blob: 27cef6553dd4fc249d1ca95a08eca3648eb89b69 [file] [log] [blame]
#include "dnsmasq.h"
#include <assert.h>
#define SERIAL_UNDEF -100
#define SERIAL_EQ 0
#define SERIAL_LT -1
#define SERIAL_GT 1
#define countof(x) (long)(sizeof(x) / sizeof(x[0]))
#define MIN(a,b) ((a) < (b) ? (a) : (b))
/*
* vtable for a signature verification algorithm.
*
* Each algorithm verifies that a certain signature over a (possibly non-contigous)
* array of data has been made with the specified key.
*
* Sample of usage:
*
* // First, set the signature we need to check. Notice: data is not copied
* // nor consumed, so the pointer must stay valid.
* alg->set_signature(sig, 16);
*
* // Second, push the data in; data is consumed immediately, so the buffer
* // can be freed or modified.
* alg->begin_data();
* alg->add_data(buf1, 123);
* alg->add_data(buf2, 45);
* alg->add_data(buf3, 678);
* alg->end_data();
*
* // Third, verify if we got the correct key for this signature.
* alg->verify(key1, 16);
* alg->verify(key2, 16);
*/
typedef struct
{
int (*set_signature)(unsigned char *data, unsigned len);
void (*begin_data)(void);
void (*add_data)(void *data, unsigned len);
void (*end_data)(void);
int (*verify)(unsigned char *key, unsigned key_len);
} VerifyAlg;
/* RFC4034, Appendix A.1: only algorithm 3 (DSA/SHA1) and 5 (RSA/SHA1) are
currently valid for zone-signing. */
static const VerifyAlg valgs[6] =
{
{0,0,0,0,0}, /* 0: reserved */
{0,0,0,0,0}, /* 1: RSA/MD5 */
{0,0,0,0,0}, /* 2: DH */
{0,0,0,0,0}, /* 3: DSA/SHA1 */
{0,0,0,0,0}, /* 4: ECC */
{0,0,0,0,0}, /* 5: RSA/SHA1 */
};
/* Implement RFC1982 wrapped compare for 32-bit numbers */
static int serial_compare_32(unsigned long s1, unsigned long s2)
{
if (s1 == s2)
return SERIAL_EQ;
if ((s1 < s2 && (s2 - s1) < (1UL<<31)) ||
(s1 > s2 && (s1 - s2) > (1UL<<31)))
return SERIAL_LT;
if ((s1 < s2 && (s2 - s1) > (1UL<<31)) ||
(s1 > s2 && (s1 - s2) < (1UL<<31)))
return SERIAL_GT;
return SERIAL_UNDEF;
}
/* Extract a DNS name from wire format, without handling compression. This is
faster than extract_name() and does not require access to the full dns
packet. */
static int extract_name_no_compression(unsigned char *rr, int maxlen, char *buf)
{
unsigned char *start=rr, *end = rr+maxlen;
int count;
while (rr < end && *rr != 0)
{
count = *rr++;
while (count-- >= 0 && rr < end)
{
*buf = *rr++;
if (*buf >= 'A' && *buf <= 'Z')
*buf += 'a' - 'A';
buf++;
}
*buf++ = '.';
}
*buf = 0;
if (rr == end)
return 0;
return rr-start;
}
/* Check whether today/now is between date_start and date_end */
static int check_date_range(unsigned long date_start, unsigned long date_end)
{
/* TODO: double-check that time(0) is the correct time we are looking for */
/* TODO: dnssec requires correct timing; implement SNTP in dnsmasq? */
unsigned long curtime = time(0);
/* We must explicitly check against wanted values, because of SERIAL_UNDEF */
if (serial_compare_32(curtime, date_start) != SERIAL_GT)
return 0;
if (serial_compare_32(curtime, date_end) != SERIAL_LT)
return 0;
return 1;
}
/* Sort RRs within a RRset in canonical order, according to RFC4034, ยง6.3
Notice that the RRDATA sections have been already normalized, so a memcpy
is sufficient.
NOTE: r1/r2 point immediately after the owner name. */
static int rrset_canonical_order(const void *r1, const void *r2)
{
int r1len, r2len, res;
const unsigned char *pr1=r1, *pr2=r2;
pr1 += 8; pr2 += 8;
GETSHORT(r1len, pr1); GETSHORT(r2len, pr2);
/* Lexicographically compare RDATA (thus, if equal, smaller length wins) */
res = memcmp(pr1, pr2, MIN(r1len, r2len));
if (res == 0)
{
if (r1len < r2len)
return -1;
else
/* NOTE: RFC2181 says that an RRset is not allowed to contain duplicate
records. If it happens, it is a protocol error and anything goes. */
return 1;
}
return res;
}
static int validate_rrsig(struct dns_header *header, size_t pktlen,
unsigned char *reply, int count, char *owner,
int sigclass, int sigrdlen, unsigned char *sig)
{
int i, res;
int sigtype, sigalg, siglbl;
unsigned char *sigrdata = sig;
unsigned long sigttl, date_end, date_start;
unsigned char* p = reply;
char* signer_name = daemon->namebuff;
int keytag;
void *rrset[16]; /* TODO: max RRset size? */
int rrsetidx = 0;
if (sigrdlen < 18)
return 0;
GETSHORT(sigtype, sig);
sigalg = *sig++;
siglbl = *sig++;
GETLONG(sigttl, sig);
GETLONG(date_end, sig);
GETLONG(date_start, sig);
GETSHORT(keytag, sig);
sigrdlen -= 18;
if (sigalg >= countof(valgs) || !valgs[sigalg].set_signature)
{
printf("RRSIG algorithm not supported: %d\n", sigalg);
return 0;
}
if (!check_date_range(ntohl(date_start), ntohl(date_end)))
{
printf("RRSIG outside date range\n");
return 0;
}
/* Iterate within the answer and find the RRsets matching the current RRsig */
for (i = 0; i < count; ++i)
{
int qtype, qclass, rdlen;
if (!(res = extract_name(header, pktlen, &p, owner, 0, 10)))
return 0;
rrset[rrsetidx] = p;
GETSHORT(qtype, p);
GETSHORT(qclass, p);
p += 4; /* skip ttl */
GETSHORT(rdlen, p);
if (res == 1 && qtype == sigtype && qclass == sigclass)
{
++rrsetidx;
assert(rrsetidx < countof(rrset));
/* TODO: here we should convert to lowercase domain names within
RDATA. We can do it in place. */
}
p += rdlen;
}
/* Sort RRset records in canonical order. */
qsort(rrset, rrsetidx, sizeof(void*), rrset_canonical_order);
/* Extract the signer name (we need to query DNSKEY of this name) */
if (!(res = extract_name_no_compression(sig, sigrdlen, signer_name)))
return 0;
sig += res; sigrdlen -= res;
/* Now initialize the signature verification algorithm and process the whole
RRset */
const VerifyAlg *alg = &valgs[sigalg];
if (!alg->set_signature(sig, sigrdlen))
return 0;
alg->begin_data();
alg->add_data(sigrdata, 18);
alg->add_data(signer_name, strlen(signer_name)-1); /* remove trailing dot */
for (i = 0; i < rrsetidx; ++i)
{
int rdlen;
alg->add_data(owner, strlen(owner));
alg->add_data(&sigtype, 2);
alg->add_data(&sigclass, 2);
alg->add_data(&sigttl, 4);
p = (unsigned char*)(rrset[i]);
p += 8;
GETSHORT(rdlen, p);
alg->add_data(p-2, rdlen+2);
}
alg->end_data();
/* TODO: now we need to fetch the DNSKEY of signer_name with the specified
keytag, and check whether it validates with the current algorithm. */
/*
pseudo-code:
char *key; int keylen;
if (!fetch_dnskey(signer_name, keytag, &key, &keylen))
return 0;
return alg->verify(key, keylen);
*/
return 0;
}
int dnssec_validate(struct dns_header *header, size_t pktlen)
{
unsigned char *p, *reply;
char *owner = daemon->namebuff;
int i, qtype, qclass, rdlen;
unsigned long ttl;
if (header->ancount == 0)
return 0;
if (!(reply = p = skip_questions(header, pktlen)))
return 0;
for (i = 0; i < ntohs(header->ancount); i++)
{
if (!extract_name(header, pktlen, &p, owner, 1, 10))
return 0;
GETSHORT(qtype, p);
GETSHORT(qclass, p);
GETLONG(ttl, p);
GETSHORT(rdlen, p);
if (qtype == T_RRSIG)
{
printf("RRSIG found\n");
/* TODO: missing logic. We should only validate RRSIGs for which we
have a valid DNSKEY that is referenced by a DS record upstream.
There is a memory vs CPU conflict here; should we validate everything
to save memory and thus waste CPU, or better first acquire all information
(wasting memory) and then doing the minimum CPU computations required? */
validate_rrsig(header, pktlen, reply, ntohs(header->ancount), owner, qclass, rdlen, p);
}
p += rdlen;
}
return 1;
}