_known_floor, &smack_known_floor,
+ GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (tsp == NULL) {
+ kmem_cache_destroy(smack_inode_cache);
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ smack_enabled = 1;
+
+ pr_info("Smack: Initializing.\n");
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_NETFILTER
+ pr_info("Smack: Netfilter enabled.\n");
+#endif
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_PORT_LABELING
+ pr_info("Smack: IPv6 port labeling enabled.\n");
+#endif
+#ifdef SMACK_IPV6_SECMARK_LABELING
+ pr_info("Smack: IPv6 Netfilter enabled.\n");
+#endif
+
+ /*
+ * Set the security state for the initial task.
+ */
+ cred = (struct cred *) current->cred;
+ cred->security = tsp;
+
+ /* initialize the smack_known_list */
+ init_smack_known_list();
+
+ /*
+ * Register with LSM
+ */
+ security_add_hooks(smack_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(smack_hooks));
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Smack requires early initialization in order to label
+ * all processes and objects when they are created.
+ */
+security_initcall(smack_init);
diff --git a/security/smack/smack_netfilter.c b/security/smack/smack_netfilter.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..aa6bf1b
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/smack/smack_netfilter.c
@@ -0,0 +1,93 @@
+/*
+ * Simplified MAC Kernel (smack) security module
+ *
+ * This file contains the Smack netfilter implementation
+ *
+ * Author:
+ * Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
+ *
+ * Copyright (C) 2014 Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
+ * Copyright (C) 2014 Intel Corporation.
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2,
+ * as published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ */
+
+#include <linux/netfilter_ipv4.h>
+#include <linux/netfilter_ipv6.h>
+#include <linux/netdevice.h>
+#include <net/inet_sock.h>
+#include "smack.h"
+
+#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
+
+static unsigned int smack_ipv6_output(void *priv,
+ struct sk_buff *skb,
+ const struct nf_hook_state *state)
+{
+ struct sock *sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
+ struct socket_smack *ssp;
+ struct smack_known *skp;
+
+ if (sk && sk->sk_security) {
+ ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ skp = ssp->smk_out;
+ skb->secmark = skp->smk_secid;
+ }
+
+ return NF_ACCEPT;
+}
+#endif /* IPV6 */
+
+static unsigned int smack_ipv4_output(void *priv,
+ struct sk_buff *skb,
+ const struct nf_hook_state *state)
+{
+ struct sock *sk = skb_to_full_sk(skb);
+ struct socket_smack *ssp;
+ struct smack_known *skp;
+
+ if (sk && sk->sk_security) {
+ ssp = sk->sk_security;
+ skp = ssp->smk_out;
+ skb->secmark = skp->smk_secid;
+ }
+
+ return NF_ACCEPT;
+}
+
+static struct nf_hook_ops smack_nf_ops[] = {
+ {
+ .hook = smack_ipv4_output,
+ .pf = NFPROTO_IPV4,
+ .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
+ .priority = NF_IP_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
+ },
+#if defined(CONFIG_IPV6) || defined(CONFIG_IPV6_MODULE)
+ {
+ .hook = smack_ipv6_output,
+ .pf = NFPROTO_IPV6,
+ .hooknum = NF_INET_LOCAL_OUT,
+ .priority = NF_IP6_PRI_SELINUX_FIRST,
+ },
+#endif /* IPV6 */
+};
+
+static int __init smack_nf_ip_init(void)
+{
+ int err;
+
+ if (smack_enabled == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ printk(KERN_DEBUG "Smack: Registering netfilter hooks\n");
+
+ err = nf_register_hooks(smack_nf_ops, ARRAY_SIZE(smack_nf_ops));
+ if (err)
+ pr_info("Smack: nf_register_hooks: error %d\n", err);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+__initcall(smack_nf_ip_init);
diff --git a/security/smack/smackfs.c b/security/smack/smackfs.c
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..94bd9e4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/security/smack/smackfs.c
@@ -0,0 +1,3069 @@
+/*
+ * Copyright (C) 2007 Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation, version 2.
+ *
+ * Authors:
+ * Casey Schaufler <casey@schaufler-ca.com>
+ * Ahmed S. Darwish <darwish.07@gmail.com>
+ *
+ * Special thanks to the authors of selinuxfs.
+ *
+ * Karl MacMillan <kmacmillan@tresys.com>
+ * James Morris <jmorris@redhat.com>
+ *
+ */
+
+#include <linux/kernel.h>
+#include <linux/vmalloc.h>
+#include <linux/security.h>
+#include <linux/mutex.h>
+#include <linux/slab.h>
+#include <net/net_namespace.h>
+#include <net/cipso_ipv4.h>
+#include <linux/seq_file.h>
+#include <linux/ctype.h>
+#include <linux/audit.h>
+#include <linux/magic.h>
+#include "smack.h"
+
+#define BEBITS (sizeof(__be32) * 8)
+/*
+ * smackfs pseudo filesystem.
+ */
+
+enum smk_inos {
+ SMK_ROOT_INO = 2,
+ SMK_LOAD = 3, /* load policy */
+ SMK_CIPSO = 4, /* load label -> CIPSO mapping */
+ SMK_DOI = 5, /* CIPSO DOI */
+ SMK_DIRECT = 6, /* CIPSO level indicating direct label */
+ SMK_AMBIENT = 7, /* internet ambient label */
+ SMK_NET4ADDR = 8, /* single label hosts */
+ SMK_ONLYCAP = 9, /* the only "capable" label */
+ SMK_LOGGING = 10, /* logging */
+ SMK_LOAD_SELF = 11, /* task specific rules */
+ SMK_ACCESSES = 12, /* access policy */
+ SMK_MAPPED = 13, /* CIPSO level indicating mapped label */
+ SMK_LOAD2 = 14, /* load policy with long labels */
+ SMK_LOAD_SELF2 = 15, /* load task specific rules with long labels */
+ SMK_ACCESS2 = 16, /* make an access check with long labels */
+ SMK_CIPSO2 = 17, /* load long label -> CIPSO mapping */
+ SMK_REVOKE_SUBJ = 18, /* set rules with subject label to '-' */
+ SMK_CHANGE_RULE = 19, /* change or add rules (long labels) */
+ SMK_SYSLOG = 20, /* change syslog label) */
+ SMK_PTRACE = 21, /* set ptrace rule */
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
+ SMK_UNCONFINED = 22, /* define an unconfined label */
+#endif
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+ SMK_NET6ADDR = 23, /* single label IPv6 hosts */
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
+ SMK_RELABEL_SELF = 24, /* relabel possible without CAP_MAC_ADMIN */
+};
+
+/*
+ * List locks
+ */
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(smack_cipso_lock);
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(smack_ambient_lock);
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(smk_net4addr_lock);
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+static DEFINE_MUTEX(smk_net6addr_lock);
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
+
+/*
+ * This is the "ambient" label for network traffic.
+ * If it isn't somehow marked, use this.
+ * It can be reset via smackfs/ambient
+ */
+struct smack_known *smack_net_ambient;
+
+/*
+ * This is the level in a CIPSO header that indicates a
+ * smack label is contained directly in the category set.
+ * It can be reset via smackfs/direct
+ */
+int smack_cipso_direct = SMACK_CIPSO_DIRECT_DEFAULT;
+
+/*
+ * This is the level in a CIPSO header that indicates a
+ * secid is contained directly in the category set.
+ * It can be reset via smackfs/mapped
+ */
+int smack_cipso_mapped = SMACK_CIPSO_MAPPED_DEFAULT;
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
+/*
+ * Allow one label to be unconfined. This is for
+ * debugging and application bring-up purposes only.
+ * It is bad and wrong, but everyone seems to expect
+ * to have it.
+ */
+struct smack_known *smack_unconfined;
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * If this value is set restrict syslog use to the label specified.
+ * It can be reset via smackfs/syslog
+ */
+struct smack_known *smack_syslog_label;
+
+/*
+ * Ptrace current rule
+ * SMACK_PTRACE_DEFAULT regular smack ptrace rules (/proc based)
+ * SMACK_PTRACE_EXACT labels must match, but can be overriden with
+ * CAP_SYS_PTRACE
+ * SMACK_PTRACE_DRACONIAN lables must match, CAP_SYS_PTRACE has no effect
+ */
+int smack_ptrace_rule = SMACK_PTRACE_DEFAULT;
+
+/*
+ * Certain IP addresses may be designated as single label hosts.
+ * Packets are sent there unlabeled, but only from tasks that
+ * can write to the specified label.
+ */
+
+LIST_HEAD(smk_net4addr_list);
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+LIST_HEAD(smk_net6addr_list);
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
+
+/*
+ * Rule lists are maintained for each label.
+ * This master list is just for reading /smack/load and /smack/load2.
+ */
+struct smack_master_list {
+ struct list_head list;
+ struct smack_rule *smk_rule;
+};
+
+static LIST_HEAD(smack_rule_list);
+
+struct smack_parsed_rule {
+ struct smack_known *smk_subject;
+ struct smack_known *smk_object;
+ int smk_access1;
+ int smk_access2;
+};
+
+static int smk_cipso_doi_value = SMACK_CIPSO_DOI_DEFAULT;
+
+/*
+ * Values for parsing cipso rules
+ * SMK_DIGITLEN: Length of a digit field in a rule.
+ * SMK_CIPSOMIN: Minimum possible cipso rule length.
+ * SMK_CIPSOMAX: Maximum possible cipso rule length.
+ */
+#define SMK_DIGITLEN 4
+#define SMK_CIPSOMIN (SMK_LABELLEN + 2 * SMK_DIGITLEN)
+#define SMK_CIPSOMAX (SMK_CIPSOMIN + SMACK_CIPSO_MAXCATNUM * SMK_DIGITLEN)
+
+/*
+ * Values for parsing MAC rules
+ * SMK_ACCESS: Maximum possible combination of access permissions
+ * SMK_ACCESSLEN: Maximum length for a rule access field
+ * SMK_LOADLEN: Smack rule length
+ */
+#define SMK_OACCESS "rwxa"
+#define SMK_ACCESS "rwxatl"
+#define SMK_OACCESSLEN (sizeof(SMK_OACCESS) - 1)
+#define SMK_ACCESSLEN (sizeof(SMK_ACCESS) - 1)
+#define SMK_OLOADLEN (SMK_LABELLEN + SMK_LABELLEN + SMK_OACCESSLEN)
+#define SMK_LOADLEN (SMK_LABELLEN + SMK_LABELLEN + SMK_ACCESSLEN)
+
+/*
+ * Stricly for CIPSO level manipulation.
+ * Set the category bit number in a smack label sized buffer.
+ */
+static inline void smack_catset_bit(unsigned int cat, char *catsetp)
+{
+ if (cat == 0 || cat > (SMK_CIPSOLEN * 8))
+ return;
+
+ catsetp[(cat - 1) / 8] |= 0x80 >> ((cat - 1) % 8);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_netlabel_audit_set - fill a netlbl_audit struct
+ * @nap: structure to fill
+ */
+static void smk_netlabel_audit_set(struct netlbl_audit *nap)
+{
+ struct smack_known *skp = smk_of_current();
+
+ nap->loginuid = audit_get_loginuid(current);
+ nap->sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current);
+ nap->secid = skp->smk_secid;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Value for parsing single label host rules
+ * "1.2.3.4 X"
+ */
+#define SMK_NETLBLADDRMIN 9
+
+/**
+ * smk_set_access - add a rule to the rule list or replace an old rule
+ * @srp: the rule to add or replace
+ * @rule_list: the list of rules
+ * @rule_lock: the rule list lock
+ * @global: if non-zero, indicates a global rule
+ *
+ * Looks through the current subject/object/access list for
+ * the subject/object pair and replaces the access that was
+ * there. If the pair isn't found add it with the specified
+ * access.
+ *
+ * Returns 0 if nothing goes wrong or -ENOMEM if it fails
+ * during the allocation of the new pair to add.
+ */
+static int smk_set_access(struct smack_parsed_rule *srp,
+ struct list_head *rule_list,
+ struct mutex *rule_lock, int global)
+{
+ struct smack_rule *sp;
+ struct smack_master_list *smlp;
+ int found = 0;
+ int rc = 0;
+
+ mutex_lock(rule_lock);
+
+ /*
+ * Because the object label is less likely to match
+ * than the subject label check it first
+ */
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(sp, rule_list, list) {
+ if (sp->smk_object == srp->smk_object &&
+ sp->smk_subject == srp->smk_subject) {
+ found = 1;
+ sp->smk_access |= srp->smk_access1;
+ sp->smk_access &= ~srp->smk_access2;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (found == 0) {
+ sp = kzalloc(sizeof(*sp), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (sp == NULL) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ sp->smk_subject = srp->smk_subject;
+ sp->smk_object = srp->smk_object;
+ sp->smk_access = srp->smk_access1 & ~srp->smk_access2;
+
+ list_add_rcu(&sp->list, rule_list);
+ /*
+ * If this is a global as opposed to self and a new rule
+ * it needs to get added for reporting.
+ */
+ if (global) {
+ smlp = kzalloc(sizeof(*smlp), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (smlp != NULL) {
+ smlp->smk_rule = sp;
+ list_add_rcu(&smlp->list, &smack_rule_list);
+ } else
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ }
+ }
+
+out:
+ mutex_unlock(rule_lock);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_perm_from_str - parse smack accesses from a text string
+ * @string: a text string that contains a Smack accesses code
+ *
+ * Returns an integer with respective bits set for specified accesses.
+ */
+static int smk_perm_from_str(const char *string)
+{
+ int perm = 0;
+ const char *cp;
+
+ for (cp = string; ; cp++)
+ switch (*cp) {
+ case '-':
+ break;
+ case 'r':
+ case 'R':
+ perm |= MAY_READ;
+ break;
+ case 'w':
+ case 'W':
+ perm |= MAY_WRITE;
+ break;
+ case 'x':
+ case 'X':
+ perm |= MAY_EXEC;
+ break;
+ case 'a':
+ case 'A':
+ perm |= MAY_APPEND;
+ break;
+ case 't':
+ case 'T':
+ perm |= MAY_TRANSMUTE;
+ break;
+ case 'l':
+ case 'L':
+ perm |= MAY_LOCK;
+ break;
+ case 'b':
+ case 'B':
+ perm |= MAY_BRINGUP;
+ break;
+ default:
+ return perm;
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_fill_rule - Fill Smack rule from strings
+ * @subject: subject label string
+ * @object: object label string
+ * @access1: access string
+ * @access2: string with permissions to be removed
+ * @rule: Smack rule
+ * @import: if non-zero, import labels
+ * @len: label length limit
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, appropriate error code on failure.
+ */
+static int smk_fill_rule(const char *subject, const char *object,
+ const char *access1, const char *access2,
+ struct smack_parsed_rule *rule, int import,
+ int len)
+{
+ const char *cp;
+ struct smack_known *skp;
+
+ if (import) {
+ rule->smk_subject = smk_import_entry(subject, len);
+ if (IS_ERR(rule->smk_subject))
+ return PTR_ERR(rule->smk_subject);
+
+ rule->smk_object = smk_import_entry(object, len);
+ if (IS_ERR(rule->smk_object))
+ return PTR_ERR(rule->smk_object);
+ } else {
+ cp = smk_parse_smack(subject, len);
+ if (IS_ERR(cp))
+ return PTR_ERR(cp);
+ skp = smk_find_entry(cp);
+ kfree(cp);
+ if (skp == NULL)
+ return -ENOENT;
+ rule->smk_subject = skp;
+
+ cp = smk_parse_smack(object, len);
+ if (IS_ERR(cp))
+ return PTR_ERR(cp);
+ skp = smk_find_entry(cp);
+ kfree(cp);
+ if (skp == NULL)
+ return -ENOENT;
+ rule->smk_object = skp;
+ }
+
+ rule->smk_access1 = smk_perm_from_str(access1);
+ if (access2)
+ rule->smk_access2 = smk_perm_from_str(access2);
+ else
+ rule->smk_access2 = ~rule->smk_access1;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_parse_rule - parse Smack rule from load string
+ * @data: string to be parsed whose size is SMK_LOADLEN
+ * @rule: Smack rule
+ * @import: if non-zero, import labels
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, -1 on errors.
+ */
+static int smk_parse_rule(const char *data, struct smack_parsed_rule *rule,
+ int import)
+{
+ int rc;
+
+ rc = smk_fill_rule(data, data + SMK_LABELLEN,
+ data + SMK_LABELLEN + SMK_LABELLEN, NULL, rule,
+ import, SMK_LABELLEN);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_parse_long_rule - parse Smack rule from rule string
+ * @data: string to be parsed, null terminated
+ * @rule: Will be filled with Smack parsed rule
+ * @import: if non-zero, import labels
+ * @tokens: numer of substrings expected in data
+ *
+ * Returns number of processed bytes on success, -ERRNO on failure.
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_parse_long_rule(char *data, struct smack_parsed_rule *rule,
+ int import, int tokens)
+{
+ ssize_t cnt = 0;
+ char *tok[4];
+ int rc;
+ int i;
+
+ /*
+ * Parsing the rule in-place, filling all white-spaces with '\0'
+ */
+ for (i = 0; i < tokens; ++i) {
+ while (isspace(data[cnt]))
+ data[cnt++] = '\0';
+
+ if (data[cnt] == '\0')
+ /* Unexpected end of data */
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ tok[i] = data + cnt;
+
+ while (data[cnt] && !isspace(data[cnt]))
+ ++cnt;
+ }
+ while (isspace(data[cnt]))
+ data[cnt++] = '\0';
+
+ while (i < 4)
+ tok[i++] = NULL;
+
+ rc = smk_fill_rule(tok[0], tok[1], tok[2], tok[3], rule, import, 0);
+ return rc == 0 ? cnt : rc;
+}
+
+#define SMK_FIXED24_FMT 0 /* Fixed 24byte label format */
+#define SMK_LONG_FMT 1 /* Variable long label format */
+#define SMK_CHANGE_FMT 2 /* Rule modification format */
+/**
+ * smk_write_rules_list - write() for any /smack rule file
+ * @file: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to get the data from
+ * @count: bytes sent
+ * @ppos: where to start - must be 0
+ * @rule_list: the list of rules to write to
+ * @rule_lock: lock for the rule list
+ * @format: /smack/load or /smack/load2 or /smack/change-rule format.
+ *
+ * Get one smack access rule from above.
+ * The format for SMK_LONG_FMT is:
+ * "subject<whitespace>object<whitespace>access[<whitespace>...]"
+ * The format for SMK_FIXED24_FMT is exactly:
+ * "subject object rwxat"
+ * The format for SMK_CHANGE_FMT is:
+ * "subject<whitespace>object<whitespace>
+ * acc_enable<whitespace>acc_disable[<whitespace>...]"
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_write_rules_list(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos,
+ struct list_head *rule_list,
+ struct mutex *rule_lock, int format)
+{
+ struct smack_parsed_rule rule;
+ char *data;
+ int rc;
+ int trunc = 0;
+ int tokens;
+ ssize_t cnt = 0;
+
+ /*
+ * No partial writes.
+ * Enough data must be present.
+ */
+ if (*ppos != 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (format == SMK_FIXED24_FMT) {
+ /*
+ * Minor hack for backward compatibility
+ */
+ if (count < SMK_OLOADLEN || count > SMK_LOADLEN)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ } else {
+ if (count >= PAGE_SIZE) {
+ count = PAGE_SIZE - 1;
+ trunc = 1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ data = kmalloc(count + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (data == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(data, buf, count) != 0) {
+ rc = -EFAULT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * In case of parsing only part of user buf,
+ * avoid having partial rule at the data buffer
+ */
+ if (trunc) {
+ while (count > 0 && (data[count - 1] != '\n'))
+ --count;
+ if (count == 0) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
+
+ data[count] = '\0';
+ tokens = (format == SMK_CHANGE_FMT ? 4 : 3);
+ while (cnt < count) {
+ if (format == SMK_FIXED24_FMT) {
+ rc = smk_parse_rule(data, &rule, 1);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ goto out;
+ cnt = count;
+ } else {
+ rc = smk_parse_long_rule(data + cnt, &rule, 1, tokens);
+ if (rc < 0)
+ goto out;
+ if (rc == 0) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto out;
+ }
+ cnt += rc;
+ }
+
+ if (rule_list == NULL)
+ rc = smk_set_access(&rule, &rule.smk_subject->smk_rules,
+ &rule.smk_subject->smk_rules_lock, 1);
+ else
+ rc = smk_set_access(&rule, rule_list, rule_lock, 0);
+
+ if (rc)
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ rc = cnt;
+out:
+ kfree(data);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/*
+ * Core logic for smackfs seq list operations.
+ */
+
+static void *smk_seq_start(struct seq_file *s, loff_t *pos,
+ struct list_head *head)
+{
+ struct list_head *list;
+ int i = *pos;
+
+ rcu_read_lock();
+ for (list = rcu_dereference(list_next_rcu(head));
+ list != head;
+ list = rcu_dereference(list_next_rcu(list))) {
+ if (i-- == 0)
+ return list;
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static void *smk_seq_next(struct seq_file *s, void *v, loff_t *pos,
+ struct list_head *head)
+{
+ struct list_head *list = v;
+
+ ++*pos;
+ list = rcu_dereference(list_next_rcu(list));
+
+ return (list == head) ? NULL : list;
+}
+
+static void smk_seq_stop(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
+{
+ rcu_read_unlock();
+}
+
+static void smk_rule_show(struct seq_file *s, struct smack_rule *srp, int max)
+{
+ /*
+ * Don't show any rules with label names too long for
+ * interface file (/smack/load or /smack/load2)
+ * because you should expect to be able to write
+ * anything you read back.
+ */
+ if (strlen(srp->smk_subject->smk_known) >= max ||
+ strlen(srp->smk_object->smk_known) >= max)
+ return;
+
+ if (srp->smk_access == 0)
+ return;
+
+ seq_printf(s, "%s %s",
+ srp->smk_subject->smk_known,
+ srp->smk_object->smk_known);
+
+ seq_putc(s, ' ');
+
+ if (srp->smk_access & MAY_READ)
+ seq_putc(s, 'r');
+ if (srp->smk_access & MAY_WRITE)
+ seq_putc(s, 'w');
+ if (srp->smk_access & MAY_EXEC)
+ seq_putc(s, 'x');
+ if (srp->smk_access & MAY_APPEND)
+ seq_putc(s, 'a');
+ if (srp->smk_access & MAY_TRANSMUTE)
+ seq_putc(s, 't');
+ if (srp->smk_access & MAY_LOCK)
+ seq_putc(s, 'l');
+ if (srp->smk_access & MAY_BRINGUP)
+ seq_putc(s, 'b');
+
+ seq_putc(s, '\n');
+}
+
+/*
+ * Seq_file read operations for /smack/load
+ */
+
+static void *load2_seq_start(struct seq_file *s, loff_t *pos)
+{
+ return smk_seq_start(s, pos, &smack_rule_list);
+}
+
+static void *load2_seq_next(struct seq_file *s, void *v, loff_t *pos)
+{
+ return smk_seq_next(s, v, pos, &smack_rule_list);
+}
+
+static int load_seq_show(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
+{
+ struct list_head *list = v;
+ struct smack_master_list *smlp =
+ list_entry_rcu(list, struct smack_master_list, list);
+
+ smk_rule_show(s, smlp->smk_rule, SMK_LABELLEN);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static const struct seq_operations load_seq_ops = {
+ .start = load2_seq_start,
+ .next = load2_seq_next,
+ .show = load_seq_show,
+ .stop = smk_seq_stop,
+};
+
+/**
+ * smk_open_load - open() for /smack/load
+ * @inode: inode structure representing file
+ * @file: "load" file pointer
+ *
+ * For reading, use load_seq_* seq_file reading operations.
+ */
+static int smk_open_load(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+ return seq_open(file, &load_seq_ops);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_write_load - write() for /smack/load
+ * @file: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to get the data from
+ * @count: bytes sent
+ * @ppos: where to start - must be 0
+ *
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_write_load(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ /*
+ * Must have privilege.
+ * No partial writes.
+ * Enough data must be present.
+ */
+ if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ return smk_write_rules_list(file, buf, count, ppos, NULL, NULL,
+ SMK_FIXED24_FMT);
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations smk_load_ops = {
+ .open = smk_open_load,
+ .read = seq_read,
+ .llseek = seq_lseek,
+ .write = smk_write_load,
+ .release = seq_release,
+};
+
+/**
+ * smk_cipso_doi - initialize the CIPSO domain
+ */
+static void smk_cipso_doi(void)
+{
+ int rc;
+ struct cipso_v4_doi *doip;
+ struct netlbl_audit nai;
+
+ smk_netlabel_audit_set(&nai);
+
+ rc = netlbl_cfg_map_del(NULL, PF_INET, NULL, NULL, &nai);
+ if (rc != 0)
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "%s:%d remove rc = %d\n",
+ __func__, __LINE__, rc);
+
+ doip = kmalloc(sizeof(struct cipso_v4_doi), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (doip == NULL)
+ panic("smack: Failed to initialize cipso DOI.\n");
+ doip->map.std = NULL;
+ doip->doi = smk_cipso_doi_value;
+ doip->type = CIPSO_V4_MAP_PASS;
+ doip->tags[0] = CIPSO_V4_TAG_RBITMAP;
+ for (rc = 1; rc < CIPSO_V4_TAG_MAXCNT; rc++)
+ doip->tags[rc] = CIPSO_V4_TAG_INVALID;
+
+ rc = netlbl_cfg_cipsov4_add(doip, &nai);
+ if (rc != 0) {
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "%s:%d cipso add rc = %d\n",
+ __func__, __LINE__, rc);
+ kfree(doip);
+ return;
+ }
+ rc = netlbl_cfg_cipsov4_map_add(doip->doi, NULL, NULL, NULL, &nai);
+ if (rc != 0) {
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "%s:%d map add rc = %d\n",
+ __func__, __LINE__, rc);
+ kfree(doip);
+ return;
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_unlbl_ambient - initialize the unlabeled domain
+ * @oldambient: previous domain string
+ */
+static void smk_unlbl_ambient(char *oldambient)
+{
+ int rc;
+ struct netlbl_audit nai;
+
+ smk_netlabel_audit_set(&nai);
+
+ if (oldambient != NULL) {
+ rc = netlbl_cfg_map_del(oldambient, PF_INET, NULL, NULL, &nai);
+ if (rc != 0)
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "%s:%d remove rc = %d\n",
+ __func__, __LINE__, rc);
+ }
+ if (smack_net_ambient == NULL)
+ smack_net_ambient = &smack_known_floor;
+
+ rc = netlbl_cfg_unlbl_map_add(smack_net_ambient->smk_known, PF_INET,
+ NULL, NULL, &nai);
+ if (rc != 0)
+ printk(KERN_WARNING "%s:%d add rc = %d\n",
+ __func__, __LINE__, rc);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Seq_file read operations for /smack/cipso
+ */
+
+static void *cipso_seq_start(struct seq_file *s, loff_t *pos)
+{
+ return smk_seq_start(s, pos, &smack_known_list);
+}
+
+static void *cipso_seq_next(struct seq_file *s, void *v, loff_t *pos)
+{
+ return smk_seq_next(s, v, pos, &smack_known_list);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Print cipso labels in format:
+ * label level[/cat[,cat]]
+ */
+static int cipso_seq_show(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
+{
+ struct list_head *list = v;
+ struct smack_known *skp =
+ list_entry_rcu(list, struct smack_known, list);
+ struct netlbl_lsm_catmap *cmp = skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.cat;
+ char sep = '/';
+ int i;
+
+ /*
+ * Don't show a label that could not have been set using
+ * /smack/cipso. This is in support of the notion that
+ * anything read from /smack/cipso ought to be writeable
+ * to /smack/cipso.
+ *
+ * /smack/cipso2 should be used instead.
+ */
+ if (strlen(skp->smk_known) >= SMK_LABELLEN)
+ return 0;
+
+ seq_printf(s, "%s %3d", skp->smk_known, skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.lvl);
+
+ for (i = netlbl_catmap_walk(cmp, 0); i >= 0;
+ i = netlbl_catmap_walk(cmp, i + 1)) {
+ seq_printf(s, "%c%d", sep, i);
+ sep = ',';
+ }
+
+ seq_putc(s, '\n');
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static const struct seq_operations cipso_seq_ops = {
+ .start = cipso_seq_start,
+ .next = cipso_seq_next,
+ .show = cipso_seq_show,
+ .stop = smk_seq_stop,
+};
+
+/**
+ * smk_open_cipso - open() for /smack/cipso
+ * @inode: inode structure representing file
+ * @file: "cipso" file pointer
+ *
+ * Connect our cipso_seq_* operations with /smack/cipso
+ * file_operations
+ */
+static int smk_open_cipso(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+ return seq_open(file, &cipso_seq_ops);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_set_cipso - do the work for write() for cipso and cipso2
+ * @file: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to get the data from
+ * @count: bytes sent
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ * @format: /smack/cipso or /smack/cipso2
+ *
+ * Accepts only one cipso rule per write call.
+ * Returns number of bytes written or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_set_cipso(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos, int format)
+{
+ struct smack_known *skp;
+ struct netlbl_lsm_secattr ncats;
+ char mapcatset[SMK_CIPSOLEN];
+ int maplevel;
+ unsigned int cat;
+ int catlen;
+ ssize_t rc = -EINVAL;
+ char *data = NULL;
+ char *rule;
+ int ret;
+ int i;
+
+ /*
+ * Must have privilege.
+ * No partial writes.
+ * Enough data must be present.
+ */
+ if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+ if (*ppos != 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (format == SMK_FIXED24_FMT &&
+ (count < SMK_CIPSOMIN || count > SMK_CIPSOMAX))
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ data = kzalloc(count + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (data == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(data, buf, count) != 0) {
+ rc = -EFAULT;
+ goto unlockedout;
+ }
+
+ data[count] = '\0';
+ rule = data;
+ /*
+ * Only allow one writer at a time. Writes should be
+ * quite rare and small in any case.
+ */
+ mutex_lock(&smack_cipso_lock);
+
+ skp = smk_import_entry(rule, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(skp)) {
+ rc = PTR_ERR(skp);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ if (format == SMK_FIXED24_FMT)
+ rule += SMK_LABELLEN;
+ else
+ rule += strlen(skp->smk_known) + 1;
+
+ ret = sscanf(rule, "%d", &maplevel);
+ if (ret != 1 || maplevel > SMACK_CIPSO_MAXLEVEL)
+ goto out;
+
+ rule += SMK_DIGITLEN;
+ ret = sscanf(rule, "%d", &catlen);
+ if (ret != 1 || catlen > SMACK_CIPSO_MAXCATNUM)
+ goto out;
+
+ if (format == SMK_FIXED24_FMT &&
+ count != (SMK_CIPSOMIN + catlen * SMK_DIGITLEN))
+ goto out;
+
+ memset(mapcatset, 0, sizeof(mapcatset));
+
+ for (i = 0; i < catlen; i++) {
+ rule += SMK_DIGITLEN;
+ ret = sscanf(rule, "%u", &cat);
+ if (ret != 1 || cat > SMACK_CIPSO_MAXCATNUM)
+ goto out;
+
+ smack_catset_bit(cat, mapcatset);
+ }
+
+ rc = smk_netlbl_mls(maplevel, mapcatset, &ncats, SMK_CIPSOLEN);
+ if (rc >= 0) {
+ netlbl_catmap_free(skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.cat);
+ skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.cat = ncats.attr.mls.cat;
+ skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.lvl = ncats.attr.mls.lvl;
+ rc = count;
+ }
+
+out:
+ mutex_unlock(&smack_cipso_lock);
+unlockedout:
+ kfree(data);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_write_cipso - write() for /smack/cipso
+ * @file: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to get the data from
+ * @count: bytes sent
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ *
+ * Accepts only one cipso rule per write call.
+ * Returns number of bytes written or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_write_cipso(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ return smk_set_cipso(file, buf, count, ppos, SMK_FIXED24_FMT);
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations smk_cipso_ops = {
+ .open = smk_open_cipso,
+ .read = seq_read,
+ .llseek = seq_lseek,
+ .write = smk_write_cipso,
+ .release = seq_release,
+};
+
+/*
+ * Seq_file read operations for /smack/cipso2
+ */
+
+/*
+ * Print cipso labels in format:
+ * label level[/cat[,cat]]
+ */
+static int cipso2_seq_show(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
+{
+ struct list_head *list = v;
+ struct smack_known *skp =
+ list_entry_rcu(list, struct smack_known, list);
+ struct netlbl_lsm_catmap *cmp = skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.cat;
+ char sep = '/';
+ int i;
+
+ seq_printf(s, "%s %3d", skp->smk_known, skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.lvl);
+
+ for (i = netlbl_catmap_walk(cmp, 0); i >= 0;
+ i = netlbl_catmap_walk(cmp, i + 1)) {
+ seq_printf(s, "%c%d", sep, i);
+ sep = ',';
+ }
+
+ seq_putc(s, '\n');
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static const struct seq_operations cipso2_seq_ops = {
+ .start = cipso_seq_start,
+ .next = cipso_seq_next,
+ .show = cipso2_seq_show,
+ .stop = smk_seq_stop,
+};
+
+/**
+ * smk_open_cipso2 - open() for /smack/cipso2
+ * @inode: inode structure representing file
+ * @file: "cipso2" file pointer
+ *
+ * Connect our cipso_seq_* operations with /smack/cipso2
+ * file_operations
+ */
+static int smk_open_cipso2(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+ return seq_open(file, &cipso2_seq_ops);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_write_cipso2 - write() for /smack/cipso2
+ * @file: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to get the data from
+ * @count: bytes sent
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ *
+ * Accepts only one cipso rule per write call.
+ * Returns number of bytes written or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_write_cipso2(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ return smk_set_cipso(file, buf, count, ppos, SMK_LONG_FMT);
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations smk_cipso2_ops = {
+ .open = smk_open_cipso2,
+ .read = seq_read,
+ .llseek = seq_lseek,
+ .write = smk_write_cipso2,
+ .release = seq_release,
+};
+
+/*
+ * Seq_file read operations for /smack/netlabel
+ */
+
+static void *net4addr_seq_start(struct seq_file *s, loff_t *pos)
+{
+ return smk_seq_start(s, pos, &smk_net4addr_list);
+}
+
+static void *net4addr_seq_next(struct seq_file *s, void *v, loff_t *pos)
+{
+ return smk_seq_next(s, v, pos, &smk_net4addr_list);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Print host/label pairs
+ */
+static int net4addr_seq_show(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
+{
+ struct list_head *list = v;
+ struct smk_net4addr *skp =
+ list_entry_rcu(list, struct smk_net4addr, list);
+ char *kp = SMACK_CIPSO_OPTION;
+
+ if (skp->smk_label != NULL)
+ kp = skp->smk_label->smk_known;
+ seq_printf(s, "%pI4/%d %s\n", &skp->smk_host.s_addr,
+ skp->smk_masks, kp);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static const struct seq_operations net4addr_seq_ops = {
+ .start = net4addr_seq_start,
+ .next = net4addr_seq_next,
+ .show = net4addr_seq_show,
+ .stop = smk_seq_stop,
+};
+
+/**
+ * smk_open_net4addr - open() for /smack/netlabel
+ * @inode: inode structure representing file
+ * @file: "netlabel" file pointer
+ *
+ * Connect our net4addr_seq_* operations with /smack/netlabel
+ * file_operations
+ */
+static int smk_open_net4addr(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+ return seq_open(file, &net4addr_seq_ops);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_net4addr_insert
+ * @new : netlabel to insert
+ *
+ * This helper insert netlabel in the smack_net4addrs list
+ * sorted by netmask length (longest to smallest)
+ * locked by &smk_net4addr_lock in smk_write_net4addr
+ *
+ */
+static void smk_net4addr_insert(struct smk_net4addr *new)
+{
+ struct smk_net4addr *m;
+ struct smk_net4addr *m_next;
+
+ if (list_empty(&smk_net4addr_list)) {
+ list_add_rcu(&new->list, &smk_net4addr_list);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ m = list_entry_rcu(smk_net4addr_list.next,
+ struct smk_net4addr, list);
+
+ /* the comparison '>' is a bit hacky, but works */
+ if (new->smk_masks > m->smk_masks) {
+ list_add_rcu(&new->list, &smk_net4addr_list);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(m, &smk_net4addr_list, list) {
+ if (list_is_last(&m->list, &smk_net4addr_list)) {
+ list_add_rcu(&new->list, &m->list);
+ return;
+ }
+ m_next = list_entry_rcu(m->list.next,
+ struct smk_net4addr, list);
+ if (new->smk_masks > m_next->smk_masks) {
+ list_add_rcu(&new->list, &m->list);
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * smk_write_net4addr - write() for /smack/netlabel
+ * @file: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to get the data from
+ * @count: bytes sent
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ *
+ * Accepts only one net4addr per write call.
+ * Returns number of bytes written or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_write_net4addr(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ struct smk_net4addr *snp;
+ struct sockaddr_in newname;
+ char *smack;
+ struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
+ char *data;
+ char *host = (char *)&newname.sin_addr.s_addr;
+ int rc;
+ struct netlbl_audit audit_info;
+ struct in_addr mask;
+ unsigned int m;
+ unsigned int masks;
+ int found;
+ u32 mask_bits = (1<<31);
+ __be32 nsa;
+ u32 temp_mask;
+
+ /*
+ * Must have privilege.
+ * No partial writes.
+ * Enough data must be present.
+ * "<addr/mask, as a.b.c.d/e><space><label>"
+ * "<addr, as a.b.c.d><space><label>"
+ */
+ if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+ if (*ppos != 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (count < SMK_NETLBLADDRMIN)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ data = kzalloc(count + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (data == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(data, buf, count) != 0) {
+ rc = -EFAULT;
+ goto free_data_out;
+ }
+
+ smack = kzalloc(count + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (smack == NULL) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto free_data_out;
+ }
+
+ data[count] = '\0';
+
+ rc = sscanf(data, "%hhd.%hhd.%hhd.%hhd/%u %s",
+ &host[0], &host[1], &host[2], &host[3], &masks, smack);
+ if (rc != 6) {
+ rc = sscanf(data, "%hhd.%hhd.%hhd.%hhd %s",
+ &host[0], &host[1], &host[2], &host[3], smack);
+ if (rc != 5) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto free_out;
+ }
+ m = BEBITS;
+ masks = 32;
+ }
+ if (masks > BEBITS) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto free_out;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If smack begins with '-', it is an option, don't import it
+ */
+ if (smack[0] != '-') {
+ skp = smk_import_entry(smack, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(skp)) {
+ rc = PTR_ERR(skp);
+ goto free_out;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Only the -CIPSO option is supported for IPv4
+ */
+ if (strcmp(smack, SMACK_CIPSO_OPTION) != 0) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto free_out;
+ }
+ }
+
+ for (m = masks, temp_mask = 0; m > 0; m--) {
+ temp_mask |= mask_bits;
+ mask_bits >>= 1;
+ }
+ mask.s_addr = cpu_to_be32(temp_mask);
+
+ newname.sin_addr.s_addr &= mask.s_addr;
+ /*
+ * Only allow one writer at a time. Writes should be
+ * quite rare and small in any case.
+ */
+ mutex_lock(&smk_net4addr_lock);
+
+ nsa = newname.sin_addr.s_addr;
+ /* try to find if the prefix is already in the list */
+ found = 0;
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(snp, &smk_net4addr_list, list) {
+ if (snp->smk_host.s_addr == nsa && snp->smk_masks == masks) {
+ found = 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ smk_netlabel_audit_set(&audit_info);
+
+ if (found == 0) {
+ snp = kzalloc(sizeof(*snp), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (snp == NULL)
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ else {
+ rc = 0;
+ snp->smk_host.s_addr = newname.sin_addr.s_addr;
+ snp->smk_mask.s_addr = mask.s_addr;
+ snp->smk_label = skp;
+ snp->smk_masks = masks;
+ smk_net4addr_insert(snp);
+ }
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Delete the unlabeled entry, only if the previous label
+ * wasn't the special CIPSO option
+ */
+ if (snp->smk_label != NULL)
+ rc = netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_del(&init_net, NULL,
+ &snp->smk_host, &snp->smk_mask,
+ PF_INET, &audit_info);
+ else
+ rc = 0;
+ snp->smk_label = skp;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Now tell netlabel about the single label nature of
+ * this host so that incoming packets get labeled.
+ * but only if we didn't get the special CIPSO option
+ */
+ if (rc == 0 && skp != NULL)
+ rc = netlbl_cfg_unlbl_static_add(&init_net, NULL,
+ &snp->smk_host, &snp->smk_mask, PF_INET,
+ snp->smk_label->smk_secid, &audit_info);
+
+ if (rc == 0)
+ rc = count;
+
+ mutex_unlock(&smk_net4addr_lock);
+
+free_out:
+ kfree(smack);
+free_data_out:
+ kfree(data);
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations smk_net4addr_ops = {
+ .open = smk_open_net4addr,
+ .read = seq_read,
+ .llseek = seq_lseek,
+ .write = smk_write_net4addr,
+ .release = seq_release,
+};
+
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+/*
+ * Seq_file read operations for /smack/netlabel6
+ */
+
+static void *net6addr_seq_start(struct seq_file *s, loff_t *pos)
+{
+ return smk_seq_start(s, pos, &smk_net6addr_list);
+}
+
+static void *net6addr_seq_next(struct seq_file *s, void *v, loff_t *pos)
+{
+ return smk_seq_next(s, v, pos, &smk_net6addr_list);
+}
+
+/*
+ * Print host/label pairs
+ */
+static int net6addr_seq_show(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
+{
+ struct list_head *list = v;
+ struct smk_net6addr *skp =
+ list_entry(list, struct smk_net6addr, list);
+
+ if (skp->smk_label != NULL)
+ seq_printf(s, "%pI6/%d %s\n", &skp->smk_host, skp->smk_masks,
+ skp->smk_label->smk_known);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static const struct seq_operations net6addr_seq_ops = {
+ .start = net6addr_seq_start,
+ .next = net6addr_seq_next,
+ .show = net6addr_seq_show,
+ .stop = smk_seq_stop,
+};
+
+/**
+ * smk_open_net6addr - open() for /smack/netlabel
+ * @inode: inode structure representing file
+ * @file: "netlabel" file pointer
+ *
+ * Connect our net6addr_seq_* operations with /smack/netlabel
+ * file_operations
+ */
+static int smk_open_net6addr(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+ return seq_open(file, &net6addr_seq_ops);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_net6addr_insert
+ * @new : entry to insert
+ *
+ * This inserts an entry in the smack_net6addrs list
+ * sorted by netmask length (longest to smallest)
+ * locked by &smk_net6addr_lock in smk_write_net6addr
+ *
+ */
+static void smk_net6addr_insert(struct smk_net6addr *new)
+{
+ struct smk_net6addr *m_next;
+ struct smk_net6addr *m;
+
+ if (list_empty(&smk_net6addr_list)) {
+ list_add_rcu(&new->list, &smk_net6addr_list);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ m = list_entry_rcu(smk_net6addr_list.next,
+ struct smk_net6addr, list);
+
+ if (new->smk_masks > m->smk_masks) {
+ list_add_rcu(&new->list, &smk_net6addr_list);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(m, &smk_net6addr_list, list) {
+ if (list_is_last(&m->list, &smk_net6addr_list)) {
+ list_add_rcu(&new->list, &m->list);
+ return;
+ }
+ m_next = list_entry_rcu(m->list.next,
+ struct smk_net6addr, list);
+ if (new->smk_masks > m_next->smk_masks) {
+ list_add_rcu(&new->list, &m->list);
+ return;
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+
+/**
+ * smk_write_net6addr - write() for /smack/netlabel
+ * @file: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to get the data from
+ * @count: bytes sent
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ *
+ * Accepts only one net6addr per write call.
+ * Returns number of bytes written or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_write_net6addr(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ struct smk_net6addr *snp;
+ struct in6_addr newname;
+ struct in6_addr fullmask;
+ struct smack_known *skp = NULL;
+ char *smack;
+ char *data;
+ int rc = 0;
+ int found = 0;
+ int i;
+ unsigned int scanned[8];
+ unsigned int m;
+ unsigned int mask = 128;
+
+ /*
+ * Must have privilege.
+ * No partial writes.
+ * Enough data must be present.
+ * "<addr/mask, as a:b:c:d:e:f:g:h/e><space><label>"
+ * "<addr, as a:b:c:d:e:f:g:h><space><label>"
+ */
+ if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+ if (*ppos != 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (count < SMK_NETLBLADDRMIN)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ data = kzalloc(count + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (data == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(data, buf, count) != 0) {
+ rc = -EFAULT;
+ goto free_data_out;
+ }
+
+ smack = kzalloc(count + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (smack == NULL) {
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ goto free_data_out;
+ }
+
+ data[count] = '\0';
+
+ i = sscanf(data, "%x:%x:%x:%x:%x:%x:%x:%x/%u %s",
+ &scanned[0], &scanned[1], &scanned[2], &scanned[3],
+ &scanned[4], &scanned[5], &scanned[6], &scanned[7],
+ &mask, smack);
+ if (i != 10) {
+ i = sscanf(data, "%x:%x:%x:%x:%x:%x:%x:%x %s",
+ &scanned[0], &scanned[1], &scanned[2],
+ &scanned[3], &scanned[4], &scanned[5],
+ &scanned[6], &scanned[7], smack);
+ if (i != 9) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto free_out;
+ }
+ }
+ if (mask > 128) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto free_out;
+ }
+ for (i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
+ if (scanned[i] > 0xffff) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto free_out;
+ }
+ newname.s6_addr16[i] = htons(scanned[i]);
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * If smack begins with '-', it is an option, don't import it
+ */
+ if (smack[0] != '-') {
+ skp = smk_import_entry(smack, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(skp)) {
+ rc = PTR_ERR(skp);
+ goto free_out;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * Only -DELETE is supported for IPv6
+ */
+ if (strcmp(smack, SMACK_DELETE_OPTION) != 0) {
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+ goto free_out;
+ }
+ }
+
+ for (i = 0, m = mask; i < 8; i++) {
+ if (m >= 16) {
+ fullmask.s6_addr16[i] = 0xffff;
+ m -= 16;
+ } else if (m > 0) {
+ fullmask.s6_addr16[i] = (1 << m) - 1;
+ m = 0;
+ } else
+ fullmask.s6_addr16[i] = 0;
+ newname.s6_addr16[i] &= fullmask.s6_addr16[i];
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Only allow one writer at a time. Writes should be
+ * quite rare and small in any case.
+ */
+ mutex_lock(&smk_net6addr_lock);
+ /*
+ * Try to find the prefix in the list
+ */
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(snp, &smk_net6addr_list, list) {
+ if (mask != snp->smk_masks)
+ continue;
+ for (found = 1, i = 0; i < 8; i++) {
+ if (newname.s6_addr16[i] !=
+ snp->smk_host.s6_addr16[i]) {
+ found = 0;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ if (found == 1)
+ break;
+ }
+ if (found == 0) {
+ snp = kzalloc(sizeof(*snp), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (snp == NULL)
+ rc = -ENOMEM;
+ else {
+ snp->smk_host = newname;
+ snp->smk_mask = fullmask;
+ snp->smk_masks = mask;
+ snp->smk_label = skp;
+ smk_net6addr_insert(snp);
+ }
+ } else {
+ snp->smk_label = skp;
+ }
+
+ if (rc == 0)
+ rc = count;
+
+ mutex_unlock(&smk_net6addr_lock);
+
+free_out:
+ kfree(smack);
+free_data_out:
+ kfree(data);
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations smk_net6addr_ops = {
+ .open = smk_open_net6addr,
+ .read = seq_read,
+ .llseek = seq_lseek,
+ .write = smk_write_net6addr,
+ .release = seq_release,
+};
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
+
+/**
+ * smk_read_doi - read() for /smack/doi
+ * @filp: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to put the result
+ * @count: maximum to send along
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ *
+ * Returns number of bytes read or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_read_doi(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ char temp[80];
+ ssize_t rc;
+
+ if (*ppos != 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ sprintf(temp, "%d", smk_cipso_doi_value);
+ rc = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, temp, strlen(temp));
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_write_doi - write() for /smack/doi
+ * @file: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to get the data from
+ * @count: bytes sent
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ *
+ * Returns number of bytes written or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_write_doi(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ char temp[80];
+ int i;
+
+ if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ if (count >= sizeof(temp) || count == 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(temp, buf, count) != 0)
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ temp[count] = '\0';
+
+ if (sscanf(temp, "%d", &i) != 1)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ smk_cipso_doi_value = i;
+
+ smk_cipso_doi();
+
+ return count;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations smk_doi_ops = {
+ .read = smk_read_doi,
+ .write = smk_write_doi,
+ .llseek = default_llseek,
+};
+
+/**
+ * smk_read_direct - read() for /smack/direct
+ * @filp: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to put the result
+ * @count: maximum to send along
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ *
+ * Returns number of bytes read or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_read_direct(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ char temp[80];
+ ssize_t rc;
+
+ if (*ppos != 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ sprintf(temp, "%d", smack_cipso_direct);
+ rc = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, temp, strlen(temp));
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_write_direct - write() for /smack/direct
+ * @file: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to get the data from
+ * @count: bytes sent
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ *
+ * Returns number of bytes written or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_write_direct(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ struct smack_known *skp;
+ char temp[80];
+ int i;
+
+ if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ if (count >= sizeof(temp) || count == 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(temp, buf, count) != 0)
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ temp[count] = '\0';
+
+ if (sscanf(temp, "%d", &i) != 1)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /*
+ * Don't do anything if the value hasn't actually changed.
+ * If it is changing reset the level on entries that were
+ * set up to be direct when they were created.
+ */
+ if (smack_cipso_direct != i) {
+ mutex_lock(&smack_known_lock);
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(skp, &smack_known_list, list)
+ if (skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.lvl ==
+ smack_cipso_direct)
+ skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.lvl = i;
+ smack_cipso_direct = i;
+ mutex_unlock(&smack_known_lock);
+ }
+
+ return count;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations smk_direct_ops = {
+ .read = smk_read_direct,
+ .write = smk_write_direct,
+ .llseek = default_llseek,
+};
+
+/**
+ * smk_read_mapped - read() for /smack/mapped
+ * @filp: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to put the result
+ * @count: maximum to send along
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ *
+ * Returns number of bytes read or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_read_mapped(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ char temp[80];
+ ssize_t rc;
+
+ if (*ppos != 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ sprintf(temp, "%d", smack_cipso_mapped);
+ rc = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, temp, strlen(temp));
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_write_mapped - write() for /smack/mapped
+ * @file: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to get the data from
+ * @count: bytes sent
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ *
+ * Returns number of bytes written or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_write_mapped(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ struct smack_known *skp;
+ char temp[80];
+ int i;
+
+ if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ if (count >= sizeof(temp) || count == 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(temp, buf, count) != 0)
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ temp[count] = '\0';
+
+ if (sscanf(temp, "%d", &i) != 1)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /*
+ * Don't do anything if the value hasn't actually changed.
+ * If it is changing reset the level on entries that were
+ * set up to be mapped when they were created.
+ */
+ if (smack_cipso_mapped != i) {
+ mutex_lock(&smack_known_lock);
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(skp, &smack_known_list, list)
+ if (skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.lvl ==
+ smack_cipso_mapped)
+ skp->smk_netlabel.attr.mls.lvl = i;
+ smack_cipso_mapped = i;
+ mutex_unlock(&smack_known_lock);
+ }
+
+ return count;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations smk_mapped_ops = {
+ .read = smk_read_mapped,
+ .write = smk_write_mapped,
+ .llseek = default_llseek,
+};
+
+/**
+ * smk_read_ambient - read() for /smack/ambient
+ * @filp: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to put the result
+ * @cn: maximum to send along
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ *
+ * Returns number of bytes read or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_read_ambient(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+ size_t cn, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ ssize_t rc;
+ int asize;
+
+ if (*ppos != 0)
+ return 0;
+ /*
+ * Being careful to avoid a problem in the case where
+ * smack_net_ambient gets changed in midstream.
+ */
+ mutex_lock(&smack_ambient_lock);
+
+ asize = strlen(smack_net_ambient->smk_known) + 1;
+
+ if (cn >= asize)
+ rc = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, cn, ppos,
+ smack_net_ambient->smk_known,
+ asize);
+ else
+ rc = -EINVAL;
+
+ mutex_unlock(&smack_ambient_lock);
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_write_ambient - write() for /smack/ambient
+ * @file: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to get the data from
+ * @count: bytes sent
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ *
+ * Returns number of bytes written or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_write_ambient(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ struct smack_known *skp;
+ char *oldambient;
+ char *data;
+ int rc = count;
+
+ if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ data = kzalloc(count + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (data == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(data, buf, count) != 0) {
+ rc = -EFAULT;
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ skp = smk_import_entry(data, count);
+ if (IS_ERR(skp)) {
+ rc = PTR_ERR(skp);
+ goto out;
+ }
+
+ mutex_lock(&smack_ambient_lock);
+
+ oldambient = smack_net_ambient->smk_known;
+ smack_net_ambient = skp;
+ smk_unlbl_ambient(oldambient);
+
+ mutex_unlock(&smack_ambient_lock);
+
+out:
+ kfree(data);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations smk_ambient_ops = {
+ .read = smk_read_ambient,
+ .write = smk_write_ambient,
+ .llseek = default_llseek,
+};
+
+/*
+ * Seq_file operations for /smack/onlycap
+ */
+static void *onlycap_seq_start(struct seq_file *s, loff_t *pos)
+{
+ return smk_seq_start(s, pos, &smack_onlycap_list);
+}
+
+static void *onlycap_seq_next(struct seq_file *s, void *v, loff_t *pos)
+{
+ return smk_seq_next(s, v, pos, &smack_onlycap_list);
+}
+
+static int onlycap_seq_show(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
+{
+ struct list_head *list = v;
+ struct smack_known_list_elem *sklep =
+ list_entry_rcu(list, struct smack_known_list_elem, list);
+
+ seq_puts(s, sklep->smk_label->smk_known);
+ seq_putc(s, ' ');
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static const struct seq_operations onlycap_seq_ops = {
+ .start = onlycap_seq_start,
+ .next = onlycap_seq_next,
+ .show = onlycap_seq_show,
+ .stop = smk_seq_stop,
+};
+
+static int smk_open_onlycap(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+ return seq_open(file, &onlycap_seq_ops);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_list_swap_rcu - swap public list with a private one in RCU-safe way
+ * The caller must hold appropriate mutex to prevent concurrent modifications
+ * to the public list.
+ * Private list is assumed to be not accessible to other threads yet.
+ *
+ * @public: public list
+ * @private: private list
+ */
+static void smk_list_swap_rcu(struct list_head *public,
+ struct list_head *private)
+{
+ struct list_head *first, *last;
+
+ if (list_empty(public)) {
+ list_splice_init_rcu(private, public, synchronize_rcu);
+ } else {
+ /* Remember public list before replacing it */
+ first = public->next;
+ last = public->prev;
+
+ /* Publish private list in place of public in RCU-safe way */
+ private->prev->next = public;
+ private->next->prev = public;
+ rcu_assign_pointer(public->next, private->next);
+ public->prev = private->prev;
+
+ synchronize_rcu();
+
+ /* When all readers are done with the old public list,
+ * attach it in place of private */
+ private->next = first;
+ private->prev = last;
+ first->prev = private;
+ last->next = private;
+ }
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_parse_label_list - parse list of Smack labels, separated by spaces
+ *
+ * @data: the string to parse
+ * @private: destination list
+ *
+ * Returns zero on success or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static int smk_parse_label_list(char *data, struct list_head *list)
+{
+ char *tok;
+ struct smack_known *skp;
+ struct smack_known_list_elem *sklep;
+
+ while ((tok = strsep(&data, " ")) != NULL) {
+ if (!*tok)
+ continue;
+
+ skp = smk_import_entry(tok, 0);
+ if (IS_ERR(skp))
+ return PTR_ERR(skp);
+
+ sklep = kzalloc(sizeof(*sklep), GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (sklep == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ sklep->smk_label = skp;
+ list_add(&sklep->list, list);
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_destroy_label_list - destroy a list of smack_known_list_elem
+ * @head: header pointer of the list to destroy
+ */
+void smk_destroy_label_list(struct list_head *list)
+{
+ struct smack_known_list_elem *sklep;
+ struct smack_known_list_elem *sklep2;
+
+ list_for_each_entry_safe(sklep, sklep2, list, list)
+ kfree(sklep);
+
+ INIT_LIST_HEAD(list);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_write_onlycap - write() for smackfs/onlycap
+ * @file: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to get the data from
+ * @count: bytes sent
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ *
+ * Returns number of bytes written or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_write_onlycap(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ char *data;
+ LIST_HEAD(list_tmp);
+ int rc;
+
+ if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ data = kzalloc(count + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (data == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(data, buf, count) != 0) {
+ kfree(data);
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
+
+ rc = smk_parse_label_list(data, &list_tmp);
+ kfree(data);
+
+ /*
+ * Clear the smack_onlycap on invalid label errors. This means
+ * that we can pass a null string to unset the onlycap value.
+ *
+ * Importing will also reject a label beginning with '-',
+ * so "-usecapabilities" will also work.
+ *
+ * But do so only on invalid label, not on system errors.
+ * The invalid label must be first to count as clearing attempt.
+ */
+ if (!rc || (rc == -EINVAL && list_empty(&list_tmp))) {
+ mutex_lock(&smack_onlycap_lock);
+ smk_list_swap_rcu(&smack_onlycap_list, &list_tmp);
+ mutex_unlock(&smack_onlycap_lock);
+ rc = count;
+ }
+
+ smk_destroy_label_list(&list_tmp);
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations smk_onlycap_ops = {
+ .open = smk_open_onlycap,
+ .read = seq_read,
+ .write = smk_write_onlycap,
+ .llseek = seq_lseek,
+ .release = seq_release,
+};
+
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
+/**
+ * smk_read_unconfined - read() for smackfs/unconfined
+ * @filp: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to put the result
+ * @cn: maximum to send along
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ *
+ * Returns number of bytes read or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_read_unconfined(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+ size_t cn, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ char *smack = "";
+ ssize_t rc = -EINVAL;
+ int asize;
+
+ if (*ppos != 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (smack_unconfined != NULL)
+ smack = smack_unconfined->smk_known;
+
+ asize = strlen(smack) + 1;
+
+ if (cn >= asize)
+ rc = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, cn, ppos, smack, asize);
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_write_unconfined - write() for smackfs/unconfined
+ * @file: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to get the data from
+ * @count: bytes sent
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ *
+ * Returns number of bytes written or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_write_unconfined(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ char *data;
+ struct smack_known *skp;
+ int rc = count;
+
+ if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ data = kzalloc(count + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (data == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(data, buf, count) != 0) {
+ rc = -EFAULT;
+ goto freeout;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Clear the smack_unconfined on invalid label errors. This means
+ * that we can pass a null string to unset the unconfined value.
+ *
+ * Importing will also reject a label beginning with '-',
+ * so "-confine" will also work.
+ *
+ * But do so only on invalid label, not on system errors.
+ */
+ skp = smk_import_entry(data, count);
+ if (PTR_ERR(skp) == -EINVAL)
+ skp = NULL;
+ else if (IS_ERR(skp)) {
+ rc = PTR_ERR(skp);
+ goto freeout;
+ }
+
+ smack_unconfined = skp;
+
+freeout:
+ kfree(data);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations smk_unconfined_ops = {
+ .read = smk_read_unconfined,
+ .write = smk_write_unconfined,
+ .llseek = default_llseek,
+};
+#endif /* CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP */
+
+/**
+ * smk_read_logging - read() for /smack/logging
+ * @filp: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to put the result
+ * @cn: maximum to send along
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ *
+ * Returns number of bytes read or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_read_logging(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ char temp[32];
+ ssize_t rc;
+
+ if (*ppos != 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ sprintf(temp, "%d\n", log_policy);
+ rc = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, temp, strlen(temp));
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_write_logging - write() for /smack/logging
+ * @file: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to get the data from
+ * @count: bytes sent
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ *
+ * Returns number of bytes written or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_write_logging(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ char temp[32];
+ int i;
+
+ if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ if (count >= sizeof(temp) || count == 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(temp, buf, count) != 0)
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ temp[count] = '\0';
+
+ if (sscanf(temp, "%d", &i) != 1)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (i < 0 || i > 3)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ log_policy = i;
+ return count;
+}
+
+
+
+static const struct file_operations smk_logging_ops = {
+ .read = smk_read_logging,
+ .write = smk_write_logging,
+ .llseek = default_llseek,
+};
+
+/*
+ * Seq_file read operations for /smack/load-self
+ */
+
+static void *load_self_seq_start(struct seq_file *s, loff_t *pos)
+{
+ struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
+
+ return smk_seq_start(s, pos, &tsp->smk_rules);
+}
+
+static void *load_self_seq_next(struct seq_file *s, void *v, loff_t *pos)
+{
+ struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
+
+ return smk_seq_next(s, v, pos, &tsp->smk_rules);
+}
+
+static int load_self_seq_show(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
+{
+ struct list_head *list = v;
+ struct smack_rule *srp =
+ list_entry_rcu(list, struct smack_rule, list);
+
+ smk_rule_show(s, srp, SMK_LABELLEN);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static const struct seq_operations load_self_seq_ops = {
+ .start = load_self_seq_start,
+ .next = load_self_seq_next,
+ .show = load_self_seq_show,
+ .stop = smk_seq_stop,
+};
+
+
+/**
+ * smk_open_load_self - open() for /smack/load-self2
+ * @inode: inode structure representing file
+ * @file: "load" file pointer
+ *
+ * For reading, use load_seq_* seq_file reading operations.
+ */
+static int smk_open_load_self(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+ return seq_open(file, &load_self_seq_ops);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_write_load_self - write() for /smack/load-self
+ * @file: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to get the data from
+ * @count: bytes sent
+ * @ppos: where to start - must be 0
+ *
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_write_load_self(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
+
+ return smk_write_rules_list(file, buf, count, ppos, &tsp->smk_rules,
+ &tsp->smk_rules_lock, SMK_FIXED24_FMT);
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations smk_load_self_ops = {
+ .open = smk_open_load_self,
+ .read = seq_read,
+ .llseek = seq_lseek,
+ .write = smk_write_load_self,
+ .release = seq_release,
+};
+
+/**
+ * smk_user_access - handle access check transaction
+ * @file: file pointer
+ * @buf: data from user space
+ * @count: bytes sent
+ * @ppos: where to start - must be 0
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_user_access(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos, int format)
+{
+ struct smack_parsed_rule rule;
+ char *data;
+ int res;
+
+ data = simple_transaction_get(file, buf, count);
+ if (IS_ERR(data))
+ return PTR_ERR(data);
+
+ if (format == SMK_FIXED24_FMT) {
+ if (count < SMK_LOADLEN)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ res = smk_parse_rule(data, &rule, 0);
+ } else {
+ /*
+ * simple_transaction_get() returns null-terminated data
+ */
+ res = smk_parse_long_rule(data, &rule, 0, 3);
+ }
+
+ if (res >= 0)
+ res = smk_access(rule.smk_subject, rule.smk_object,
+ rule.smk_access1, NULL);
+ else if (res != -ENOENT)
+ return res;
+
+ /*
+ * smk_access() can return a value > 0 in the "bringup" case.
+ */
+ data[0] = res >= 0 ? '1' : '0';
+ data[1] = '\0';
+
+ simple_transaction_set(file, 2);
+
+ if (format == SMK_FIXED24_FMT)
+ return SMK_LOADLEN;
+ return count;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_write_access - handle access check transaction
+ * @file: file pointer
+ * @buf: data from user space
+ * @count: bytes sent
+ * @ppos: where to start - must be 0
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_write_access(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ return smk_user_access(file, buf, count, ppos, SMK_FIXED24_FMT);
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations smk_access_ops = {
+ .write = smk_write_access,
+ .read = simple_transaction_read,
+ .release = simple_transaction_release,
+ .llseek = generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
+
+/*
+ * Seq_file read operations for /smack/load2
+ */
+
+static int load2_seq_show(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
+{
+ struct list_head *list = v;
+ struct smack_master_list *smlp =
+ list_entry_rcu(list, struct smack_master_list, list);
+
+ smk_rule_show(s, smlp->smk_rule, SMK_LONGLABEL);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static const struct seq_operations load2_seq_ops = {
+ .start = load2_seq_start,
+ .next = load2_seq_next,
+ .show = load2_seq_show,
+ .stop = smk_seq_stop,
+};
+
+/**
+ * smk_open_load2 - open() for /smack/load2
+ * @inode: inode structure representing file
+ * @file: "load2" file pointer
+ *
+ * For reading, use load2_seq_* seq_file reading operations.
+ */
+static int smk_open_load2(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+ return seq_open(file, &load2_seq_ops);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_write_load2 - write() for /smack/load2
+ * @file: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to get the data from
+ * @count: bytes sent
+ * @ppos: where to start - must be 0
+ *
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_write_load2(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ /*
+ * Must have privilege.
+ */
+ if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ return smk_write_rules_list(file, buf, count, ppos, NULL, NULL,
+ SMK_LONG_FMT);
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations smk_load2_ops = {
+ .open = smk_open_load2,
+ .read = seq_read,
+ .llseek = seq_lseek,
+ .write = smk_write_load2,
+ .release = seq_release,
+};
+
+/*
+ * Seq_file read operations for /smack/load-self2
+ */
+
+static void *load_self2_seq_start(struct seq_file *s, loff_t *pos)
+{
+ struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
+
+ return smk_seq_start(s, pos, &tsp->smk_rules);
+}
+
+static void *load_self2_seq_next(struct seq_file *s, void *v, loff_t *pos)
+{
+ struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
+
+ return smk_seq_next(s, v, pos, &tsp->smk_rules);
+}
+
+static int load_self2_seq_show(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
+{
+ struct list_head *list = v;
+ struct smack_rule *srp =
+ list_entry_rcu(list, struct smack_rule, list);
+
+ smk_rule_show(s, srp, SMK_LONGLABEL);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static const struct seq_operations load_self2_seq_ops = {
+ .start = load_self2_seq_start,
+ .next = load_self2_seq_next,
+ .show = load_self2_seq_show,
+ .stop = smk_seq_stop,
+};
+
+/**
+ * smk_open_load_self2 - open() for /smack/load-self2
+ * @inode: inode structure representing file
+ * @file: "load" file pointer
+ *
+ * For reading, use load_seq_* seq_file reading operations.
+ */
+static int smk_open_load_self2(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+ return seq_open(file, &load_self2_seq_ops);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_write_load_self2 - write() for /smack/load-self2
+ * @file: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to get the data from
+ * @count: bytes sent
+ * @ppos: where to start - must be 0
+ *
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_write_load_self2(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
+
+ return smk_write_rules_list(file, buf, count, ppos, &tsp->smk_rules,
+ &tsp->smk_rules_lock, SMK_LONG_FMT);
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations smk_load_self2_ops = {
+ .open = smk_open_load_self2,
+ .read = seq_read,
+ .llseek = seq_lseek,
+ .write = smk_write_load_self2,
+ .release = seq_release,
+};
+
+/**
+ * smk_write_access2 - handle access check transaction
+ * @file: file pointer
+ * @buf: data from user space
+ * @count: bytes sent
+ * @ppos: where to start - must be 0
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_write_access2(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ return smk_user_access(file, buf, count, ppos, SMK_LONG_FMT);
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations smk_access2_ops = {
+ .write = smk_write_access2,
+ .read = simple_transaction_read,
+ .release = simple_transaction_release,
+ .llseek = generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
+/**
+ * smk_write_revoke_subj - write() for /smack/revoke-subject
+ * @file: file pointer
+ * @buf: data from user space
+ * @count: bytes sent
+ * @ppos: where to start - must be 0
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_write_revoke_subj(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ char *data;
+ const char *cp;
+ struct smack_known *skp;
+ struct smack_rule *sp;
+ struct list_head *rule_list;
+ struct mutex *rule_lock;
+ int rc = count;
+
+ if (*ppos != 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ if (count == 0 || count > SMK_LONGLABEL)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ data = kzalloc(count, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (data == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(data, buf, count) != 0) {
+ rc = -EFAULT;
+ goto out_data;
+ }
+
+ cp = smk_parse_smack(data, count);
+ if (IS_ERR(cp)) {
+ rc = PTR_ERR(cp);
+ goto out_data;
+ }
+
+ skp = smk_find_entry(cp);
+ if (skp == NULL)
+ goto out_cp;
+
+ rule_list = &skp->smk_rules;
+ rule_lock = &skp->smk_rules_lock;
+
+ mutex_lock(rule_lock);
+
+ list_for_each_entry_rcu(sp, rule_list, list)
+ sp->smk_access = 0;
+
+ mutex_unlock(rule_lock);
+
+out_cp:
+ kfree(cp);
+out_data:
+ kfree(data);
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations smk_revoke_subj_ops = {
+ .write = smk_write_revoke_subj,
+ .read = simple_transaction_read,
+ .release = simple_transaction_release,
+ .llseek = generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
+/**
+ * smk_init_sysfs - initialize /sys/fs/smackfs
+ *
+ */
+static int smk_init_sysfs(void)
+{
+ return sysfs_create_mount_point(fs_kobj, "smackfs");
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_write_change_rule - write() for /smack/change-rule
+ * @file: file pointer
+ * @buf: data from user space
+ * @count: bytes sent
+ * @ppos: where to start - must be 0
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_write_change_rule(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ /*
+ * Must have privilege.
+ */
+ if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ return smk_write_rules_list(file, buf, count, ppos, NULL, NULL,
+ SMK_CHANGE_FMT);
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations smk_change_rule_ops = {
+ .write = smk_write_change_rule,
+ .read = simple_transaction_read,
+ .release = simple_transaction_release,
+ .llseek = generic_file_llseek,
+};
+
+/**
+ * smk_read_syslog - read() for smackfs/syslog
+ * @filp: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to put the result
+ * @cn: maximum to send along
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ *
+ * Returns number of bytes read or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_read_syslog(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+ size_t cn, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ struct smack_known *skp;
+ ssize_t rc = -EINVAL;
+ int asize;
+
+ if (*ppos != 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (smack_syslog_label == NULL)
+ skp = &smack_known_star;
+ else
+ skp = smack_syslog_label;
+
+ asize = strlen(skp->smk_known) + 1;
+
+ if (cn >= asize)
+ rc = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, cn, ppos, skp->smk_known,
+ asize);
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_write_syslog - write() for smackfs/syslog
+ * @file: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to get the data from
+ * @count: bytes sent
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ *
+ * Returns number of bytes written or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_write_syslog(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ char *data;
+ struct smack_known *skp;
+ int rc = count;
+
+ if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ data = kzalloc(count + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (data == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(data, buf, count) != 0)
+ rc = -EFAULT;
+ else {
+ skp = smk_import_entry(data, count);
+ if (IS_ERR(skp))
+ rc = PTR_ERR(skp);
+ else
+ smack_syslog_label = skp;
+ }
+
+ kfree(data);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations smk_syslog_ops = {
+ .read = smk_read_syslog,
+ .write = smk_write_syslog,
+ .llseek = default_llseek,
+};
+
+/*
+ * Seq_file read operations for /smack/relabel-self
+ */
+
+static void *relabel_self_seq_start(struct seq_file *s, loff_t *pos)
+{
+ struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
+
+ return smk_seq_start(s, pos, &tsp->smk_relabel);
+}
+
+static void *relabel_self_seq_next(struct seq_file *s, void *v, loff_t *pos)
+{
+ struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
+
+ return smk_seq_next(s, v, pos, &tsp->smk_relabel);
+}
+
+static int relabel_self_seq_show(struct seq_file *s, void *v)
+{
+ struct list_head *list = v;
+ struct smack_known_list_elem *sklep =
+ list_entry(list, struct smack_known_list_elem, list);
+
+ seq_puts(s, sklep->smk_label->smk_known);
+ seq_putc(s, ' ');
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static const struct seq_operations relabel_self_seq_ops = {
+ .start = relabel_self_seq_start,
+ .next = relabel_self_seq_next,
+ .show = relabel_self_seq_show,
+ .stop = smk_seq_stop,
+};
+
+/**
+ * smk_open_relabel_self - open() for /smack/relabel-self
+ * @inode: inode structure representing file
+ * @file: "relabel-self" file pointer
+ *
+ * Connect our relabel_self_seq_* operations with /smack/relabel-self
+ * file_operations
+ */
+static int smk_open_relabel_self(struct inode *inode, struct file *file)
+{
+ return seq_open(file, &relabel_self_seq_ops);
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_write_relabel_self - write() for /smack/relabel-self
+ * @file: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to get the data from
+ * @count: bytes sent
+ * @ppos: where to start - must be 0
+ *
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_write_relabel_self(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ struct task_smack *tsp = current_security();
+ char *data;
+ int rc;
+ LIST_HEAD(list_tmp);
+
+ /*
+ * Must have privilege.
+ */
+ if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ /*
+ * Enough data must be present.
+ */
+ if (*ppos != 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ data = kzalloc(count + 1, GFP_KERNEL);
+ if (data == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(data, buf, count) != 0) {
+ kfree(data);
+ return -EFAULT;
+ }
+
+ rc = smk_parse_label_list(data, &list_tmp);
+ kfree(data);
+
+ if (!rc || (rc == -EINVAL && list_empty(&list_tmp))) {
+ smk_destroy_label_list(&tsp->smk_relabel);
+ list_splice(&list_tmp, &tsp->smk_relabel);
+ return count;
+ }
+
+ smk_destroy_label_list(&list_tmp);
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations smk_relabel_self_ops = {
+ .open = smk_open_relabel_self,
+ .read = seq_read,
+ .llseek = seq_lseek,
+ .write = smk_write_relabel_self,
+ .release = seq_release,
+};
+
+/**
+ * smk_read_ptrace - read() for /smack/ptrace
+ * @filp: file pointer, not actually used
+ * @buf: where to put the result
+ * @count: maximum to send along
+ * @ppos: where to start
+ *
+ * Returns number of bytes read or error code, as appropriate
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_read_ptrace(struct file *filp, char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ char temp[32];
+ ssize_t rc;
+
+ if (*ppos != 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ sprintf(temp, "%d\n", smack_ptrace_rule);
+ rc = simple_read_from_buffer(buf, count, ppos, temp, strlen(temp));
+ return rc;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_write_ptrace - write() for /smack/ptrace
+ * @file: file pointer
+ * @buf: data from user space
+ * @count: bytes sent
+ * @ppos: where to start - must be 0
+ */
+static ssize_t smk_write_ptrace(struct file *file, const char __user *buf,
+ size_t count, loff_t *ppos)
+{
+ char temp[32];
+ int i;
+
+ if (!smack_privileged(CAP_MAC_ADMIN))
+ return -EPERM;
+
+ if (*ppos != 0 || count >= sizeof(temp) || count == 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ if (copy_from_user(temp, buf, count) != 0)
+ return -EFAULT;
+
+ temp[count] = '\0';
+
+ if (sscanf(temp, "%d", &i) != 1)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ if (i < SMACK_PTRACE_DEFAULT || i > SMACK_PTRACE_MAX)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ smack_ptrace_rule = i;
+
+ return count;
+}
+
+static const struct file_operations smk_ptrace_ops = {
+ .write = smk_write_ptrace,
+ .read = smk_read_ptrace,
+ .llseek = default_llseek,
+};
+
+/**
+ * smk_fill_super - fill the smackfs superblock
+ * @sb: the empty superblock
+ * @data: unused
+ * @silent: unused
+ *
+ * Fill in the well known entries for the smack filesystem
+ *
+ * Returns 0 on success, an error code on failure
+ */
+static int smk_fill_super(struct super_block *sb, void *data, int silent)
+{
+ int rc;
+ struct inode *root_inode;
+
+ static struct tree_descr smack_files[] = {
+ [SMK_LOAD] = {
+ "load", &smk_load_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+ [SMK_CIPSO] = {
+ "cipso", &smk_cipso_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+ [SMK_DOI] = {
+ "doi", &smk_doi_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+ [SMK_DIRECT] = {
+ "direct", &smk_direct_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+ [SMK_AMBIENT] = {
+ "ambient", &smk_ambient_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+ [SMK_NET4ADDR] = {
+ "netlabel", &smk_net4addr_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+ [SMK_ONLYCAP] = {
+ "onlycap", &smk_onlycap_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+ [SMK_LOGGING] = {
+ "logging", &smk_logging_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+ [SMK_LOAD_SELF] = {
+ "load-self", &smk_load_self_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO},
+ [SMK_ACCESSES] = {
+ "access", &smk_access_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO},
+ [SMK_MAPPED] = {
+ "mapped", &smk_mapped_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+ [SMK_LOAD2] = {
+ "load2", &smk_load2_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+ [SMK_LOAD_SELF2] = {
+ "load-self2", &smk_load_self2_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO},
+ [SMK_ACCESS2] = {
+ "access2", &smk_access2_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO},
+ [SMK_CIPSO2] = {
+ "cipso2", &smk_cipso2_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+ [SMK_REVOKE_SUBJ] = {
+ "revoke-subject", &smk_revoke_subj_ops,
+ S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+ [SMK_CHANGE_RULE] = {
+ "change-rule", &smk_change_rule_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+ [SMK_SYSLOG] = {
+ "syslog", &smk_syslog_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+ [SMK_PTRACE] = {
+ "ptrace", &smk_ptrace_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+#ifdef CONFIG_SECURITY_SMACK_BRINGUP
+ [SMK_UNCONFINED] = {
+ "unconfined", &smk_unconfined_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+#endif
+#if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_IPV6)
+ [SMK_NET6ADDR] = {
+ "ipv6host", &smk_net6addr_ops, S_IRUGO|S_IWUSR},
+#endif /* CONFIG_IPV6 */
+ [SMK_RELABEL_SELF] = {
+ "relabel-self", &smk_relabel_self_ops,
+ S_IRUGO|S_IWUGO},
+ /* last one */
+ {""}
+ };
+
+ rc = simple_fill_super(sb, SMACK_MAGIC, smack_files);
+ if (rc != 0) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "%s failed %d while creating inodes\n",
+ __func__, rc);
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ root_inode = d_inode(sb->s_root);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/**
+ * smk_mount - get the smackfs superblock
+ * @fs_type: passed along without comment
+ * @flags: passed along without comment
+ * @dev_name: passed along without comment
+ * @data: passed along without comment
+ *
+ * Just passes everything along.
+ *
+ * Returns what the lower level code does.
+ */
+static struct dentry *smk_mount(struct file_system_type *fs_type,
+ int flags, const char *dev_name, void *data)
+{
+ return mount_single(fs_type, flags, data, smk_fill_super);
+}
+
+static struct file_system_type smk_fs_type = {
+ .name = "smackfs",
+ .mount = smk_mount,
+ .kill_sb = kill_litter_super,
+};
+
+static struct vfsmount *smackfs_mount;
+
+static int __init smk_preset_netlabel(struct smack_known *skp)
+{
+ skp->smk_netlabel.domain = skp->smk_known;
+ skp->smk_netlabel.flags =
+ NETLBL_SECATTR_DOMAIN | NETLBL_SECATTR_MLS_LVL;
+ return smk_netlbl_mls(smack_cipso_direct, skp->smk_known,
+ &skp->smk_netlabel, strlen(skp->smk_known));
+}
+
+/**
+ * init_smk_fs - get the smackfs superblock
+ *
+ * register the smackfs
+ *
+ * Do not register smackfs if Smack wasn't enabled
+ * on boot. We can not put this method normally under the
+ * smack_init() code path since the security subsystem get
+ * initialized before the vfs caches.
+ *
+ * Returns true if we were not chosen on boot or if
+ * we were chosen and filesystem registration succeeded.
+ */
+static int __init init_smk_fs(void)
+{
+ int err;
+ int rc;
+
+ if (smack_enabled == 0)
+ return 0;
+
+ err = smk_init_sysfs();
+ if (err)
+ printk(KERN_ERR "smackfs: sysfs mountpoint problem.\n");
+
+ err = register_filesystem(&smk_fs_type);
+ if (!err) {
+ smackfs_mount = kern_mount(&smk_fs_type);
+ if (IS_ERR(smackfs_mount)) {
+ printk(KERN_ERR "smackfs: could not mount!\n");
+ err = PTR_ERR(smackfs_mount);
+ smackfs_mount = NULL;
+ }
+ }
+
+ smk_cipso_doi();
+ smk_unlbl_ambient(NULL);
+
+ rc = smk_preset_netlabel(&smack_known_floor);
+ if (err == 0 && rc < 0)
+ err = rc;
+ rc = smk_preset_netlabel(&smack_known_hat);
+ if (err == 0 && rc < 0)
+ err = rc;
+ rc = smk_preset_netlabel(&smack_known_huh);
+ if (err == 0 && rc < 0)
+ err = rc;
+ rc = smk_preset_netlabel(&smack_known_invalid);
+ if (err == 0 && rc < 0)
+ err = rc;
+ rc = smk_preset_netlabel(&smack_known_star);
+ if (err == 0 && rc < 0)
+ err = rc;
+ rc = smk_preset_netlabel(&smack_known_web);
+ if (err == 0 && rc < 0)
+ err = rc;
+
+ return err;
+}
+
+__initcall(init_smk_fs);