ipsec: make pre-shared keys harder to misuse
Using pre-shared keys is usually a bad idea, one should use eg. IKEv2
instead, but one does not always have the choice.
For AES-CBC, the IV must be unpredictable (see NIST SP800-38a Appendix
C) whereas for AES-CTR or AES-GCM, the IV should never be reused with
the same key material (see NIST SP800-38a Appendix B and NIST SP800-38d
section 8).
If one uses pre-shared keys and VPP is restarted, the IV counter
restarts at 0 and the same IVs are generated with the same pre-shared
keys materials.
To fix those issues we follow the recommendation from NIST SP800-38a
and NIST SP800-38d:
- we use a PRNG (not cryptographically secured) to generate IVs to
avoid generating the same IV sequence between VPP restarts. The PRNG is
chosen so that there is a low chance of generating the same sequence
- for AES-CBC, the generated IV is encrypted as part of the message.
This makes the (predictable) PRNG-generated IV unpredictable as it is
encrypted with the secret key
- for AES-CTR and GCM, we use the IV as-is as predictable IVs are fine
Most of the changes in this patch are caused by the need to shoehorn an
additional state of 2 u64 for the PRNG in the 1st cacheline of the SA
object.
Type: improvement
Change-Id: I2af89c21ae4b2c4c33dd21aeffcfb79c13c9d84c
Signed-off-by: Benoît Ganne <bganne@cisco.com>
diff --git a/src/vnet/ipsec/ipsec.c b/src/vnet/ipsec/ipsec.c
index 3ea2e4d..86cb898 100644
--- a/src/vnet/ipsec/ipsec.c
+++ b/src/vnet/ipsec/ipsec.c
@@ -408,10 +408,7 @@
/* change SA crypto op data */
pool_foreach (sa, ipsec_sa_pool)
- {
- sa->crypto_op_data =
- (is_enabled ? sa->async_op_data.data : sa->sync_op_data.data);
- }
+ ipsec_sa_set_async_mode (sa, is_enabled);
}
static void